Login
Article written by Zeynep G in 2005 and published on the website 'In Defence of Marxism'. Backup version can be located by pressing here.
-------
Cyprus is one of several countries that is to be admitted into the European Union in 2004. But there remains the problem of the unresolved national question on the island. Turkey's continued hold over the northern part of the island has become a major obstacle to Turkey being accepted as an EU member. The debate among the ruling elite in Turkey has swiftly turned into a blunt choice of "whether to abandon Cyprus or to annex it". This article by Zeynep Günes, a Turkish Marxist, presents a socialist perspective on the question of Cyprus.
As membership of Cyprus to the EU draws closer, the pressure exerted by liberals in the Turkish press on Denktas (the president of the so-called, but unrecognised KKTC, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) has been increasing. All of a sudden they have started to complain about how many millions of dollars Cyprus has cost Turkey in these hard times of economic crisis, and what a huge fetter this is for Turkey's entry into the EU. The debate has swiftly turned into a blunt choice of "whether to abandon Cyprus or annex it".
On top of this we have had the statements of TUSIAD, the most powerful organisation of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. They have announced that "Cyprus may be a strategically important island, but on the other hand we have the task of improving the living-standards of sixty-five million people by becoming a member of the EU, by becoming a rich country and part of the modern (civil) world. We cannot miss the opportunity simply because of the problem of Cyprus."
The debate became extremely heated when TUSIAD issued the statement in which they said, "we do not agree that Turkey's support for Rauf Denktas' uncompromising hard-line policy is correct." The pressure was becoming so strong that Denktas was compelled to do something at the end of the day. That same Denktas who had earlier tried his best to obstruct and avoid any negotiations was forced to approach Glafcos Clerides (leaders of the Greek speaking southern part of the island) to start new talks, the first round of which took place on August 4. Both before and after the meeting, the hawkish Denktas was compelled to smile and hinted that there existed the hope for a "solution".
Of course, the issue of EU membership is not the only element bringing about this change. In the current conjuncture, there are many coinciding factors: the US designs for a "new order" throughout the world starting with the Afghanistan War; the role of the Middle East in this plan; and the role that Turkey is supposed to play in this game. All these factors further complicate the balance in this region and means that the problem of Cyprus has to be placed within a broader framework. Thus we see another big power stepping in to ‘solve" the problem: the USA.
The formula of the "United States of Cyprus", which was spelled out by Denktas after the December 4 talks, was later revealed to be of US origin. The rumour is going round that an unofficial document has been prepared by US foreign ministry experts, which is presently being examined by both Turkey and Greece. The United Nations are said to be in favour of the document which is also supported by Turkey. Thus it is evident that when the official negotiations start, this will be one of the most important documents on the table.
Another aspect of the problem is that both the USA and the EU wish to use the island as a military base. It is not difficult to understand the crucial significance of Cyprus especially when we consider the potential of impending big conflicts in the Middle East. Once again Cyprus is seen as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" as was the case during the "Cold War" years.
In order to understand how the present situation came about and find where the real solution lies for the working-class, we have to look into the history of the Cyprus question.
Cyprus became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1571 and the first Turkish community was sent to the island in the same year. The Ottoman State, in order to get back the territories lost to Russia in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, rented the island to Britain in exchange for help, with the understanding that once the Ottomans got their territories back, the island was to be handed back to the Ottoman Empire. But when the Ottoman Empire backed Germany in World War I, Britain announced that it had annexed the island. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 confirmed the annexation of Cyprus and the island officially became a colony of Britain in 1925. At that time, the majority of the island's population consisted of Greeks with a minority of Turks.
In 1931, the island's Greek speaking population burnt down the British imperial governor's palace during a revolt against British imperialism. Britain then formed a police force from among the Turkish speaking population who had not taken part in the revolt, but had opposed it. Thus started the familiar British policy of Divide and Rule, playing off the Greeks and Turks against one another – with pogroms on both sides.
After the uprising, as the idea of Enosis (uniting with Greece) prevailed among the island's Greek population, Britain set about organizing the Turks as a counter-balancing force. In 1943, a British-manipulated organization, the Institution of the Turkish Minority of Cyprus Island (KATAK), was founded. However, this organisation proved incapable of achieving the desired influence. And in 1944, Dr. Faz?l Kucuk founded the National Turkish People Party of Cyprus.
The Communist Party of Cyprus (KKP), founded in 1926, had been declared illegal after the uprising of 1931. The KKP founded the AKEL in 1941 in order to carry on its legal activities. After three years of co-existence, in 1944 the KKP dissolved into AKEL. At that time, the anti-imperialist movement was led mainly by the AKEL and the Orthodox Church.
Since the 1950s, one of the most important factors that increased the importance of Cyprus were the oil reserves in the Middle East. Another factor was that Cyprus was an important base from which to intervene in the conflicts that erupted throughout the region (for instance in the Arab-Israeli conflict). Britain was losing its military bases throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, and therefore it gave great importance to Cyprus.
When we look at the position of the Turkish ruling class prior the 1950s we see an interesting picture. Prior to the 1950s, as Turkish senior officials declared at that time, "there was no such thing as the Cyprus" for Turkey. On January 23, 1950, the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, announced in the TBMM (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey) that "there is no such thing as the Cyprus question… our strong conviction is that Britain has no intention or inclination of handing Cyprus over to another state today. No matter what happens in Cyprus, the British government will not hand the island of Cyprus over to any other state. Therefore the stirrings among our youth are in vain." Again in July of the same year, Fuat Köprülü, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of the Democrat Party, also said that "there was no such problem."
Of course the most important factor determining this policy, that was maintained until the mid-1950s, was NATO. Turkey and Greece both joined NATO in 1952. Turkey was in favour of maintaining the status quo, and had no desire to be in conflict with Greece over Cyprus, which would have jeopardised its NATO membership. At the same time hysterical anti-communism, whipped up by NATO, was prevalent in both countries and this affected the whole policy to a great extent. It was the independence struggle on the part of the Greek Cypriots that was to force Greece to break with its indifference.
In 1954, Greece appealed to the United Nations to force Britain to acknowledge "the right of self-determination" for Cyprus. In the negotiations, Turkey lined up with Britain saying that the island was Britain's and the appeal was rejected. As a matter of fact, this attitude of Turkey siding with the colonialists is not an accident at all. During the independence struggles of Algeria and Tunisia against French colonialism, Turkey was on the side of France. And quite naturally, Turkey was seen as a pro-colonialist country in the eyes of the Middle East and other underdeveloped countries.
In order to stop such a strategically important island from falling under the sphere of influence of the USA, Britain attempted to legitimise its own presence on the island by drawing Turkey into the problem and creating a de facto Turkish-Greek conflict. In fact, the strengthening of both Greek and Turkish nationalism (which were both artificially intensified), suited the interests of Britain very well. In fact it was no accident that EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, founded on nationalistic bases in 1955) launched provocative attacks against ordinary people including the Turks. Nor was the granting of a seat to Turkey at the London Conference in the same year. The same applies to the plotting of the infamous November 6-7 incident coinciding with the last days of the conference.
On November 6, 1955, a state-sponsored newspaper spread the news that Atatürk's former house in Salonica (Thessaloniki) had been bombed. Then began the attacks on Greeks and other non-Muslims in Istanbul which devastated their houses, shops and churches. Three people were killed and 30 injured. The attacks were conducted in an extremely organized and well-prepared manner. Backed by the MAH (the then Turkish intelligence service), organisations such as the ‘Cyprus Belongs to Turkey Society' and the Union of Istanbul Higher Education Students effectively led the attacks. Immediately the government announced "communists" as the scapegoats, and a witch-hunt against them began. Only years later did a retired army general reveal the real perpetrators when he declared that "the incidents of November 6-7 were the act of the Special War Unit. It was a great operation and it achieved its aim." Also it was disclosed that the Turkish government itself had plotted the bombing of the house in Salonica (Thessaloniki).
At the same time, all over Turkey there were demonstrations organised by the state behind the main slogan of "Partition or Death!" School students and university students were stirred up to participate in the demonstrations. And thus with a massive campaign Cyprus became a "national cause".
At the same time, another campaign was started in Cyprus to decimate the left. In mid-December, AKEL and many left organizations were banned and all left publications were prohibited. Around 140 people were arrested and sent to the concentration camps and gaols. During the period of underground work, which lasted until December 1959, many left cadres were assassinated under the guidance of ringleader Grivas, one of the fascist leaders of the EOKA. In spite of this AKEL managed to maintain its underground struggle during this period.
Having started negotiations with Makarios for "autonomy" in early 1956, Britain had him arrested and sent into exile when he insisted on "the right of self-determination". [1] However, in July of the same year there was more bad news for Britain in the region. The Nasser government of Egypt announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the British military bases situated in Egypt were closed. In the meantime the struggle of the Greek Cypriots had intensified. Having lost its bases in Egypt, Britain was compelled to acknowledge "the right of self-determination" for fear of losing the whole of Cyprus, whose regional importance had been massively increased. But Britain added that its military bases on the island should remain.
In the same year, Turkey presented the idea of "partition" to the United Nations, which was originally the position of Britain. According to this idea the island was to be divided into Greek and Turkish parts and then these parts were to be joined to their own "fatherlands." This was perfectly suited the "divide and rule" policy of British imperialism.
EOKA announced a cease-fire in early 1957 after Makarios' release. On the other hand, during the same months NATO got involved in the question under the guise of "mediating" between Greece and Turkey. From then on, the process became more complicated and one plot followed another. On October 27, the former British imperial vice-attorney-general Rauf Denktas was appointed as chairman of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions. On November 29, an organisation called the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) appeared with its first leaflets. A year later, EOKA revived its attacks. In reply the TMT declared war on the Greeks as well. However, the TMT did not target only Greeks but also some Turkish workers who were in favour of peace and independence of the island. After a joint mass demonstration by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the TMT began murdering Turkish trade union members. In the same manner, left-wing Greek workers were murdered by the Greek chauvinists. In order to carry through the policies of imperialism, it was necessary to smash the will of the working class whose attitude in favour of fraternity, peace and independence was an obstacle.
As tension increased, Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO, came close to war. Following this, the new American backed formula of "independence" was introduced. With the signing of the Zurich-London Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance in 1959, Turkey, Greece and Britain became the guarantors of the Cypriot constitution.
With the Constitution of Cyprus in 1960, the island became a so-called "independent" country, but with British military bases still on the island. Turkey and Greece also had military forces on the island and Cyprus was not allowed to be member of any alliance in which Greece and Turkey were not also members. Also, the Cypriot people would not be permitted to amend the constitution, otherwise, as stated in the treaty, Britain, Turkey and Greece were entitled to intervene in order to "re-establish order."
The president of the newly-founded Republic of Cyprus was to be a Greek (Makarios) and the vice-president a Turk (Faz?l Küçük). In all decisions relating to political, military and security problems both the president and vice president had equal rights of veto. There were two official languages. The Assembly was to consist of 70% of Greeks and 30% of Turks. Seven ministers would be Greeks and three Turks, in a ten-person cabinet. Bear in mind that at that time, the Turkish population on the island was just 18% of the total population. The fact that they had a disproportionate representation of 30% and that they were accepted as an "equal" party meant that ground was already being prepared for the future conflicts.
After 1960, the electoral support of the pro-Soviet AKEL began to grow. At the same time the Republic of Cyprus became one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. This movement had been known for its close relations with the USSR. All these were sufficient reasons to cause Turkey and the imperialist bourgeoisie to have nightmares. As was stated in New York Times of December 12, 1961: "The Soviet Union can seize power in a democratic manner only in one country, that is Cyprus. After independence communist influence increased, the unemployment rate rose high. According to the forecasts of some diplomats, in a free election the communists can get 35% of the vote. When we remember the strategic significance of Cyprus, we understand how dangerous it is for the West." These fears of the "danger" would lead to an exacerbation of the designs and plots over Cyprus.
In November 1963, president Makarios attempted to amend the constitution in thirteen different clauses. This was partly because of EOKA's (The Organization of Cypriot Fighters) pressure. Most of the amendments were aimed at restricting the rights that had been given to the Turkish community in the constitution. The constitution had been based on the principle of the recognition of two different societies. For instance, the judicial and municipal services in each part were run by people from the respective communities within the existing order. The number of officials, MPs, soldiers and police were determined proportionally. The amendments involved a transition to a state with no separate rights for any single community. Thus the level of conflict increased. While Makarios took firm measures, the Turkish Cypriots leaders showed absolutely no interest in negotiations. Thus they abandoned parliament and all the other institutions beating the drum and accusing the other side that "they have thrown us out of the republic" (To this day, the seats reserved for the Turks are still empty in the Assembly of Republic of Cyprus).
Thereafter Turkey once again put forward the idea of partition. The intensified attacks on the Turkish speaking population, which led to 24 Turks being killed, together with their claims that there had been a violation of the constitution, were used as ground for intervention. And quoting past treaties, Turkey hinted at a possible intervention on the island. US president Johnson stated, in his famous letter of June 5, 1964, that the US was against a possible intervention on the island, warning Turkey in a "bitter tone". One month later, within the framework of a plan prepared by the US Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dean Acheson, negotiations with Greece and Turkey began.
According to Acheson's plan, there would be a region in the upper north-east of the island consisting of Turks and Turkey could station as many soldiers there as it wanted. However Makarios rejected the idea alleging, that it meant an indirect "partition", and no agreement could be reached. On August 8-9, Turkey bombed the Greek region of the island for two days, resulting in the death of 33 Greek Cypriots and 230 injured. The US and Britain remained silent about the bombing. In fact they gave it implicit support. A short while after the famous Johnson letter, Acheson said in his private talks with Nihat Erim (later prime minister of Turkey) and Turgut Sunalp, "as a friend, I tell you off the record that you can go and seize the region allocated to you with your military forces if you can do it without shedding much blood. The American fleet will not hinder you but protect you." That revealed the implicit support of the US for the intervention. This was because the plan that was being carried out meant that the island would come under indirect control of NATO.
The bombing of the island, despite Johnson's letter, did not mean that Turkey "stood up" to the US. To present things in this way is nothing but an exaggeration which serves only to prop up nationalism.
With the coup d'état of April 21, 1967, Greece entered a dark period under the rule of the Colonels' Junta. When the Junta rejected US requests to use Greek airports during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, a counter coup d'etat took place on November 25, 1973 against the former junta, which had lost the support of the US. And on July 15, 1974, a fascist coup d'état, led by Sampson, was carried out in Cyprus against the regime of Makarios, which was an attempt to set up a fascist-type administration. But five days after the coup, on July 20, 1974, Turkey invaded the North-Eastern part of the island and on July 23, both juntas in Greece and Cyprus collapsed. [2]
Turkey legitimised its invasion on the grounds of its entitlements stemming from the guarantor-treaties and this initially had the support of the West. At the same time, the invasion provided NATO with its long-desired chance of gaining a presence on the island. [3] The USSR, which had supported Makarios previously in the Non-Aligned Movement, also sided with Turkey in order to prevent the island passing under the sovereignty of Greece.
Nevertheless, through a second military operation on August 14, the Turkish army occupied 37% of the island's territory by pushing its troops forward. [4] The USSR withdrew its support when it realised that Turkey had no intention of putting Makarios [5] back at the head of government. Likewise, the US launched a three-year arms embargo beginning in February 1975.
Since the invasion, 40,000 Turkish Cypriots (at that time, one-third of the Turkish population in the island) have emigrated to Western countries, especially to Britain. On the other hand, Turkey started to send a lot of settlers to the island in order to increase the Turkish population. Having invaded the island under the guise of protecting the constitutional republic, Turkey abandoned its own pretext by setting up the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus (KTFD) on February 13, 1975 and installing Denktas as its president. According to the treaties of the same year, the Turkish population of the South and the Greek population of the North were exchanged and the people of the island were compelled to live in two separate regions according to their ethnic origins. On November 15, 1983, another step was taken with the declaration of an independent state, namely the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC). Interestingly, the "left" parties in the Turkish area, such as the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Social Liberation Party (TKP), acknowledged the decision by submitting to the threats of Denktas without any resistance. Thus, an internationally un-recognized, self-proclaimed "republic" was set up. The main figure in this process was Britain's former imperial attorney, and now Turkey's imperial governor, Denktas, the same man who had been trying to silence his rivals using every method possible for the previous 27 years.
Meanwhile, in Turkey the military dictatorship that had come to power in the September 12 (1980) coup had just come to an end and elections had taken place. But the government had not yet been formed. Turgut Ozal, the winner of the elections, together with the generals and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initially were not in favour of the proclamation of the KKTC. However, they had to accept Denktas' fait accompli, who had taken advantage of the situation, and they then recognised the KKTC.
The proclamation of this so-called state was the result of Denktas' personal calculations. According to the constitution of the KTFD, Denktas did not have the right to be elected for a third term to the presidency. However, with the proclamation of the new "state", both the constitution and the electoral system were changed and therefore the reign of Denktas and his party, the National Union Party (UBP), could be maintained for many more years.
After the partitioning of the island into two regions, in the wake of Turkish invasion, countless negotiations took place between the Turkish and the Greek sides, but no agreement has ever been reached. In this deadlock, both Turkey and Greece have played major roles, each considering the island a colony to be ruled by their respective governors. The question of Cyprus, just as the question of the Aegean islands, is stirred up whenever public opinion has to be diverted away from internal problems - a ploy that is still going on today. When the class struggle becomes intense, the ruling class puts nationalism back on the agenda by using Cyprus and the Aegean islands to push the fundamental problems into the background.
When we examine the views of the Turkish side in Cyprus, we see constant changes. From 1974 to the present day, Turkey initially offered a cantonal structure, then, with the foundation of the KTFD, jumped to the idea of a federation and then shifted to the idea of independence. But because nobody recognises this independence, the idea of confederation has been put into circulation. And despite their accepting the existence of two separate states on the island with the proclamation of the KKTC, Turkey and the KKTC insist on not recognizing the Republic of Cyprus. Above all, Turkey is adamantly opposes to the Republic of Cyprus joining the EU (the "Republic of Cyprus" which they refuse to recognise) and threatens the annexation of the north to Turkey if membership of the EU is accepted. This KKTC is so independent that speeches referring to annexation to Turkey receive standing ovations from the "president" of this so-called "independent state". With this position Turkey has ironically demonstrated how "independent" the KKTC really is, at the same time as it struggles to get the KKTC recognised on an international scale.
As to the economic situation… Northern Cyprus has become a paradise for laundering black money with its casinos, which have blossomed over the last years, and its suspect banks where organised crime and the MIT (National Intelligence Service of Turkey) rule supreme. Except for the private universities, it has hardly any income and the north of the island has become thoroughly dependent on Turkey. Most of the island's natives have emigrated abroad owing to the lack of employment. Now the number of Turks who were brought from Turkey as new settlers is nearly equal to the number of native Cypriot Turks and the majority of these newcomers are mainly lumpen-nationalist elements. This tends to sharpen the conflicts between these people and the native people.
As the EU accepted the application of the Republic of Cyprus as a candidate in 1993 the question of Cyprus has become an "official" EU problem and therefore it began to occupy a greater place in the membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The fact that Greece joined the EU in 1981 has been a great disadvantage for Turkey since Greece can use its right of veto in relation to the membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Having been compelled to make a lot of concessions before being accepted for membership, Turkey was finally accepted as an official candidate in 1999 at the Helsinki summit.
According to the decision taken in this summit the EU will decide on the Republic of Cyprus' membership in December 2002. If the Cyprus question has been solved, its membership will be approved. If not, a decision will be taken to consider who was responsible for the continuation of the problem. That is the main reason why Turkey is extremely alarmed. The "solution" to the problem of Cyprus is thus an urgent matter that can no longer be delayed in terms of both the membership of Turkey and of Cyprus. That means that, unlike in the past, the policy of evading or putting off a "solution" seems no longer possible. If Turkey continues to be a "troublemaker", the south of Cyprus could become an EU member regardless of the status of the northern part of the island. Although Turkey threatens to annex the north if such a scenarios were to become reality, neither Turkey nor Denktas know how to curb the population. Most of the Turkish Cypriots are in fact in favour of joining the EU together with the south. Despite all dangers involved, the rapidly increasing number of Turkish Cypriot applicants for Republic of Cyprus (Southern) passports demonstrates this. The path to EU membership for Turkey, in one way or another, passes through some form of a united Cyprus, which is what Turkey has always wished to avoid.
One of the reasons why Denktas and his colleagues do not want the Greek speaking part of Cyprus to join the EU is that the freedom of travel, settlement and property (the so-called "three freedoms") would then become almost impossible to restrict. One of the hard-line advocates of the Turkish policies, Gunduz Aktan, a columnist and a former ambassador, referred thus to the proposals made by Annan during the negotiations which Denktas abandoned: "In short, Annan ... implies that Turkey must accept the three freedoms beforehand. That means that the rich Greeks supported by mainland and American Greeks will come to the north with the aim of settlement and investment and will purchase the estates of poor Turks easily. They will be able to change the composition of the population and property of the north in a short time to their advantage. So the solution will bring about the liquidation of the Turks in a more civilized manner." (Radikal, January 10, 2001)
One must realise that there is a sizeable section of the people who stand for the status quo on the island. There are those who launder all their black money through the island, those who do not want to lose their rent thanks to the invasion, and those who were promoted from the position of imperial attorney general to the presidency together with their bootlickers. And there is a section of the Turkish bourgeoisie (which extends into the army, etc.) which is against Turkey's membership of the EU,. Of course, there are also their Greek counterparts as well.
Among the Turkish population on the island, which has been silent owing to years of intimidation and oppression, new dissident voices have begun to be heard over the last couple of years and this process has begun to accelerate. Big mass demonstrations have broken out since July 2000 as civil servants and public workers have not had their salaries paid, creating serious difficulty for them, and this is a direct reflection of the economic crisis in Turkey itself. Two months later, in September, as well as a massive rally, there was a general strike with the participation of 35,000 people. On the rallies, the workers expressed their anger against the economic measures which are being forced onto them in parallel with what is taking place in Turkey. They shouted slogans like "Ankara! We want neither your money, nor your package, nor your officials... We don't want to be slaves."
The austerity programme of hunger, poverty and repression imposed by the IMF on Turkey has simply been transmitted by Turkey onto northern Cyprus. KTÖS (the Teacher's Union of Turkish Cyprus) expressed its opposition to any attempt to coerce them into accepting such austerity measures with an advertisement in a daily newspaper, Avrupa (Europe), saying that "this country is ours, we are the ones who should rule." In reply to this, Denktas, this lackey of Ankara, said "I was shocked. This can only come from the Greek side," and added that "these kind of people shouldn't be allowed to teach." Moreover Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu accused the trade union of being "ungrateful," and pressure on the trade union has been stepped up. The leaders were arrested, union premises were raided, the teachers were forced to give statements and were taken to court with the intention of barring them from teaching. It did not stop there. Two writers of Avrupa, which stands for a united and independent republic on the island, were arrested on the accusation of "spying" and shortly afterwards its printing offices were set on fire. Curiously enough, there then appeared a new organization, namely the UHH (National People's Movement), founded by those who are in favour of union with Turkey and against joining the EU. In its public statements, it has raised its demands for union with Turkey, opposition to the EU and the need to wage "a firm struggle against the internal enemies." The leader of the organization is a former DP (the party of Denktas) member and an adviser to the president! Moreover, Denktas did not deny his obvious "sympathies" for the organisation and even said that although he was not the chairman of this organisation he would in fact have been proud to be running it. As can easily be guessed, the UHH stood behind the acts of sabotage and threats although it was not proved officially.
The pressures on the opposition, especially on the progressive layers of society, are still continuing. For instance, recently, a teacher, Nilgun Orhon, was barred from teaching and an investigation into her was launched after she wrote in Avrupa that the Turkish army should go home putting an end to the invasion. [6] A lot of members of the KTOS and other trade unions protested against this, but they were beaten and arrested. The KTOS, on December 12, organized a one-day warning strike in Lefkosa (Nicosia) and Magusa. The students also took part in the demonstrations refusing to attend school. Opposition parties boycotted parliament. But the government took its revenge on Avrupa. Denktas had previously sued Avrupa demanding compensation. The lawsuits filed by Denktas were rushed through and concluded immediately and as a result of the heavy fines and sequestrations inflicted on the paper it was forced to close down.
In spite of his repressive measures, all this shows that Denktas is no longer able to maintain his arbitrary dictatorship as comfortably as he used to do.
For centuries, the people of Cyprus have been denied any real self-determination and have been kept out of the game. The island was purchased, sold, rented out, invaded, annexed, carved up against the will of the islanders who have never been allowed to have a say. And the situation, is in fact, no different today.
The workers in both the northern and the southern parts lack their own organisations that are capable of putting forward a solution based on their real class interests. This explains why they are sometimes misled by the "solutions" of the bourgeois. Now on both sides of the divide there are widespread illusions that EU membership will solve all the problems. For instance, there is a growing demand amongst the Turkish community in the north to unite with the Greek part in the south. This is because of the low level of GDP per capita in the Turkish north compared to that of the Greek south ($3,000 compared to $13,000). Yet it is the EU, as well as the others (the US, Turkey and Greece), who created the mess on the island in the first place. Wasn't Britain, a member of the EU, hugely responsible for this mess? It is clear that unless the working class comes out clearly against bourgeois politics, it will always end up falling into a trap.
A lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus is impossible under capitalism. None of the imperialist "solutions", whether as a member of the EU or as an independent Cypriot state, can provide Cyprus with permanent and lasting peace. The problem will be provoked again and again by the very same agents who are now being presented as those who are going to solve the problem. The only permanent solution is a united socialist federation comprising Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.
No doubt this may sound utopian to some. However history has confirmed many times over that the real utopians are those who have been trying to solve the problem on a capitalist basis. In spite of this, now the same illusions are being spread again. Yet the futility of these bourgeois dreams is not only demonstrated by the bitter history of Cyprus. These bourgeois delusions have been proven not to withstand the test of reality, above all in Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kashmir and many other parts of the world. Only the internationalist programme of the working class can solve the problems of these peoples who have been poisoned for years with all kinds of nationalist, ethnic and religious chauvinism.
Within the framework of this internationalist programme for a permanent socialist solution to the conflict in Cyprus the following immediate demands need to be put forward:
December 20, 2001
Notes
[1] Makarios was released in March 1957 but was exiled from the island and forced to settle in Athens. He was able to return to the island only after the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960.
[2] On the basis of this some argue that the intervention played a progressive role. They even present it as if it were the intended aim of the intervention. However, the invading Turkish army had no such aims. It would be nothing but mere speculation to say that had it not been for the intervention the military regime in Greece would have lasted for a long time. Moreover, it amounts to attributing to the reactionary Turkish army a democratic role which has never been the case. Remember that the very same army that is supposed to have "saved" Greece from the military junta, brought a similar nightmare to Turkey just 6 years later (the military coup of September 12, 1980). Also it was the same Turkey that was the first country to recognise the regime of the Colonels' Junta back in 1967.
[3] In 1964 there were plans to establish a NATO military base on the island, however the opposition of the USSR and Makarios hindered the plan. Instead, UN troops were placed on the island. After the Turkish invasion, Greece, in protest, declared that it was withdrawing from the military side of NATO, and this lasted until 1980.
[4] Most of those in the Turkish socialist movement, unfortunately adopted a nationalistic attitude towards the invasion of Cyprus. The fact that the military juntas collapsed in both Greece and Cyprus helped Turkish nationalism disguise its real nature behind the façade of anti-fascism for quite some time. The fact that the USSR supported the invasion, at least in the early stages, encouraged the pro-Soviet socialists (who were tail-ending Ecevit, the then Turkish prime-minister) to support the invasion. From Turk-Is to the DISK, all the trade unions in Turkey supported this nationalist madness and backed Ecevit. For instance DISK even launched a campaign for its members to donate one-day's wages to the state. Those revolutionaries who described the "Operation Peace" as an invasion were labelled "enemies of the Turks". That such an accusation in the name of "left" could be regarded as an insult shows just how deep nationalist sentiment had permeated the left.
[5] Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7 and took over as the president.
[6] There are 35,000 Turkish troops on the island today, which is a stunning figure when we consider that the total Turkish population is only 150,000.
[7] Britain still has a 100 square-kilometre military zone and has 20,000 troops based there.
I have encountered, on several occasions, rape denialism when talking with Cypriot pro-Palestinian leftists in relation to the October 7 Hamas attack. Since every such discussion has left me, frankly, nauseated, I decided to collect here some of the documented proof regarding the matter. I am responding here to one claim only, that rapes and sexual violence did not take place during Hamas' attack.
I am not interested in writing a detailed rebuttal of every pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian propaganda point surrounding the narratives over sexual violence. Others are better equipped to do so than me, and indeed have done so. What I have encountered is not a discussion of such points, but merely the plain denial that sexual violence took place in any form or consistency. In relation to the facts themselves, we have reports and statements from credible organisations whose purpose is to document human rights violations across the globe, and who have not been shy of documenting atrocities committed by Israel both in the past and in the present. The three sources I quote below do not exhaust the available documentation.
"Overall, based on the totality of information gathered from multiple and independent sources at the different locations, there are reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred at several locations across the Gaza periphery, including in the form of rape and gang rape, during the 7 October 2023 attacks. Credible circumstantial information, which may be indicative of some forms of sexual violence, including genital mutilation, sexualized torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, was also gathered" (page 21).
You can read it by pressing here.
"Amnesty International has interviewed one person who described being subjected to rape at the Nova festival by members of a Palestinian armed group. It has spoken to several mental health and legal professionals who, between them, reported treating or providing legal services to a number of survivors and witnesses of rape or other sexual violence during the attacks, and a psychiatrist who said that some returned hostages reported being subjected to sexual violence by men guarding them. The organization has received testimonies describing bodies of people killed during the attacks that raise concerns about rape or other sexual violence and is reviewing several images of bodies of victims of the attacks that also appear to prompt such concerns" (page 5).
You can read it by pressing here.
"Human Rights Watch found evidence of acts of sexual and gender-based violence by fighters including forced nudity, and the posting without consent of sexualized images on social media. [...] The extent to which acts of sexual and gender-based violence were committed during the October 7 assault will likely never be fully known: many victims may have been killed; stigma and trauma often deter survivors from reporting; and Israeli security forces and other responders largely did not collect relevant forensic evidence from the attack sites or the recovered bodies" (Pages 7-8).
You can read it by pressing here.
Survivor Testimonies
It has been more than once that I encountered the argument that there are no public accounts of rape victims themselves. In the minds of some people, this is apparently proof that rape and sexual violence did not occur. I always found the demand that victims of rape must publicly expose themselves bizarre, a demand that I frankly have never encountered amongst Cypriot leftists in any other occasion of sexual violence.
These accounts are indeed scarce, and the reason is obvious. Many of the victims of rape and sexual assault were killed on the same day by Islamist militants. Those who survived have to endure the psychological fallout of their abuse, as well as social stigma in a patriarchical society that has long been shifting towards conservatism and religious fundamentalism. But for those who desperately need such proof, here is one statement of a survivor of the Nova massacre witnessing rape, and another by a survivor experiencing rape. Although not relevant to the October 7 attack as such, there is also this long piece of a former Hamas hostage detailing her experiences, including being raped at gunpoint.
A Recent Instance of Misinformation
In January 2025, Israeli prosecutor Moran Gez gave an interview to Yedioth Ahronoth, stating, amongst other things, that:
“Unfortunately, it will be very difficult to prove these crimes. In the end, we don’t have complainants. What was reported in the media compared to what will ultimately be established will look very different—either because the victims were murdered or because women who were raped are unwilling to come forward.
We reached out to women’s rights organisations and requested cooperation. They told us no one had contacted them. Some parents reached out to these organisations, asking what to do if something happened to their daughters, but they didn’t disclose the assaults.
In this area, I would temper expectations. I know the public is expecting action and understands the need to address the horrific sexual offences and assaults that occurred, but the vast majority of these cases won’t meet the evidentiary threshold in court, and the criticism will ultimately fall on the prosecution—unjustly so.”
Moran Gez was here commenting on the legal dimension - it is not enough in a court of law to prove that rapes did take place, as the reports above indicate. One has to connect each individual rape to an individual perpetuator, who needs to be first identified, taken into custody, formally charged, and proven guilty based on the standard of proof demanded by the judicial system. So for Gez, the chances of legal persecutions and convictions of October 7 rapists are slim, even if surviving victims do come forward - which they are unlikely to do, as has been the case in past examples of conflict-driven sexual violence, including that of Cyprus.
How was the above reported by some pro-Palestinian sites? By misrepresenting the statements made in the interview, cherry-picking them to promote the narrative that no rapes or sexual violence ever took place, and that Gez herself confirmed that. This is what Electronic Intifada did, as well as the Middle East Monitor, the World Socialist Website, and the Iranian Press TV, just to name a few. And with the way (mis)information spreads in today's algorithm-driven social media, it does not take long for the content of a propagandistic article on a website to be repeated to me by a friend over coffee during a lazy afternoon.
Propaganda & Ideology
Lies during conflicts spread like Los Angeles wildfires. Early on in the conflict, Israeli narratives promoted spectacles of abysmal violence, descriptions of brutal acts that fall well within Islamophobic stereotypes, orientalised caricatures and dehumanising discourses whose purpose is to strip any human resemblance of Palestinians at large. This was a propaganda uninterested in careful documentation, aimed at dominating public discourse at day one, and good propaganda needs its exaggeration. When some of the accounts circulating on international media proved to be false, various pro-Palestinian groups, websites and activists grasped the opportunity to produce their own counter-narrative, that no rapes or sexual violence whatsoever took place during the October 7 attack. This counter-narrative is no less propagandistic than the Israeli one, it concerns itself not with the truth, but with its distortion for political ends. Its presence is neither surprising nor new. Encountering it amongst local feminists and socialists, whose commitment to social justice I do not doubt, is what I increasingly find disturbing.
The first time that I noticed such levels of misinformation within the alternative left in Cyprus was during the Covid-19 pandemic. The second time was during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and there is a long report on this blog (in Greek) documenting the denialism of Russian crimes against humanity by a popular leftist social media page. In all cases, what became blatantly obvious was the inability of people to separate a reliable from an unreliable source, to effectively fact-check what they are consuming and to identify obvious misinformation. I will simply list here again some of the news media sources that have proven to be consistently reliable in terms of their reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Associated Press, Reuters, Al Jazeera, Bellingcat. These are to be viewed as complimentary news media sources, as each has a different focus. In relation to human rights violations and crimes against humanity, the reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the United Nations are the focal points of reference.
On the left, we often accuse others of having been brainwashed by hegemonic discourses. Leftist ideology, like all counter-hegemonic ideologies, perceives itself as being located outside broader ideological processes, looking in. Indeed, much of the self-gratification in leftist politics can be traced to the (un)conscious belief that one sees beyond the ideological facade, participating in a politics that brings to the surface social reality as it itself objectively exists. It is a dangerous belief, making those holding it easily susceptible to all sorts of misinformation, precisely because they perceive themselves exempt from it. And when you are repeating the talking points of rape denialists, it might be time to ask yourself how you got there.
Delirium
There are a
few simple ways to access blocked websites. These
include using the Wayback Machine, proxy sites, and VPNs. It should be noted
that the tools below are not meant for online security but simply for accessing
a blocked site.
Wayback Machine
One way of accessing a blocked website is by checking captures of said website on the Wayback Machine database – as long as you have the link to the website you want to access. The Wayback Machine creates digital copies of internet websites. This allows for access to (versions of) websites that have gone permanently offline, or in our case, of websites that are blocked by our internet provider. This works because what you are in fact actually accessing is the Wayback Machine website, rather than the blocked website in question. As long as the Wayback Machine is not blocked by your provider, you are good to go. In is important to note that the database has partial captures, so it may not necessarily have up to date captures of the link you input, and captures tend to be more numerous depending on the popularity of the site you are trying to access.
Proxy Sites
Another way to access a blocked site is through the use of a proxy server. Proxy servers will load for you the site, bypassing the block, as again what you are technically accessing is the proxy server website in question, rather than the website you are in fact trying to access. One example of a free proxy site is proxysite.com. Again, you will need to have the link of the site you would like to access.
VPNs
A VPN (Virtual Private Network) works by sending your internet traffic through a secure connection to a special server run by the VPN company. This hides your real location and makes it hard for others to see what you're doing. It also helps you access websites or content that might be blocked in your country.
There are many free VPNs available as extensions for browsers that are good enough to use if what you are simply trying to achieve is access to a blocked website. However, if what you are concerned with is also to protect your IP and personal data, paid options appear as an inevitability, as free VPNs tend to collect and sell the data of their users. Nonetheless, for simply accessing blocked websites, free VPNs are good enough. One example of a free VPN extension is ProtonVPN.
The following is a brief discussion on various tools for the effective scanning, digitization, and long-term preservation of documents and media. It highlights accessible hardware and free software options for individuals and organizations working with limited resources.
Scanning & Digitization
Access to a scanner is essential for archiving documents. A4 scanners remain relatively cheap in the market (around €100) and come a long way in allowing for the preservation of printed material. These scanners have their limitations – they may not be able to produce images of the highest quality and will typically not be able to scan film negatives, which high-end quality scanners are able to do. Nonetheless, their relatively low cost and accessible interface makes them suitable for individuals and groups with limited financial resources. In terms of A3 scanners, the only affordable scanner we were able to locate is the Plustek OpticSlim 1180, which costs less than €400.
In cases where a document is in such a dire state of decomposition that the very process of scanning it may result in its destruction or any other significant damage, a simple solution is the careful photographing of each page with a relatively decent digital camera. Photographing documents is however a time-consuming process which I would not advise pursuing as a substitute for scanning.
I highly recommend the digital preservation of documents in the form of PDF files. An exceptionally useful tool is PDF24, a free software that allows for the creation, simple editing and compression of PDF files. It further has the capacity to convert images to text through OCR.
Useful Free Software
For those who have limited knowledge of image editing and no access to commercial software, like me, I recommend Paint.NET, a free image and photo editing software. GIMP is a more advanced alternative, while for very simple stuff, Microsoft Paint remains remarkably handy.
For converting a DVD into a video file, HandBrake is excellent, while WinCDEmu is only one of many free programs allowing the emulation of CD/DVD/BD drives. VLC Media Player remains exceptional for playing video files, while OpenShot Video Editor is an accessible free open-source video editor.
In terms of viewing PDF files, Sumatra PDF is undoubtedly superior to Adobe Reader, being extremely fast and lightweight, unlike its Adobe competitor. Although most operating systems have their own snapping tools, Greenshot is another lightweight free software allowing for easy screen capturing that has proven quite useful over the years. Regarding opening and creating archive files, 7-Zip remains essential. Lastly, when creating a digital archive, consistently in file naming is of the essence, especially as files keep accumulating. Bulk Rename Utility is an excellent tool allowing for the bulk renaming of files, saving its user a lot of time and effort.
Creating Backups
Beyond accessibility, one of the great advantages of creating a digital archive is the possibility of creating multiple copies of the archive, reducing the risk of damage and loss. Creating multiple copies of a digital archive is thus essential to avoid possible loss of data. Loss of data can come in many forms –physical destruction of the hardware where the files are stored (external hard disks, flash drives, laptops etc.), theft of hardware, collapse of a server, online hacking and so on. It is thus important to maintain multiple backups of the digitized files. An easy practice is to create backups by using multiple external hard drives, which are then stored at different locations. In the case of the physical destruction of one hard drive (for example, due to a house fire) other backups survive. There are of course also cloud services, which nonetheless come at a cost.
This practice, although essential, protects digital archives only offline. Assuming an archive is publicly and openly available online, the collapse of its website infrastructure will inevitably lead to the archive going offline as a whole, since files will be hosted on the website’s server. To avoid this, it is worth considering uploading digital files of archived material on alternative databases as well – creating such copies preserves access to the files even if one server hosting them falls apart.
An easy solution to this dilemma is the uploading of files (depending on copyright etc.) on the Internet Archive database. The Internet Archive hosts an enormous amount of files and is an excellent website to upload files for backup. Setting up an account is easy and straightforward, as is uploading files on the database. In addition, the Internet Archive also hosts the Wayback Machine, which creates digital copies of internet websites. This allows for access to (versions of) websites that have gone permanently offline. Capturing your own site’s URLs in the Wayback Machine, including the URLs to digital files, is another way to create backups of an online archive. Another website, archive.is, does something similar and can be used as an alternative, but Wayback Machine is preferable, as it belongs to a broader project dedicated to open access to information. Wayback Machine also has an official browser extension that is very handy and which I highly advise installing.
Η ιστοσελίδα της Ομάδας Κύπρος μπορεί να εντοπιστεί στο Wayback Machine πατώντας εδώ.
Διακήρυξη
Μια νέα προσπάθεια για τη λύση του Κυπριακού έχει αρχίσει.
Οι ελπίδες πως μπορεί επιτέλους να υπάρξει μια συμφωνημένη λύση που θα επανενώνει τον τόπο μας στο πλαίσιο μιας Ομόσπονδης Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας έχουν αναπτερωθεί. Το όραμα αυτό μοιράζονται οι δύο ηγέτες, μεγάλα πολιτικά κόμματα, ενεργοί πολίτες αλλά και η μεγάλη πλειοψηφία στις δύο κοινότητες. Το ενδιαφέρον της διεθνούς κοινότητας είναι δεδομένο και ενισχυμένο. Η τοπική και διεθνής συγκυρία είναι ευνοϊκή.
Η συντριπτική πλειοψηφία των Κυπρίων θέλουμε ειλικρινά να υπάρξει συμφωνημένη λύση και κατανοούμε ότι αυτή θα είναι προϊόν αλληλοκατανόησης και συμβιβασμού. Δεν θεωρούμε το στάτους κβο ως τη λύση του προβλήματος. Κανένας δεν προτείνει τη βία και τη σύγκρουση ως μέσο επίλυσης. Το μοντέλο της Ομοσπονδίας είναι ο μόνος κοινός τρόπος για να υπάρξει συμφωνία. Πέρα από τους φόβους και τις ανησυχίες, που είναι φυσιολογικές λόγω του βεβαρημένου ιστορικού, όλοι οι Κύπριοι θέλουμε να εισέλθει ο τόπος σε μια νέα εποχή μακρόχρονης ειρήνης και να μετατραπεί σε πρότυπο δημοκρατίας, πολύ-πολιτισμικότητας, προόδου και ευημερίας. Αυτή η προοπτική είναι αναγκαίο να στηριχθεί και να ενισχυθεί, ώστε, αναλόγως και της πορείας των διαπραγματεύσεων, να μπορεί να αγκαλιαστεί πλειοψηφικά και να οδηγήσει στην Κύπρο που όλοι ονειρευόμαστε.
Είμαστε μια ομάδα πολιτών με δράση στον ευρύ χώρο της κοινωνίας των πολιτών στην ελληνοκυπριακή κοινότητα, που έχουμε αποφασίσει να συνεργαστούμε για να στηρίξουμε αυτή την προσπάθεια. Δεν έχουμε τις ίδιες πολιτικές ή ιδεολογικές προσεγγίσεις. Μας ενώνει όμως το όραμα για επανένωση της πατρίδας μας. Ανήκουμε ηλικιακά στη νεότερη γενιά - ο μέσος όρος ηλικίας μας είναι κάτω από 40 - που έζησε και μεγάλωσε μετά τα τραγικά γεγονότα που διαίρεσαν το νησί και το λαό μας. Τόσο εμείς, όσο και πολλοί άλλοι, είμαστε ενθαρρυμένοι από τη βούληση και την αποφασιστικότητα των δύο ηγετών να προχωρήσουν με τόλμη και όραμα, και είμαστε πρόθυμοι να συμβάλουμε, ως εθελοντές, στην ευόδωση της προσπάθειας.
Ο δικός μας ρόλος είναι η παραγωγή και εφαρμογή ιδεών για την επικοινωνιακή στήριξη της ειρηνευτικής διαδικασίας και της διαπραγματευτικής προσπάθειας. Επικεντρωνόμαστε σε θέματα ανάλυσης επικαιρότητας, διεξαγωγής ερευνών κοινής γνώμης, διατύπωσης λόγου και χρήσης των νέων τεχνολογιών επικοινωνίας. Στις προτεραιότητές μας είναι η αξιοποίηση των μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης αλλά και των πιο παραδοσιακών Μέσων Ενημέρωσης, προκειμένου να αναδείξουμε και να στηρίξουμε την εν εξελίξει ειρηνευτική διαδικασία, με ενημερωτικό υλικό, απόψεις και αναλύσεις. Τα συμπεράσματα και οι εισηγήσεις μας θα είναι στη διάθεση όλων όσοι προσβλέπουν και εργάζονται για την επανένωση: πολιτική ηγεσία, οργανωμένοι φορείς, κοινωνία πολιτών. Δεν έχουμε απαντήσεις σε όλα τα πιθανά ερωτήματα, έχουμε όμως τη βούληση να αναζητήσουμε εποικοδομητικές απαντήσεις με σεβασμό σε όλες τις ανησυχίες.
Ξεκαθαρίζουμε ότι δεν είναι στις προθέσεις μας ανάμιξη στις συνομιλίες και στην κομματική πολιτική. Η διαπραγμάτευση του Κυπριακού αποτελεί αρμοδιότητα και ευθύνη των δύο ηγετών και της πολιτικής ηγεσίας. Θεωρούμε, ωστόσο, ότι η ειρηνευτική διαδικασία πρέπει να γίνει πιο κατανοητή στον μέσο πολίτη ως προς τα προσδοκώμενα ευεργετικά της αποτελέσματα, πιο διαφανής, και στο μέτρο του δυνατού να εμπλέκει την κοινωνία η οποία μπορεί και πρέπει να φορτίσει θετικά την ειρηνευτική διαδικασία και τους πρωταγωνιστές της.
Πέραν των ατόμων που απαρτίζουν την Ομάδα, είμαστε ανοιχτοί για συνεργασία με ευρύτερους κύκλους συμπολιτών μας που έχουν γνώσεις και εμπειρίες σε τέτοια θέματα.
Δεν έχουμε ενώπιον μας ένα σχέδιο λύσης. Κατανοούμε και σεβόμαστε ότι ο πολύς κόσμος είναι αμφίθυμος ως προς τη λύση και ότι θα τοποθετηθεί όταν και εφόσον θα έχει μπροστά του ένα ολοκληρωμένο πλαίσιο. Το ίδιο ισχύει και για εμάς.
Πρόθεσή μας είναι να λειτουργήσουμε νομότυπα και με πλήρη διαφάνεια και λογοδοσία σε ό,τι αφορά τη χρηματοδότηση των δράσεων που πρέπει να διεκπεραιωθούν.
Τέλος, ονομάσαμε την προσπάθεια μας Ομάδα Κύπρος- ΟΚ γιατί βλέπουμε την Κύπρο μας σαν μια Ομάδα. Μια Ομάδα που περιλαμβάνει όλους τους Πολίτες της ισότιμους και συμμέτοχους στον αγώνα για ένα μέλλον αντάξιο των προοπτικών που έχει η Πατρίδα μας. Τα αρχικά Ο και Κ δημιουργούν το γνωστό σε όλους μας ΟΚ. Μια έννοια που αναδεικνύει τη θετικότητά μας στην επιχειρούμενη προσπάθεια για λύση. Λέμε τους ηγέτες «ΟΚ, προχωρήστε! Είμαστε εδώ, στηρίζουμε, ενισχύουμε και, ταυτόχρονα ελέγχουμε!»
Ανεπίσημο αρχείο με τις βασικές αρχές και κείμενα του Κινήματος Κυπριωτισμού από το 2021 τα οποία ανακτήθηκαν μέσω του Wayback Machine.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Ανεπίσημο αρχείο με τις βασικές αρχές και κείμενα του Κινήματος Κυπριωτισμού από το 2021 τα οποία ανακτήθηκαν μέσω του Wayback Machine.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Article can be located on archive.is by pressing here.
—
The Cypriot art community has been shaken within the last week amidst reactions against the programming of Jan Fabre at the Cyprus International Theatre Festival.
With the organisers pulling every known move from the gaslighter’s hand book, what started as expression of outrage for the programming of an individual who has been found guilty for abuse and violence against 5 women from his dance company has somehow turned into a discussion on whether “cancel culture has gone too far”, on “whether artists can repent” and on “keeping an open mind and participate in dialogue”. Something very particular seems to have expanded into something “grey” and “complicated”. But is it?
This is not a matter of freedom of speech it is a matter of worker rights within the art industry
We don’t create art in a vacuum. It is an industry with an employer-worker relationship in place. While moral outrage over Jan Fabre’s continued recognition may be subjective, the foundation of this debate lies in objective realities about working conditions in the arts.
Unlike Renaissance times, the vast majority of artists do not enjoy the patronship of a Medici, they can’t just be taken care of and create art in a vacuum (although no art is ever created in a vacuum). The reality of today’s society is that an artist is more often than not also a worker, an employee or in the case of Fabre an employer who also receives money from a larger entity, in this case the Belgian government. With those benefits come responsibilities.
The Cyprus international Theatre Festival has been anything but forthcoming about Fabre’s problematic past. Initially when his participation in the lineup was announced the festival failed to mention any of the context surrounding him, perhaps hoping that no one would notice. Even when members of the Cyprus art community did notice, an orchestrated effort through identical press releases published in virtually every major outlet tried to convince otherwise; that this is about opening dialogue and freedom of expression. It is worth noting that this has been accompanied by jargon that significantly downplays Fabre’s record, shifting the discourse into more grey, “complicated” discussions about feelings and morality, which both can be subjective.
What is objectively a fact, is that his conviction was not a mere civil lawsuit seeking reparations but a criminal trial where guilt had to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that it was. Fabre received an 18-month suspended sentence and a five-year suspension of his civil rights, including voting and assembly, which remains in effect until 2027. Fabre is not just a “provocative personality”, he is a convicted criminal by the dictionary definition of the term. This doesn’t mean that individuals do not deserve a second chance, that is after all the purpose of a suspended sentence. But if CITF truly believes there is nothing reprehensible about its programming, why wasn’t there any transparency on who this individual is from the get go?
This case underscores systemic failures in the arts: blurred boundaries between creative expression and coercion, a culture of silence fostered by industry precariousness, and the lack of structures to protect workers. Unlike doctors or lawyers, artists face no professional oversight body; in the absence of regulatory deterrents, abuses persist under the guise of the “creative process.”
This issue extends beyond Mr Fabre; it is pervasive across artistic communities, including the Cypriot scene. The biblical saying, “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone,” feels particularly relevant. Boundaries in the creative process can sometimes be subjective, and rumors about colleagues—some of whom have spoken out on this case—circulate widely. Even I, as the writer, am not exempt from differing perceptions on my personal and professional integrity. This lack of a clear framework creates a vacuum, enabling behaviors like Fabre’s to take root in the first place.
Rather than debating Mr Fabre’s personal right to artistic expression, we should focus on the impact of his programming post-conviction—while he is still serving his sentence—on the industry as a whole. If a choreographer of his stature is found unfit to safeguard his employees yet continues to receive exposure that sustains his influence and power, effectively facing no real consequences, how can behaviors like his ever be denormalized?
No one can dictate to an Artistic Director, especially of a festival that is privately funded, what they can or cannot programme. Programmers, audiences and authors alike can celebrate and rejoice the privilege to “artistic expression” all they want. But it is the art workers who collectively have to bear the consequences by continuing to survive in an industry that resists any shifting towards sustainable, healthier and attainable expectations.
The lesson for the Cypriot art community
Fabre is just one piece of a larger issue, and while his art—undeniably compelling—is forever marked by the boundaries he repeatedly crossed, culminating in his conviction. The sold-out shows scheduled for next week are caught in the crossfire of debates that extend far beyond him or any single artist or artwork. That is, of course, if one chooses to prioritise the human factor over the final product, whatever that may be.
Whereas Fabre is a problem, the problem for the Cyprus art community is the vacuum that CITF claims to be filling. A vacuum created by the lack of long term, determined and achievable cultural policy on a state level.
A privately funded festival has found access to a municipal theatre with more ease than any other performing arts organisation or individual artist. With the exception of Diastasis and NEA KINISI when was the last time that Pattihio theatre was offered as an accessible venue for the presentation of any state funded dance performance? Almost 40% of Pattihio Municipal Theatre’s programming from now until October is promoted only in Russian, with no English or Greek descriptions.
This reality is deeply revealing—we are witnessing two parallel worlds on the island, especially in Limassol. In one, historically and culturally significant real estate with immense potential for thoughtful cultural development is steadily being acquired by private stakeholders. This was the case with old factories in Limassol, now housing commercial artistic spaces. These spaces, privately managed and accountable to no one, exert control over cultural affairs by monopolising venues, often offering them at “Russian prices.”
It is within this bubble that CITF finds its place—an event organised entirely by non-natives, seemingly indifferent to the withdrawal of the only native Cypriot productions from its lineup. Even their inclusion in the first place could be seen as decorative rather than integral to the festival’s programming. It does make one wonder if appropriating the name “Cyprus” and “International” comes from a point of audacity or from a point of reflecting a new state affairs on the island.
In a parallel reality, Dance House Lemesos remains without a home, struggling against Limassol’s hyperinflated real estate market—despite being one of the oldest and most dedicated organizations for contemporary dance in Cyprus. The city’s municipal theatre, Pattihio, lacks artistic direction, while in cities where municipal theatres do have leadership—like the Nicosia Municipal Theatre—there is little transparency. Questionable practices persist, such as programming young artists at festivals without a fixed payment fee, expecting them to rely solely on box office earnings in exchange for “exposure.” Just this past week, we learned that the Cyprus Youth Symphony Orchestra—one of the island’s most accomplished ensembles, with domestic and international recognition—has no fixed rehearsal space, and its academy’s budget for affordable, high-quality training has been cut.
The problem isn’t that “foreigners come and alter our culture.” It becomes a problem when private interests override collective needs, limiting the majority’s ability to shape its own future. Consider how MidBrain Ltd intervened in the redevelopment of the Limassol Municipal Garden playground without public consultation. If CITF did not carry a name suggesting it represents the collective Cypriot cultural community, perhaps the backlash wouldn’t have been as strong.
The reason private interests have taken over is because we, collectively, have not stepped up. Cyprus is overflowing with native talent, intelligence, and artistic inspiration. We don’t need to be “taught” culture—but we do need direction, not just in the arts but in governance. A recent poll from the Deputy Ministry of Culture identified the artistic community’s top priorities: increased funding and a legal framework for art workers. Both are essential, but as this case demonstrates, money and legality alone are not enough.
I wouldn’t waste more of my time discussing whether another problematic personality can or cannot express himself. I learnt a lot from his past work, but my personal ethics and logic push me to prioritise things that I deem more important than any kinds of art available out there.
But this is a time for reckoning for our community. Where are we heading at? What do we want culture on this island to look like in 10, 15, 20 years from now?
*Marita Anastasi is a Cypriot born and raised arts administrator and movement artist. She is currently Programming Coordinator at the English National Opera based in London.
Κριτική καταγραφή και σχολιασμός της κάλυψης της Ρώσικης εισβολής στην Ουκρανία από τη Δέφτερη Ανάγνωση. Γράφτηκε τον Απρίλιο του 2022 και κυκλοφόρησε σε κλειστό κύκλο. Δημοσιεύθηκε ανοιχτά τον Μάρτη του 2025.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Τον Φλεβάρη του 2025 κυκλοφόρησε στη Λευκωσία το βιβλίο της Λέσχης Κινηματικού Αναστοχασμού «Υφαίνοντας το Νήμα: Συγκυρία, Ταξική Σύνθεση και Ανταγωνιστικό Κίνημα στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία». Ποιο κάτω ακολουθεί κριτική του βιβλίου. Θα πρέπει να σημειωθεί ότι δεν πρόκειται για μια τυπική βιβλιοκριτική και, ως εκ τούτου, δεν υπάρχει εκτενής συζήτηση για το περιεχόμενο του βιβλίου, ούτε επαρκής περιγραφή των θετικών συνεισφορών του. Συνεπώς, η παρούσα κριτική προϋποθέτει ότι η αναγνώστρια της έχει διαβάσει το βιβλίο, το οποίο μπορεί να εντοπιστεί προς το παρόν στον κοινωνικό χώρο Καϊμάκκιν. Θα ήθελα επίσης να παροτρύνω τα άτομα που είναι μέρος, ή ασχολούνται με τον κυπριακό ριζοσπαστικό χώρο να διαβάσουν το βιβλίο, τόσο γιατί πρόκειται, τουλάχιστον εξ όσων γνωρίζω, για την πρώτη προσπάθεια προσέγγισης της κυπριακής εμπειρίας με αυτόν τον τρόπο, όσο και γιατί το εκδοτικό εγχείρημα του Faura Books, που έχει εκδώσει το βιβλίο, είναι μια αξιόλογη πρωτοβουλία η οποία καλύπτει ένα ιστορικό κενό και αξίζει της υποστήριξης μας.
Το βιβλίο μπορεί να χωριστεί σε τρία μέρη, αν και αυτά δεν αντικατοπτρίζονται από τα κεφάλαια του με ακρίβεια. Στο πρώτο μέρος παρουσιάζονται βασικά στοιχεία γύρω από την ταξική σύνθεση της κυπριακής εργατικής τάξης στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία, αντλώντας στοιχεία κυρίως από τις διαθέσιμες επίσημες στατιστικές και από μέρος της ακαδημαϊκής βιβλιογραφίας. Η παρουσίαση αυτή χωρίζεται γύρω από τις έννοιες της τεχνικής σύνθεσης, της κοινωνικής σύνθεσης και της πολιτικής σύνθεσης, προσφέροντας μια περιγραφή που κυμαίνεται από το μορφωτικό επίπεδο των εργαζομένων, το ρόλο της οικογένειας και το είδος της εργασίας που εκτελείται, μέχρι την ιδιοκατοίκηση, τα μέσα συγκοινωνίας, το πολιτικό τοπίο και τη διάκριση μεταξύ μεταναστευτικής και ντόπιας εργασίας. Αυτό το μέρος του βιβλίου είναι ίσως το ισχυρότερο, συγκεντρώνοντας βασικές πληροφορίες γύρω από την πραγματική, υπάρχουσα εργατική τάξη. Εμπεριέχει, παρόλα αυτά, μια σημαντική αδυναμία, την έλλειψη ιστορικής καταγραφής/ανάλυσης της συγκρότησης και εξέλιξης της κυπριακής εργατικής τάξης. Παρά τις μεμονωμένες ιστορικές αναφορές, έχουμε μια εικόνα του σήμερα χωρίς να ξέρουμε πως ακριβώς φτάσαμε εδώ.
Το δεύτερο μέρος, το οποίο αποτελεί μέσα στο βιβλίο κομμάτι του υποκεφαλαίου σχετικά με την πολιτική σύνθεση, είναι λίγο-πολύ μια καταγραφή διαφόρων πολιτικών δραστηριοτήτων και κοινωνικών αγώνων των τελευταίων ετών, σε συνδυασμό με μια προσπάθεια παρουσίασης των στιγμών, των πτυχών και των διαστάσεων της ταξικής πάλης που εμπεριέχονται μέσα σε αυτούς τους αγώνες. Η καταγραφή είναι από μόνη της αξιοσημείωτη, δεδομένου ότι είναι δυστυχώς σπάνιο για τον κυπριακό ριζοσπαστικό χώρο να διατηρεί τη μνήμη της δικής του πολιτικής δραστηριότητας, πόσο μάλλον της δραστηριότητας άλλων υποκειμένων και οργανώσεων, όπως τα συνδικάτα, οι φοιτητές, οι μετανάστριες κλπ. [15]. Το τρίτο μέρος αποτελείται από το τελευταίο κεφάλαιο, όπου παρουσιάζονται τα βασικά συμπεράσματα του βιβλίου.
Εργατικό Κίνημα & Ταυτότητα
Το βιβλίο αναφέρει την ανάλυση των Endnotes σχετικά με την ιστορία του εργατικού κινήματος (υποσημείωση 46), αλλά δεν φαίνεται να έχει αφομοιώσει όλα τα συμπεράσματα αυτής της ανάλυσης, ακόμη και αν επαναλαμβάνει κάποια από αυτά στα συμπεράσματα του. Όπως αναφέρουν οι Endnotes, το εργατικό κίνημα οργανώθηκε γύρω από τους βιομήχανους εργάτες, φτάνοντας σε ένα εσωτερικό φραγμό στην οργάνωση της υπόλοιπης εργατικής τάξης. Με τη σειρά του, το βιομηχανικό προλεταριάτο δεν αναπτύχθηκε και επεκτάθηκε σε τέτοιο βαθμό που να αποτελεί την πλειοψηφία του πληθυσμού μέσα στον 20ο αιώνα, ενώ μετά τη δεκαετία του ‘70 βλέπουμε την συρρίκνωση του παγκόσμια, και όχι απλώς τη μεταφορά του από τις δυτικές στις ανατολικές χώρες [17]. Η κατάρρευση του εργατικού κινήματος, εν τέλει, συνδέεται με την συρρίκνωση του βιομηχανικού προλεταριάτου, πάνω στο οποίο και κτίστηκε. Όπως επισημάνουν:
«Οι οργανώσεις αυτές δεν θα είχαν πετύχει στα καθήκοντά τους αν δεν στηρίζονταν, την ίδια στιγμή, σε μια επιβεβαιώσιμη ταξική ταυτότητα. Στον βαθμό που έκαναν θυσίες στο όνομα του εργατικού κινήματος, οι εργάτες δεν ενεργούσαν, γενικά, για τα άμεσα συμφέροντά τους. Το να πει κανείς ότι οι εργάτες επιβεβαίωναν μια κοινή ταυτότητα σημαίνει ότι το κίνημα πέτυχε να τους πείσει να αναστείλουν τα συμφέροντά τους, ως μεμονωμένοι πωλητές σε μια ανταγωνιστική αγορά εργασίας και, αντίθετα, να ενεργήσουν κινούμενοι από μια δέσμευση στο συλλογικό πρόταγμα του εργατικού κινήματος» [14 σελ. 26].
«Οι εργάτες μπορούσαν να γεφυρώσουν τα χάσματα, μεταξύ των συντεχνιακών τους συμφερόντων, μόνο στον βαθμό που πίστευαν, και έπειθαν και άλλους να πιστεύουν, σε μια κοινή ταυτότητα: τον συλλογικό εργάτη. Όμως, η ενότητα, που ονομαζόταν έτσι, δεν ήταν μια “πραγματική” ενότητα, δοσμένη άμεσα από την πλήρη άνθηση των καπιταλιστικών κοινωνικών σχέσεων. Ήταν ένας μύθος που τον προϋπέθετε, και τον έθετε, το ίδιο το κίνημα» (έμφαση δική μου) [14 σελ. 79].
Είναι ακριβώς αυτή η αναγνώριση πως η εργατική ταυτότητα (ή ο συλλογικός εργάτης) δεν ήταν ένα φαινόμενο έξω από το εργατικό κίνημα, αλλά παράγωγο του ίδιου του κινήματος – δεν υπήρξε ούτε υπάρχει ανεξάρτητα από αυτό. Η κατάρρευση τόσο του εργατικού κινήματος, όσο και των συνθηκών που το ανέδειξαν, σημαίνει και την κατάρρευση της οργάνωσης της εργατικής τάξης γύρω από την εργατική ταυτότητα καθαυτή. Η ταξική πάλη συνεχίζει, και ενίοτε οι εργάτες εμφανίζονται σαν υποκείμενα μέσα από διάφορες μορφές αγώνα αλλά:
«Δεν μπορούμε, πλέον, να προσφεύγουμε στην έννοια της ταξικής συνείδησης, με ό,τι αυτή συνεπάγεται. Είμαστε αναγκασμένοι να αντιμετωπίσουμε το γεγονός ότι η εργατική τάξη είναι μια τάξη αυτού του τρόπου παραγωγής, που ενοποιείται μόνο στον διαχωρισμό. Φυσικά, υπάρχουν, ακόμα, στιγμές στους αγώνες τους, που οι εργάτες συναντιούνται με έναν τρόπο που διακόπτει την ενότητά τους για το κεφάλαιο, επιτρέποντάς τους να οργανωθούν τόσο εντός, όσο και κατά μήκος, των γραμμών που τους διαχωρίζουν. Όμως, όταν συναντιούνται, σήμερα, αυτό δεν το κάνουν ως τάξη, γιατί το ταξικό ανήκειν είναι αυτό, ακριβώς, που τους χωρίζει» [14 σελ. 82].
Παρόλα αυτά, σε διάφορα σημεία το βιβλίο φαίνεται να υποχωρεί σε παραδοσιακές αναγνώσεις, όπως στη χρήση του όρου της ψευδής συνείδησης, η οποία με τη σειρά του προϋποθέτει μια αυθεντική ταξική συνείδηση η οποία καταπιέζεται:
«[Τ]ο κενό που δημιουργείται από τη συρρίκνωση του κράτους προνοίας καλύπτεται από…την ψευδή συνείδηση και την υλική πραγματικότητα που αυτή δημιουργεί» (σελ. 40).
Σε άλλα σημεία, υπάρχει μια επιστροφή πίσω στη γνώριμη ανάγνωση περί λανθασμένων επιλογών του εργατικού κινήματος, παρά στην καθοριστική επίδραση της εξέλιξης του καπιταλισμού πάνω στο ίδιο το κίνημα:
«Το εργατικό κίνημα πέτυχε μια πύρρειο νίκη στις δυτικές χώρες…έκανε το εργατικό υποκείμενο συνομιλητή των κυβερνήσεων με σημαντικά οφέλη…και με αντάλλαγμα την ενσωμάτωση του στις διαδικασίες της καπιταλιστικής ανάπτυξης. Το εργατικό κίνημα ξεδόντιασε τον εαυτό του. Στην πορεία, συνέλαβε στην κατάρρευση της εργατικής ταυτότητας που ήταν η κεντρική προϋπόθεση του…» (σελ. 58).
Τέλος, σε διάφορα σημεία του κειμένου διαφαίνεται μια δυσαρέσκεια συνδυασμένη με αμηχανία για τη δραστηριότητα της τοπικής εργατικής τάξης - μια δυσαρέσκεια που μάλλον κρύβει εκνευρισμό και απογοήτευση για ένα κομμάτι της τάξης που δεν ενεργεί όπως θα έπρεπε, όπου αντί «να επιδιώκεται η συλλογική δράση, συχνά προκρίνεται η οδός της προσωπικής ή οικογενειακής αρπαχτής, η οποία φαίνεται να είναι ποιο ελκυστική» (σελ. 92). Η ουσία εδώ είναι πως δεν φαίνεται ποιο ελκυστική. Είναι ποιο ελκυστική σε σχέση με τα άμεσα συμφέροντά. Είναι σε τέτοια σημεία που μπορούμε να διακρίνουμε στο βιβλίο την παρασκηνιακή διατήρηση ενός μεταφυσικού κοινού ταξικού συμφέροντος ως το σημείο αναφοράς γύρω από το οποίο κινείται η ανάλυση.
Τα Άμεσα Συμφέροντα
Βασική αδυναμία στην ανάλυσή του βιβλίου σχετίζεται με τα αντιφατικά συμφέροντα στο εσωτερικό της εργατικής τάξης. Στο βιβλίο γίνεται μια βασική, αλλά σημαντική καταγραφή των διαιρέσεων στο εσωτερικό της κυπριακής εργατικής τάξης σε σχέση με το φύλο, την εθνικότητα, το καθεστώς εργοδοσίας κτλ. Η συγκέντρωση αυτών των στοιχείων στο βιβλίο και η οργάνωση τους μέσα από το πρίσμα της ταξικής σύνθεσης είναι αδιαμφησβήτητα χρήσιμη. Αυτές οι διαιρέσεις είναι παρόλα αυτά γνωστές. Αυτό που απουσιάζει είναι η ανάλυση του διαχωρισμού των άμεσων συμφερόντων διαφόρων τμημάτων της εργατικής τάξης σε σχέση με άλλα τμήματα της ίδιας τάξης. Υπάρχει η αναγνώριση αυτής της εσωτερικής διαίρεσης, αλλά αντί να μπει στο επίκεντρο της ανάλυσης, η διαίρεση συχνά παρουσιάζεται ως μεταγενέστερη σκέψη.
Για παράδειγμα αναφέρεται πως «παρόλο που περίπου τα δύο τρίτα του πληθυσμού της ΚΔ ανήκουν στην εργατική τάξη, υπάρχουν και στο εσωτερικό της διαστρωματώσεις και αντικρουόμενα συμφέροντα» (σελ. 78), αναφέροντας μετέπειτα πως κομμάτι της εργατικής τάξης εκμεταλλεύονται την μεταναστευτική εργασία, μέσα από φτηνό εργατικό δυναμικό στους τομείς της φροντίδας και της οικιακής εργασίας. Σε άλλο σημείο αναφέρεται πως η ιδιοκατοίκηση στην Κύπρο ανέρχεται στο 70% (σελ. 32), αλλά μετέπειτα αναφέρεται πως ενώ «η μεγάλη πλειοψηφία …της εργατικής τάξης τάσσεται κατά των ψηλών ενοικίων…υπάρχει ένα ποσοστό ντόπιων εργαζόμενων που, ενοικιάζοντας παράλληλα διάφορα διαμερίσματα…επιλέγουν να επωφεληθούν από την κερδοσκοπική αγορά ακινήτων» (σελ. 92). Παρόλα αυτά, δεν ακολουθείται μια ανάλυση που να εστιάζει στις επιπτώσεις αυτών των δεδομένων.
Σχετικά με το επίπεδο της ιδιοκατοίκησης μπορούμε να συμπεράνουμε τα ακόλουθα: α) Η πλειοψηφία του πληθυσμού έχει συμφέρον από τη συνεχιζόμενη αύξηση της αξίας των ακινήτων β) η ενοικίαση ακινήτων παραμένει σημαντικό κομμάτι των εισοδημάτων αρκετών εργαζομένων γ) καθώς οι μισθοί μειώθηκαν μετά το 2009, θα πρέπει να υποθέσουμε ότι η εισοδηματική αναλογία που προέρχεται από τα ενοίκια έχει αυξηθεί για αυτό το τμήμα της εργατικής τάξης. Τα άμεσα συμφέροντα αυτού του κομματιού της εργατικής τάξης είναι αντίθετα με τα άμεσα συμφέροντα εργατών οι οποίοι νοικιάζουν. To παράδοξο θα ήταν να υπήρχε μαζική προσέλευση σε διαμαρτυρίες για τα ψηλά νοίκια, όχι το αντίθετο.
Η απασχόληση μεταναστριών οικιακών εργατριών τόσο την οικιακή εργασία, όσο και για την ιδιωτική φροντίδα του ηλικιωμένου πληθυσμού, είναι καθοριστική για την κοινωνική αναπαραγωγή των ντόπιων εργαζομένων. Σημαντικό κομμάτι της εκμετάλλευσης αυτή της εργασίας συμβαίνει επίσης στη μαύρη αγορά, καθώς οι μετανάστριες εργάτριες επισκέπτονται επιπλέον σπίτια στο ρεπό τους (συνήθως τις Κυριακές), και πληρώνονται για την κάθε επίσκεψη. Είναι μέσα από τη μαύρη αγορά που οι περισσότεροι ντόπιοι εργάτες και εργάτριες επωφελούνται από τα φτηνά εργατικά χέρια των μεταναστριών εργατριών. Υπάρχει επίσης η πρακτική του «διαμοιρασμού» των οικιακών εργαζομένων σε πολλά οικογενειακά νοικοκυριά, μέσω της παράνομης υπερεργασίας τους [16]. Αυτές οι δύο πρακτικές είναι τόσο συχνές που δεν χρειαζόμαστε στατιστικά στοιχεία για να τις θεωρήσουμε διάχυτες μέσα στην ελληνοκυπριακή κοινωνία. Τα άμεσα συμφέροντα όσων εργοδοτούν οικιακές εργάτριες, τόσο επίσημα όσο και περιστασιακά, είναι αντίθετα με τα συμφέροντα των ίδιων των εργατριών, από το μισθό μέχρι και το καθεστώς περιορισμού πρόσβασης στην αγορά εργασίας.
Τα ποιό πάνω καταδεικνύουν μόνο δυο διαστάσεις αντιφατικών άμεσων συμφερόντων στο εσωτερικό της κυπριακής εργατικής τάξης, συμφερόντων που παραμένουν αγεφύρωτα. Χρειαζόμαστε μια εκτεταμένη ανάλυση αυτών ακριβώς των άμεσων συμφερόντων εάν θέλουμε να κατανοήσουμε πραγματικά την πολυπλοκότητα της εμπειρίας της εργατικής τάξης στο νησί. Είμαι επίσης πεπεισμένος πως μόνο μέσα από μια τέτοια ανάλυση θα μπορέσουμε να εξηγήσουμε και να κατανοήσουμε «τις αδυναμίες των κινημάτων επανένωσης τα τελευταία 20 χρόνια στην ΚΔ, σε αντίθεση με την ΤΔΒΚ» (σελ. 69).
Θεωρητικές Ασάφειες
Ο ορισμός που προτάσσεται για τον καπιταλισμό ως «ένα παγκόσμιο μοντέλο κοινωνικής οργάνωσης που παράγει δομικές ανισότητες και ιεραρχίες, με κύριο σκοπό την παραγωγή κέρδους για τα αφεντικά μέσω της εκμετάλλευσης της εργασίας» (σελ. 15), χωρίς αναφορά σε μέσα παραγωγής, την παραγωγή εμπορεύματος για ανταλλαγή και την αξιακή μορφή του προϊόντος, παραμένει εξαιρετικά ανεπαρκής, ενώ συγχύζει αποτελέσματα του καπιταλισμού (διεθνοποίηση) με τον ίδιο τον ορισμό του [9]. Το βιβλίο επίσης χρησιμοποιεί αρκετούς όρους, επεξηγώντας όμως ελάχιστους. Όροι όπως «προλεταριάτο», «εργατική τάξη», «μικροαστοί», «μεσοαστοί», «αστοί», «μικροαστική ιδεολογία», «ψευδή συνείδηση», «ταξική πάλη», «έθνος-κράτος» και «μεσαία τάξη» δεν είναι αυτονόητοι, αφού έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί με διάφορους τρόπους μέσα στις ριζοσπαστικές θεωρητικές παραδόσεις, και σίγουρα δεν είναι αυτονόητοι για κάθε αναγνώστρια που δεν είναι εξοικειωμένη με τις πολύ συγκεκριμένες ριζοσπαστικές θεωρητικές τάσεις από τις οποίες είναι επηρεασμένο το κείμενο.
Η ανάγνωση του κειμένου ασυνείδητα φέρνει έτσι ένα θεωρητικό-ιδεολογικό γέμισμα από τον αναγνώστη με βάση τις δικές του γνώσεις σχετικά με τους όρους που χρησιμοποιούνται, με το νόημα του κειμένου καθαυτού να παραμένει σε διάφορα σημεία θολό. Είναι κάπως παράδοξο να επιχειρείται ταξική ανάλυση χωρίς διευκρινίσεις σχετικά με τους όρους που χρησιμοποιούνται. Αυτή η θεωρητική ασάφεια έρχεται και δένει με μια γενικότερη θεωρητική έλλειψή που χαρακτηρίζει το βιβλίο – γίνεται π.χ. αναφορές σε ιδεολογία αλλά δεν αναφέρεται ή προτάσσεται θεωρία της ιδεολογίας, αναφέρεται ο εθνικισμός αλλά δεν επιχειρείται ή παρουσιάζεται κάποια θεωρητική ανάγνωση σχετικά με το έθνος, δεν παρουσιάζεται κάποια ιδιαίτερη θεωρία του κράτους κτλ.
Το αποτέλεσμα είναι μια εκτεταμένη απόκλιση μεταξύ του αντικειμένου που επιχειρεί να αναλύσει το βιβλίο και των εργαλείων που χρησιμοποιεί για να το κάνει, καταλήγοντας σε μια περιγραφικού χαρακτήρα καταγραφή, παρά σε αναλυτική εμβάθυνση. Το αναφέρω αυτό γιατί εάν συμφωνήσουμε με τους Endnotes πως οι εργάτες σήμερα όταν «συναντιούνται…δεν το κάνουν ως τάξη», αυτό σημαίνει πως συναντιούνται και οργανώνονται κάτω από άλλες κατηγορίες, ως άλλου τύπου υποκείμενα – ως πολίτες, ως έθνος/λαός, ως γυναίκες, ως η «πλειοψηφία» κτλ. Όπως αναφέρει ο Etienne Balibar σε σχέση με το έθνος:
«Κάθε κοινωνική κοινότητα που αναπαράγεται από τη λειτουργία των θεσμών είναι φαντασιακή, δηλαδή βασίζεται στην προβολή της ατομικής ύπαρξης στο νήμα μιας συλλογικής αφήγησης, στην αναγνώριση ενός κοινού ονόματος και στις παραδόσεις που ζουν ως ίχνη ενός πανάρχαιου παρελθόντος (ακόμη και όταν έχουν κατασκευαστεί και ενσταλαχθεί στο πρόσφατο παρελθόν). Αλλά αυτό καταλήγει στην αποδοχή ότι, υπό ορισμένες συνθήκες, μόνο οι φαντασιακές κοινότητες είναι πραγματικές (μετάφραση δική μου) [18 σελ. 346].»
Αυτές οι κατηγορίες διαμεσολαβούν μεταξύ τάξεων, κοινωνικών σχέσεων και πολιτικής και δεν μπορούν να θεωρηθούν ούτε ως αυτονόητες, ούτε ως απλές ιδεολογικές διαστρεβλώσεις που τυφλώνουν τους εργαζόμενους από κάποια πραγματική, ουσιώδη ταυτότητά τους. Εμπεριέχουν την δική τους ιστορικότητα, κοινωνική δυναμική και εξελικτική πορεία. Η ανάλυση λοιπόν πρέπει να αρχίζει από τη θεωρητική ανάκριση των ίδιων των κατηγοριών, αντί να τις βλέπουμε ως απλές ανορθολογικές εκφράσεις των παθολογιών του καπιταλισμού, εξίσου εύκολες στο να εξηγηθούν και να απορριφθούν. Είναι εδώ που συναντάμε την εργατική τάξη ως πολιτικό υποκείμενο στον 21ο αιώνα, όχι όπως εμείς τη θέλουμε, αλλά όπως αυτή συγκροτείται.
Υπάρχει επίσης η τάση μέσα στο βιβλίο να περιγράφεται η ταξική σύνθεση κινημάτων/πολιτικών χώρων χωρίς να παρατίθεται έστω και μια παραπομπή ή στοιχείο που να δίνει βάση στους ισχυρισμούς. Ενδεικτικά, αυτό γίνεται για τον ριζοσπαστικό χώρο (σελ. 66), για το ΕΛΑΜ (σελ. 72) και για το περιβαλλοντικό κίνημα (σελ. 94). Τέτοιου τύπου περιγραφές απλώς δεν μπορούν να θεωρηθούν αξιόπιστες. Η όποια επίκληση σε «εμπειρική γνώση από τη συμμετοχή…στα κινήματα» (σελ. 19) που αναφέρεται στην εισαγωγή του βιβλίου έχει με τη σειρά της τα όρια της.
Δευτερεύοντα Σχόλια
Σελίδα 31: Αναφέρεται ότι η «στατιστική είναι η επιστήμη του κράτους», με ένα απολογητικό ύφος για τη χρήση στατιστικών στοιχείων που προέρχονται από επίσημους θεσμούς. Εάν τα δεδομένα είναι ανεπαρκή ή προβληματικά, αυτό δεν οφείλεται στην ίδια τη στατιστική ως επιστήμη, αλλά στα στοιχεία που επιλέγει να συλλέξει ο εκάστοτε κρατικός θεσμός, καθώς και για τους λόγους που αποφασίζει να το κάνει. Για παράδειγμα, υπάρχει η παράδοση της κριτικής εγκληματολογίας, όπου τα δεδομένα που συλλέγει το κράτος αμφισβητούνται τόσο θεωρητικά όσο και εμπειρικά, μέσω της συλλογής, καταγραφής και ανάλυσης νέων δεδομένων που εξέρχονται από τη λογική της αστυνόμευσης. Αν συνεχίσουμε να αξιολογούμε μεθόδους και μεθοδολογίες έρευνας με τόσο απλοϊκό τρόπο, στο τέλος θα πρέπει να απορρίψουμε και άλλες επιστημονικές προσεγγίσεις, όπως η εθνογραφία και η αρχειοθέτηση (ως επιστήμες της αποικιοκρατίας), οι συνεντεύξεις και τα focus groups (ως μέθοδοι του marketing), καθώς και την ιστοριογραφία (ως επιστήμη του έθνους-κράτους), για να καταλήξουμε τελικά στη μόνη «αντικειμενική» μέθοδο: την προσωπική εμπειρία. Όσο δεν υπάρχει κατανόηση των διάφορων μεθόδων συλλογής στοιχείων και μεθοδολογιών ανάλυσης, τόσο ο ριζοσπαστικός χώρος θα παραμένει ανίκανος να παράγει τη δική του γνώση, μένοντας εξαρτημένος στην παραγωγή γνώσης από τους υφιστάμενους θεσμούς.
Σελίδα 62: Αναφέρεται πως η ΕΔΕΚ «πάντα είχε κάποιες εθνικές αναφορές αλλά σήμερα έχει μετατραπεί σε συντηρητικό, εθνικιστικό κόμμα με λαϊκές αναφορές». Είναι μια παράδοξη τοποθέτηση για ένα κόμμα του οποίοι οι παραστρατιωτικοί πήραν μέρος στη δικοινοτική βία του 1963-64 με σημαντική συμβολή υπέρ της ελληνοκυπριακής πλευράς στις μάχες του Πενταδάκτυλου. Το ότι πήραν επίσης μέρος στη αντίσταση κατά του πραξικοπήματος δεν σημαίνει πως τα μέλη της λειτουργούσαν πέραν της εθνικής φαντασίωσης – η ΕΔΕΚ στήριζε την κυρίαρχη εθνική γραμμή των Μακαριακών ενάντια στην Γριβική και χουντική γραμμή. Η ΕΔΕΚ ήταν εκ γενετής της ένα εθνικιστικό πολιτικό κόμμα, το οποίο ενίοτε χρησιμοποιούσε τη ρητορική του σοσιαλισμού του τρίτου κόσμου, που χαρακτηριζόταν από έναν αριστερού τύπου εθνικισμό, για να αντλήσει εκλογική στήριξη μεσώ της πολιτικής υπεραξίας που απέκτησε μετά την ήττα του πραξικοπήματος. Το ότι στέγασε για μια δεκαετία μια αριστερή νεολαία (η οποία εκδιώχθηκε αρχικά το 1978 [6] και τελειωτικά το 1981 [7]) δεν αλλοίωσε σε καμία περίπτωση τον πολιτικό και ιδεολογικό της προσανατολισμό. Αν μη τι άλλο καταδεικνύει την ιστορική αποτυχία του ισοδισμού στην Κύπρο.
Σελίδα 72: Αναφέρεται πως η πρώτη διαδήλωση του ΕΛΑΜ στη Λευκωσία το 2009 ακυρώθηκε. Αυτό δεν στέκει. H διαδήλωση διοργανώθηκε κανονικά, αλλά το ΕΛΑΜ σταμάτησε λόγο της αντιπορείας στα φώτα του Debenhams. Η αστυνομία κράτησε τις δύο πορείες χωριστά σε αρκετή απόσταση [1].
Σελίδα 80: Δεν καταγράφεται πως η απεργία στη Wolt κατέληξε σε συλλογική σύμβαση, που παρόλες τις αδυναμίες της είναι σημαντικό κατόρθωμα για ένα κλάδο που χαρακτηρίζεται από επισφαλή εργασία, μεταναστευτικό πληθυσμό και τεράστιες δυσκολίες οργάνωσης [2, 3].
Σελίδα 83: Αναφέρεται πως ο Αλέκος Μοδινός «καταδικάστηκε, και αργότερα στο ΕΔΑΔ…δικαιώθηκε». Ο Μοδινός δεν καταδικάστηκε από Κυπριακό δικαστήριο. Έκανε απευθείας προσφυγή στο Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων επιχειρηματολογώντας πως η διατήρηση του νόμου κατά της ομοφυλοφιλίας «συνιστά αδικαιολόγητη παρέμβαση στην δικαίωμα σεβασμού της ιδιωτικής ζωής» [4, 5]. Μάλιστα, βασικό επιχείρημα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας ήταν πως ο νόμος κατά της ομοφυλοφιλίας σταμάτησε να εφαρμόζεται, επιχείρημα που δεν έγινε αποδεκτό από το ΕΔΑΔ [5].
Σελίδες 84-85: Σχετικά με την ιστορική απουσία ενός φεμινιστικού κινήματος στο νησί, πιθανόν ο ίδιος ο τρόπος προσέγγισης του ζητήματος να αξίζει αναθεώρησης. Παρόλο που δεν υπήρξε φεμινιστικό κίνημα με τον ορισμό που μπορεί να του προσδίδει ο χώρος σήμερα, υπήρξε ιστορικά πολιτική δράση από τις γυναίκες της Κύπρου και από τους διάφορους οργανισμούς, πρωτοβουλίες και ομάδες γυναικών μέσα από τις οποίες οργανώθηκαν. Όπως μιλάμε λοιπόν για το εργατικό κίνημα από τη μια, και την ταξική πάλη από την άλλη, έτσι μπορούμε να μιλήσουμε για το γυναικείο/φεμινιστικό κίνημα από τη μια και για τις έμφυλες σχέσεις και την εξέλιξη τους από την άλλη.
Η ιστορία της πολιτικής δράσης γύρω από τις έμφυλες σχέσεις στην Κύπρο δεν έχει ακόμη καταγραφεί, αλλά μπορούμε να αναφέρουμε ενδεικτικά εδώ, τουλάχιστον σε σχέση με τις πρώτες δεκαετίες της μεταπολεμικής περιόδου, τη μάχη για τη νομική κατοχύρωση του συναινετικού πολιτικού διαζυγίου και του πολιτικού γάμου [11], και την πρωτοβουλία «Γυναίκες Επιστρέφουν», η οποία παραμένει η μεγαλύτερη κινητοποίηση γυναικών σε δημόσιο χώρο στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία [12]. Υπήρχε επίσης τουλάχιστον μια γυναικεία οργάνωση μέσα στο ριζοσπαστικό χώρο τη δεκαετία του ‘80 (Ομάδα Γυναικών Λευκωσίας, 1979-81) [13], ενώ υπήρξε επίσης κάποια πρωτοβουλία για την ενδοοικογενειακή βία μέσα στη δεκαετία του ‘90. Είμαι βέβαιος πως εάν γίνει μια μεθοδική έρευνα, θα εντοπιστούν όλο και περισσότερες πρωτοβουλίες και δράσεις του παρελθόντος που μας είναι άγνωστες. Μια κριτική ιστορική καταγραφή της πραγματικής εξέλιξης των έµφυλων σχέσεων, αν και δύσκολη, είναι ο μόνος τρόπος μέσα από τον οποίο θα μπορέσουμε να κατανοήσουμε τόσο την ιστορική εξέλιξη αυτών των σχέσεων, όσο και τη γυναίκα ως πολιτικό και κοινωνικό υποκείμενο μέσα στο κυπριακό πλαίσιο.
Σελίδα 105: Η απόρριψη από τον ριζοσπαστικό χώρο πως η βόρεια Κύπρος βρίσκεται υπό κατοχή δεν έχει προσφέρει κάποια ιδιαίτερη εναλλακτική ανάγνωση όλα αυτά τα χρόνια, πέραν από μια καταδίκη των δύο εθνικισμών και μια γενικότερη αδιαφορία κατανόησης της ιστορικής εμπειρίας και εξέλιξης της Τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας μετά το 1974, καθώς και των κοινωνικών σχέσεων στο βόρειο τμήμα του νησιού. Το ότι το Τούρκικό κράτος ασκεί αποτελεσματικό συνολικό έλεγχο της βόρειας Κύπρου δεν είναι απλώς κάποιο νομικίστικο σόφισμα, αλλά η υλική πραγματικότητα όσων κατοικούν και ζουν στην περιφέρεια της ΤΔΒΚ, ενός αυτοανακηρυγμένου κράτους του οποίου το σύνταγμα ορίζει πως η εσωτερική και εξωτερική άμυνα ελέγχεται από τις Τούρκικές δυνάμεις [19], με την αστυνομία, τις τουρκοκυπριακές ένοπλες δυνάμεις και την πυροσβεστική υπηρεσία να υπάγονται στον Τούρκικο στρατό [20]. Το ελάχιστο για την ύπαρξη ενός κράτους είναι να μπορεί να ασκεί αποκλειστική νόμιμη βία εντός της επικράτειας που διεκδικεί [21]. Η ΤΔΒΚ δεν πληροί αυτό το κριτήριο. Μαίνεται σε όσους/όσες επιμένουν στην απόρριψη της κατανόησης της βόρειας Κύπρου ως μια διοίκηση ενός γεωγραφικού χώρου υπό τον έλεγχο του Τούρκικού κράτους, να προσφέρουν μια ανάλυση που παρουσιάζει κάποιο αξιόλογο ορισμό του κράτους και εξηγεί τι σχηματισμός είναι εν τέλει η ΤΔΒΚ.
Υποσημείωση 77, σελίδα 105: Αδυνατώ να κατανοήσω με ποια λογική ή ορισμό μπορεί να αναφέρεται η Δυτική Όχθη ως κράτος. Σε καμία περίπτωση δεν μπορεί να αποδοθεί ο όρος «κράτος» στην Παλαιστινιακή Αρχή, καθώς οι στρατιωτικές δυνάμεις του Ισραήλ δρουν ανεξέλεγκτα μέσα στη Ζώνη A (οι επιθέσεις μέσα στην Τζενίν μιλούν από μόνες τους [8]). Οι Ζώνες B & C βρίσκονται υπό επίσημο στρατιωτικό έλεγχο του Ισραήλ.
Delirium
Αναφορές
[1] Charalambous C. (2009) ‘We’ll come at night and find you, traitor’. Cyprus Mail, 29 Δεκέμβρη. Σελίδα 123 στο ‘Φασισμός, Ξενοφοβία, Εκμετάλλευση και Ρατσιστική Βία στην Κύπρο (Έβδομη Έκδοση)’. Διαθέσιμο στο: https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:magazines:antifaarchive:no_7 [18/02/25].
[2] IWW Cyprus (2024) Victory(?) in the struggle of delivery drivers! Διαθέσιμο στο: https://www.iww.cy/articles/victory-struggle-delivery-drivers/ [18/02/25].
[3] Karakondylou C. (2024) First collective agreement covering delivery workers to come into force. In-Cyprus, 5 Ιούλη, Διαθέσιμο στο https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/insider/first-collective-agreement-covering-delivery-workers-to-come-into-force/ [18/02/25].
[4] Kamenou N. (2011) ‘Cyprus is the Country of Heroes, Not of Homosexuals’: Sexuality, Gender and Nationhood in Cyprus. Διδακτορική Διατριβή. Λονδίνο: King's College London, σελίδα 153.
[5] European Court of Human Rights (1993) Case of Modinos v. Cyprus (Application no. 15070/89). 22 Απριλίου, σελίδες 6-7.
[6] Θεοδόρου Φ. (1978) Σ.Ν. ΕΔΕΝ: Κρίση - Μια Σύντομη Αναφορά. Δελτίο Συζήτησης, Τεύχος 3, σελίδες 19-22.
[7] Αριστερή Πτέρυγα (1981) Διακήρυξη της Αριστερής Πτέρυγας του Σ.Κ. ΕΔΕΚ. Σοσιαλιστική Έκφραση, Φύλλο 100, σελίδες 2-3.
[8] Al Jazeera (2025) Israeli army’s Jenin raid enters 2nd month; mass displacement in West Bank. Al Jazeera, 19 Φλεβάρη, Διαθέσιμο στο https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/19/israeli-armys-jenin-raid-enters-2nd-month-mass-displacement-in-west-bank [20/02/25].
[9] Με βάση τη λογική του ορισμού που προτάσσεται, δεν υπήρχε καπιταλισμός π.χ. τον 16ο-18ο αιώνα στην Αγγλία [10] επειδή δεν αποτελούσε ακόμη «παγκόσμιο μοντέλο κοινωνικής οργάνωσης». Προφανώς και δεν υποστηρίζεται τέτοια θέση μέσα στο βιβλίο, αλλά αυτό είναι το λογικό επακόλουθο με βάση τον ορισμό που παρουσιάζεται.
[10] Wood E. M. (2002) The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso: Λονδίνο, σελίδες 125-129.
[11] ΙστοριΚων (2023) Κύπρος: Ο πόλεμος για το πολιτικό διαζύγιο. Podcast. Διαθέσιμο στο https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/ ιστορικων-historicon/112-κύπρος-ο-πόλεμος-για-το-8DCdQq-Yy5a/ [19/02/25].
[12] Hadjipavlou M. & Mertan B. (2010) Cypriot Feminism: An Opportunity to Challenge Gender Inequalities and Promote Women’s Rights and a Different Voice. The Cyprus Review, 22(2), σελ. 247-268, σελίδα 250.
[13] Κυπριακό Κινηματικό Αρχείο (2024) Ομάδα Γυναικών Λευκωσίας. Διαθέσιμο στο https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:groups:omadaginekon [19/02/25].
[14] Endnotes (2015) A History of Separation. In: Endnotes Volume 4, Unity in Separation. Διαθέσιμο στο https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/4 [20/02/25]. Ελληνική μετάφραση από qutopic. Διαθέσιμη στο: https://inmediasres.espivblogs.net/files/2016/06/a_history_of_separation_root.pdf [20/02/25].
[15] Κυπριακές Υποσημειώσεις (2022) The Extra-Parliamentary Radical Milieu of Cyprus: Available Sources. Διαθέσιμο στο https://cyfootnotes.blogspot.com/2022/11/the-extra-parliamentary-radical-milieu.html [20/02/25].
[16] Hadjigeorgiou N. (2020) Report on the Status of Foreign Domestic Workers in Cyprus. Σελίδα 22. Διαθέσιμο στο https://ssrn.com/abstract=4396345 [20/02/25].
[17] Benanav A. (2020) Automation and the Future of Work. Λονδίνο: Verso, σελίδα 22.
[18] Balibar E. (1990) The Nation Form: History and Ideology. Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 13(3), σελ. 329-361.
[19] Σύνταγμα ΤΔΒΚ (1985) Transitional Article 10. Διαθέσιμο στο https://ombudsman.gov.ct.tr/Portals/20/Constitution%20of%20TRNC.pdf [20/02/25].
[20] Moudouros N. (2021) State of Exception in the Mediterranean: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community. Λονδίνο: Palgrave Macmillan, σελίδα 21.
[21] Weber M. (2004) Politics as a Vocation. Στο: David Owen & Tracy B. Strong (eds.), The Vocation Lectures. Cambridge: Hackett, σελ. 32-94, σελίδα 33.
'The Cyprus Carve-up', article published in anarchist newspaper 'Freedom' on 22/08/64.
It can be found by pressing here.
Σε αυτή την ψηφιακή συλλογή έχουν οργανωθεί χρονολογικά κείμενα και άρθρα του Φειδία Χριστοδουλίδη, τα οποία δημοσιεύτηκαν από τον Ιούλιο του 2020 μέχρι τον Απρίλιο του 2024.
Η συλλογή μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Articles regarding the experiences of Cypriot women in Britain. Published in Issue 4 (Series 2) of Women's Voice newspaper, in April of 1977.
It can be found by pressing here.
Letter written by the Cyprus Solidarity Committee of Boston and published in issue 19 (December Version, 1979) of the newspaper Socialist Worker (USA).
It can be located by pressing here.
Σειρά αρθρών στο περιοδικό antifa σχετικά με την Κύπρο, που κυκλοφόρησαν το 2018-2019.
Μπορούν να εντοπιστούν πατώντας εδώ.
Το τεύχος 14 του περιοδικού 'Ρήξη'.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ (24.5mb).
Φυλλάδιο κατά λογοκρισίας από το Κινηματογραφικό Κέντρο, που κυκλοφόρησε στις 21/09/78.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Open Letter to Makarios from Cypriot Defence Campaign (Ανοικτή Επιστολή προς τον Μακάριο από την Εκστρατεία Άμυνας Κυπρίων).
Bilingual leaflet from the 1970s, which was published in London.
It can be located by pressing here.
Η πρώτη έκδοση (1957) του Ημερολογίου του Γρίβα, η οποία περιέχει κομμάτι του ημερολογίου που εντόπισε η Βρετάνη αποικιακή διοίκηση της Κύπρου τη δεκαετία του 1950.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ (64mb).
Poetry collection by Kevin Cadwallender.
It can be found by pressing here (14.1mb).
A lower resolution version can be found by pressing here (2.4mb).
Νομοσχέδιο που περιορίζει το δικαίωμα στη διαδήλωση και την ειρηνική διαμαρτυρία στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Ποιητική συλλογή του Μ.Γ. Χειμαρίδη, με υπότιτλο 'Για τον πατέρα μου τον Γιώργη Χειμαρίδη τον Αρκάτη'.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ (28mb).
Μπορούν να εντοπιστούν πατώντας εδώ (219mb).
Το φύλλο 631 της Κυπριακής εφημερίδας 'Χαραυγή', που καταγράφει τη δολοφονία του αριστερού εργάτη Σάββα Μένοικου.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Master's thesis at the University of Surrey.
It can be located by pressing here.
Μελέτη που αναδημοσιεύτηκε το 1987 στην εφημερίδα Χαραυγή.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ (19.6mb).
One Radical Planet