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Εκδόσεις Θούπος

By Θούπος

Οι εκδόσεις Θούπος  εν ένα αυτοοργανωμένο εγχείρημα με έδρα την Κύπρο. Εδημιουργήθηκαν με σκοπό να πυκνώσουν τες ανατρεπτικές λέξεις τζιαι σελίδες στο νησί.

Ο στόχος υλοποιείται προς θκιό κατευθύνσεις :

Που τη μια με προώθηση της θεωρίας, έρευνας τζιαι συλλογικής γνώσης για τον κοινωνικό ανταγωνισμό τζαι που την άλλη με την διάδοση των κινηματικών ιδεών τζιαι πρακτικών ευρύτερα στον κοινωνικό ιστό.

Σε τούντην κατεύθυνση δρομολογείται η έκδοση ενός εύρους υλικού, πρωτοεμφανιζόμενου αλλά τζιαι ανατυπωμένου, με μια μεγάλη γκάμα θεμάτων.

Ελπίζουμε οι εκδόσεις να μπορέσουν να λειτουργήσουν στα πρότυπα της συνεργατικής παράδοσης τζαι ότι αρκετά μέλη με μια μικρή συνδρομή ή εισφορά θα επιτρέψουν την υλοποίηση άλλης μιας αναγκαίας υποδομής για τις ανάγκες του ανταγωνιστικού κινήματος

Τέλος είμαστε ανοιχτοί/ες σε ιδέες τζιαι συνεργασίες για μελλοντικά πρότζεκτ.

Λευκωσία, Καλοκαίρι 2017

Eκποιήσεις - Νέο Νομικό Πλαίσιο και Δυνατότητες Αντίστασης

By Μάγια Αθανάτου

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Σεπτέμβρης 2017: Eκποιήσεις: Νέο Νομικό Πλαίσιο και Δυνατότητες Αντίστασης

Στο Αυτόνομο Σχολείο του Σεπτέμβρη θα συζητήσουμε για το θέμα των εκποιήσεων, το καινούργιο νομοθετικό πλαίσιο και τις δυνατότητες αντίστασης από την κοινωνία. Φιλοξενούμε τους:

Μάγια Αθανατου, LLM by Research: 'The New Legal Foreclosure Regime in Cyprus: Time that is not Wasted, Time that Counts'

Σύνοψη παρουσίασης: Θα προσπαθήσω να αναδείξω κάποια χαρακτηριστικά των νομοθετικών μεταρρυθμίσεων σε σχέση με τις εκποιήσεις και την αφερεγγυότητα φυσικών προσώπων όπως αυτές προέκυψαν έπειτα του προγράμματος οικονομικής μεταρρύθμισης μεταξύ της Κύπρου και των Δανειστών της. Στα πλαίσια πτυχιακής, έθεσα ερωτήματα σε σχέση με το ρόλο του ‘χρόνου’ στις πρόσφατες αλλαγές. Η έννοια του χρόνου αποτελεί βάση με την οποία προσεγγίζω τρία κυρίως θέματα. Πρώτον, το ρόλο της ίδιας της απειλής έναντι της πρώτης κατοικίας. Υποστηρίζω ότι η σχετική απειλή εκφράζει αντιπαραθέσεις με συγκεκριμένες πτυχές κοινωνικού χρόνου στην Κύπρο που σχετίζονται με την απώλεια πρώτης κατοικίας. Δεύτερον, το ‘δίχτυ προστασίας’ που παρέχεται από το πλαίσιο αφερεγγυότητας. Υποστηρίζω πως βασικά ελαττώματα και κίνδυνοι που σχετίζονται με το ‘δίχτυ προστασίας’ συναρτούν με την ενεργοποίηση και την δόμηση του ατομικού χρόνου. Τρίτον, θέτω ερωτήματα για την έννοια ‘νόμοι-εξπρές’, υποστηρίζοντας ότι ο όρος επιτάχυνση μπορεί να κατανοηθεί και ως τον συντονισμό διαφορετικών χρονικών συμπεριφορών, ακόμα και των καθυστερήσεων και της έλλειψης χρόνου.

Δημήτρης Δημητρίου, Κινημα Ενάντιας Στις Εκποιήσεις: «Εκποιήσεις με διαδικασίες express όπως κατοχυρώνονται στο νέο νομοθετικό πλαίσιο»

Το Κίνημα ξεκίνησε από τα μέσα του 2013 με πρώτη κινητοποίηση τη πορεία προς το προεδρικό το καλοκαίρι του ιδίου χρόνου. Εντατικοποίηση των δράσεων σημειώθηκε το 2014 ιδιαίτερα λίγο πριν και κατά τη διάρκεια των συζητήσεων του νέου νομοθετικού πλαισίου , Σεπτέμβρη 2014 με εκδηλώσεις διαμαρτυρίας έξω από τη βουλή .

Ηχογράφηση:

Νέες Προσθήκες στο Αρχείο: Ολοκλήρωση Ψηφιοποίησης ...

Νέες Προσθήκες στο Αρχείο: Ολοκλήρωση Ψηφιοποίησης του Τραίνο Στην Πόλη

Το περιοδικό Τραίνο Στην Πόλη ήταν ένα από τα πρώτα έντυπα του αναρχικού/αντιεξουσιαστικού χώρου στην Κύπρο. Το πρώτο τεύχος εκδόθηκε στην Λεμεσό το 1987 και το τελευταίο το 1994.

Πλέον, και τα 11 τεύχη του περιοδικού είναι διαθέσιμα στο Αρχείο σε μορφή PDF, ωστόσο μια σειρά από εργασίες πρέπει να ακολουθήσουν, και η βοήθεια σας είναι αναγκαία.

  • Τα τεύχη 1 ως 8 έχουν σκαναριστεί από φωτοτυπίες, με αποτέλεσμα χαμηλή ποιότητα ψηφιοποίησης και απώλεια μέρους του κειμένου. Πρόσβαση στα πρωτότυπα των τευχών 1 ως 8 είναι απαραίτητη για νέο σκανάρισμα.
  • Υλικό που συνόδευε το περιοδικό σαν ένθετα, και υλικό που δημιουργήθηκε από τους ίδιους εκδότες είτε δεν έχει εντοπιστεί, είτε δεν έχει κατηγοριοποιηθεί κατάλληλα.
  • Για τα περισσότερα τεύχη απουσιάζει ο μήνας έκδοσης και άλλες ιστορικές πληροφορίες.
  • Για τα περισσότερα τεύχη δεν έχει δακτυλογραφηθεί ο κατάλογος περιεχομένων.
  • Για τα περισσότερα τεύχη δεν έχουν δακτυλογραφηθεί τα σκαναρισμένα άρθρα.
  • Κανένα άρθρο του περιοδικού, ούτε οι σελίδες περιγραφής του δεν έχουν μεταφραστεί στα Αγγλικά και Τουρκικά.

Για οποιαδήποτε βοήθεια μπορείτε να προσφέρετε, επικοινωνήστε μαζί μας με email στο arxeio@riseup.net.

Η αντίσταση στο πραξικόπημα του 1974 στο Καϊμακλί

By Πανίκος Λαπηθιώτης

Η αντίσταση στο πραξικόπημα του 1974 στο Καϊμακλί

Συζήτηση με τους: Πανίκο Λαπηθιώτη, μαχητή της Αντίστασης Ανδρέα Σαβουλλή, πρώην πρόεδρο του Μορφωτικού Συλλόγου «Πρόοδος» Καϊμακλίου

Τρίτη, 25/7/2017 ώρα: 19.30 στον Κοινωνικό Χώρο Kaymakκιν, Αρχ. Μακαρίου 127, Καϊμακλί

Audio Recording:

Η αντίσταση στο πραξικόπημα του 1974 στο Καϊμακλί

By Πανίκος Λαπηθιώτης

Η αντίσταση στο πραξικόπημα του 1974 στο Καϊμακλί

Συζήτηση με τους: Πανίκο Λαπηθιώτη, μαχητή της Αντίστασης Ανδρέα Σαβουλλή, πρώην πρόεδρο του Μορφωτικού Συλλόγου «Πρόοδος» Καϊμακλίου

Τρίτη, 25/7/2017 ώρα: 19.30 στον Κοινωνικό Χώρο Kaymakκιν, Αρχ. Μακαρίου 127, Καϊμακλί

Audio Recording:

Νέες Προσθήκες στο Αρχείο: Τα 6 πρώτα τεύχη του Εντός ...

Νέες Προσθήκες στο Αρχείο: Τα 6 πρώτα τεύχη του Εντός των Τειχών

Ανακοινώνουμε την διάθεση των πρώτων 6 τευχών του εξαιρετικά σημαντικού περιοδικού της Λευκωσίας, Εντός των Τειχών.

Το Εντός των Τειχών κυκλοφόρησε μεταξύ των ετών 1985 και 1989, με 41 τεύχη στο σύνολο του. Έχουμε ολοκληρώσει την ψηφιοποίηση των πρώτων 6, δηλαδή όλα τα τεύχη που κυκλοφόρησαν το 1985. Σύντομα θα είναι διαθέσιμα και τα τεύχη 7 έως 17, που καλύπτουν τον επόμενο χρόνο κυκλοφορίας του περιοδικού, το 1986.

Όπως και για κάθε υλικό που ανεβάζουμε στο Αρχείο, η διαθεσιμότητα των σκαναρισμένων PDF είναι μόνο η αρχή. Χρειαζόμαστε την βοήθεια σας για την καλύτερη ταξινόμηση και ιστορική πλαισίωση του κάθε υλικού, την δακτυλογράφηση των σκαναρισμένων σελίδων και την μετάφραση του υλικού προς τα Αγγλικά και τα Τουρκικά.

Επίσης, για το Εντός των Τειχών, χρειαζόμαστε το τεύχος 28, το οποίο δεν έχουμε ανακτήσει ακόμα.

Για οποιαδήποτε βοήθεια μπορείτε να προσφέρετε, επικοινωνήστε μαζί μας με email στο arxeio@riseup.net.

EXTERNAL ASPECT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

By myislandcyprus.blogspot.com

In the “Special Issue: The Cyprus Problem” of the “In Depth” bimonthly Electronic Newsletter, published in February 2017, I dealt with the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem under the title “Uncertainties at the Cyprus negotiations.” In this issue, I shall point out the uncertainties about the external aspect, mainly the security and the guarantee issues in a possible agreement.

INTERNAL SECURITY
According to the new guarantee formula that the Greek Cypriot side has brought to the table, first 75% of Turkish troops will be withdrawn and the remaining 25% will be withdrawn within a predetermined time (e.g. 18 months) under UNFICYP supervision. (The Turkish Cypriot side did not accept this. They insist that the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, whenever it is needed, should have always the unilateral right of calling Turkey for intervention.)

Internal security was organized in three stages: First, there will be a police force at the constituent state level, comprising 60% Greek Cypriot and 40% Turkish Cypriot policemen, who will serve at their desks, i.e. 5,000 in the south and 3,100 in the north.

The second phase is at the federal level, with 500 police officers at a proportion of 50: 50%, units with the authority of using weapons would serve in emergency response and in federal criminal investigation bureau. The local police of the Turkish Cypriot state will ask for help from the federal government if it is difficult.

In the third stage, the UN Security Council will have an international police force of 2,500 people. This police force will provide personnel from the EU countries outside Greece and the UK and from third countries outside Turkey. This multinational police force to be formed immediately after the settlement will not interfere in any way with the internal arrangement of the United Cyprus and it will function for five years and will be placed on the border between the two constituent states, after the Turkish troops have withdrawn completely from the island. According to Article 6 of the UN Constitution, there will be only light weapons and no authority to interfere with conflicts.

The international police force will only be activated if there is a threat and international peace is in danger. This is a comment by the Security Council based on political criteria and interests and it requires a number of other measures, such as implementing the 7th Article, the economic embargo before the military measures and/or the sea and air bombings.

EXTERNAL SECURITY AND GUARANTEES
Great Britain and Greece, three of the NATO countries that guaranteed the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, seem eager to give up their rights in the new era.

Greek Foreign Minister Kotzias made a proposal to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Stabilization between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. Through this treaty, it was announced that safety valves could be added to various subjects.

Turkey, on the other hand, requires a structure, as in 1960, not only for the United Cyprus Republic, but also for the constituent states, in which the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order are guaranteed. Three Turkish formulas have been put forward regarding the guarantees:

1. A formula, in which NATO is involved,
2. The guarantee of a Turkish base within the Turkish Cypriot province and commanded by the Turkish commander,
3. The Turkish guarantor will remain for only the Turkish Cypriots after the settlement. In this regard, no agreement has yet been reached.

SOVEREIGN MILITARY BASE
It is understood that Turkey's proposal is not to assure the physical security of the Turkish Cypriots or the implementation of the resolution, but rather to raise the geo-strategic demands of her own country. Although Turkey had leaked to the press that she wanted to limit her right to interfere with island’s internal affairs, only to the Turkish Cypriot province, but later Turkey wanted to keep a sovereign military base within the Turkish state to be formed in the northern part of the island. This would be commanded by a Turkish commander and its duration would not be fixed.


Turkish President Erdogan wanted to give the message that Turkey will always stay in Cyprus with guarantees and her troops, in a statement he gave immediately after the end of the five-party conference in Geneva in the middle of January 2017. Erdogan demanded that the closed territory of Famagusta be given to the Greek Cypriot side, while the territory of Kokkina and Morphou would be combined and given to the Turkish Cypriot side. "Do not wait for Karpasia and the shoreline" he added. This meant that the Pirgo-Dilliria regions would be given to the control of the constituent Turkish Cypriot state.

According to the Greek Cypriot press, the occupation army has recently developed facilities in the Kokkina region and the Republic of Cyprus also was asked for some facilities, but these requests were rejected. After this rejection, 250 concrete and other materials were transported by sea to this region. According to the evaluations made, this development of the region is related to the military base the Turkish side wants to establish in Cyprus in case of a solution. According to the Turkish proposal, this base will be sovereign and 2,500 troops will settle here.


RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT OF FOUR FREEDOMS TO THE CITIZENS OF TURKEY, THE CITIZENS OF A NON-EU MEMBER
It was described as "very serious", when Turkey demanded, especially during the discussions on the Cyprus issue, that the EU's 4 freedoms (free movement of people, goods, services and capital) should be granted to Turkish citizens and the Greek Cypriot side stated that it did not consider this demand to deal with Cyprus negotiations.

President Nicos Anastasiades sent a letter to the European Commission on January 30, 2017, saying that "Ankara made a blackmail with her demand for 4 freedoms" and, if recognized, "this will have very serious and unprecedented effects not only on Cyprus, but also on the EU and its member states".

The newspaper wrote that Anastasiades received positive responses from the European countries, saying that so far some EU member states were against to the granting of 4 freedoms to Turkish citizens and Bulgaria responded in the same way the day before.

The Fileleftheros newspaper, dated 4 April 2017, informed that a joint procedure of Washington, London, Brussels and the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide was being followed that the demand for the recognition of 4 freedoms would be recognized for the Turkish citizens after the settlement of the Cyprus problem.


Under the title of "The US has 4 freedoms in the background", the Fileleftheros newspaper, based on the information it received, reported that the United States was included in the "game" of support for the request of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, through Jonathan Cohen, Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The newspaper claims that Cohen gave the EU the opinion that the Turkish request should be fulfilled and that Brussels does not oppose this view and that, based on the same information, he also claimed that the issue of equal treatment for the Turkish citizens was also on the agenda, whereas they are not aware of the rights the Greek citizens in Cyprus have acquired from the EU membership.


The newspaper also said that in case the EU demands, Cohen would be able to provide equal treatment for Turkish and Greek Citizens in Cyprus by "simulating exercises" through the combination of previously applied models, including "Kaliningrad" or "Portugal". He was also informed that preparations could be made for that. It has also been suggested that Brussels will act in a way that Cyprus will have a special status in the EU, in accordance with "previous models".

Regarding the free movement of goods, the newspaper claimed that Turkey is working on the combination of "Customs Union with the EU" and "Providing mutual facilities" between the Federal Republic of Cyprus and Ankara.

In its news comment on 5 March 2017, the Fileleftheros newspaper wrote under the title "EU: Four Freedom with the Portuguese-Brazilian Model" that there are hopes for the creation of a perspective for the resumption of the negotiations on the Cyprus issue, if the influential circles in Brussels examine the “similar examples” for the realization of the Turkish demands for 4 freedoms for her citizens in Cyprus.


The newspaper wrote that the influential circles worked on the example of Portugal, which provided the privileged treatment of the EU, before allowing it to join the EU, by granting work permits to workers from Brazil depending on the special relationship between the two countries.

The newspaper reported that there is a significant difference between the Portuguese example and the situation in Cyprus and that Portugal was not an EU member, when it demanded this privilege, whereas Cyprus has been an EU member state since 13 years.


After a blockage of the inter-communal negotiations, the Greek Cypriot press wrote that the UN has prepared some important bridging proposals between the external security aspect of the Cyprus problem and the internal constitutional aspect, like the rotating presidency. We shall be seeing the results, when the two leaders meet in New York.



(published in In Depth, Bimonthly Electronic Newsletter, Volume 14, Issue 3- June 2017, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs,  University of Nicosia)
  • June 27th 2017 at 22:25
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Νέες Προσθήκες στο Αρχείο - New Additions in the Archive

Νέες Προσθήκες στο Αρχείο - New Additions in the Archive

Το ακόλουθο υλικό έχει προσθεθεί στο Αρχείο - The Following Documents have been added to the Archive (in the Greek language section):

Επίσεις δακτυλογραφήθηκαν τα ακόλουθα κείμενα στα Ελληνικά - In Addition, the following articles have been typed in Greek:

Όταν η ιστορία μαθαίνει από το κίνημα

By Αντώνης Χατζήκυριακου

2ο Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Ιούνης 2017: Όταν η ιστορία μαθαίνει από το κίνημα

Στο δεύτερο αυτόνομο σχολείο του Ιούνη, θα συζητήσουμε με τον ιστορικό / οθωμανολόγο Αντώνη Χατζήκυριακου: " Όταν η ιστορία μαθαίνει από το κίνημα: από την οικονομική στην περιβαλλοντική ιστορία και από την Κύπρο στη Μαδέιρα"

Ηχογράφηση:

Όταν η ιστορία μαθαίνει από το κίνημα

By Αντώνης Χατζήκυριακου

2ο Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Ιούνης 2017: Όταν η ιστορία μαθαίνει από το κίνημα

Στο δεύτερο αυτόνομο σχολείο του Ιούνη, θα συζητήσουμε με τον ιστορικό / οθωμανολόγο Αντώνη Χατζήκυριακου: " Όταν η ιστορία μαθαίνει από το κίνημα: από την οικονομική στην περιβαλλοντική ιστορία και από την Κύπρο στη Μαδέιρα"

Ηχογράφηση:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

By myislandcyprus.blogspot.com


The Cyprus problem has been the legacy of the British colonial “divide and rule” policy. When the British occupied the island in 1878, ending a 300-year period of Ottoman rule that had begun in 1571, the British preferred to keep the existing structures of education in Cyprus. The Christian Greek Cypriot and the Moslem Turkish Cypriot schools were kept separate from one another. There were two Boards of Education, which ensured that the curriculums of the two communities mirrored those in Greece and Turkey respectively. Thus the nationalism of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots did not originate from the local historical circumstances, but the nationalist ideas were imported to the island through the teachers, books and newspapers that came from Greece and Turkey. This nationalism was encouraged by the British colonial administration and the British tried to disseminate it among the unconscious masses of people in accordance to their traditional policy of ‘divide and rule’.
           Following the annexation of Cyprus by the British Empire in 1914, the new Republic of Turkey gave up all of her rights on Cyprus, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923. This was confirmed in 1925, when Britain declared Cyprus as a Crown Colony – a status it retained until 1960.
The Communist Party of Cyprus, which was established in 1926, had a political programme of acquiring independence of the island and it was envisaged to become a part of the Socialist Balkan Federation. But after the nationalist rebellion of the Greek Cypriots in 1931, the British banned all the political activities and abolished the Legislative Council, where a Turkish Cypriot member voted together with the Greek Cypriot members some months ago.

             During the Second World War, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots fought and served together, on the side of Great Britain, on various fronts and at home, they organised  themselves in the same trade unions against the difficult economic conditions. In 1941, the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL) was established and it adopted a policy for the union (enosis) of the island with Greece. This was the biggest obstacle for the cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots, who saw it as a danger to their existence.
            In 1955, the Greek Cypriots started a terror campaign against the British colonial administration with the final aim of union of the island with Greece. It was in 1955 that Turkey was made again a party to the Cyprus problem with the London Conference and in 1956 Turkey and the collaborationist Turkish Cypriot leadership adopted the British plans, which aimed at the partition of the island (taksim) as a political solution.
The Turkish Cypriot youth became auxiliary police and commandoes in order to fight against the Greek Cypriot fighters. When the Greek Cypriot underground organization, the EOKA, killed the Turkish Cypriot members of the security forces, the Turkish Cypriot underground organization, the TMT, began to kill the Greek Cypriots in retaliation.

Both organizations were anti-communist oriented and they killed also progressive Cypriots. The TMT killed in 1958 some members of the progressive Turkish Cypriot trade unions and forced the others to resign from the common trade unions, thus destroying the foundations of the common political struggle.

            At the end of the conflict, neither the Greek Cypriots’ aim for enosis, nor the Turkish Cypriots’ aim for taksim were materialized, but a limited independence was given to a new partnership Republic of Cyprus, which was established in 1960. The British maintained their sovereignty over the two military bases. Both enosis and taksim policies were banned in the constitution. The guarantors of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new state were members of the NATO, i.e. Britain, Greece and Turkey and they did not want to see a Cypriot state, free of their influences.

            The Turkish Cypriots, having 18% of the island’s population, were given 30% share in the administration of the new Republic of Cyprus. This was not digested by the Greek Cypriots. Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Republic, did not believe in the idea of creating a new Cypriot nation. He told to an Italian newspaper that the London Agreements created a new state, but not a new nation. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not believe in the new partnership Republic and continued its separatist policies.
Two Turkish Cypriot advocates, Ahmet Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet, started to publish on the day of independence a weekly newspaper, called “Cumhuriyet” (The Republic), where they waged with other progressive Turkish Cypriots a struggle for the cooperation of the two main communities in Cyprus in the new state. For the first time, the ideas of Cypriotism were being propagated through an oppositional newspaper and later they established a political party. The writers of the “Cumhuriyet” newspaper were supporting the independence of Cyprus, condemning the aim of union of the island with another nation or state and they wanted that Cyprus should belong to its own people, the Cypriots. Unfortunately these staunch supporters of the Republic of Cyprus were killed by the TMT on 23 April 1962, on the pretext that they served the interests of the Greek Cypriots. In 1965, Dervish Ali Kavazoglu, who was a Turkish Cypriot member of the Central Committee of the AKEL, was murdered together with his Greek Cypriot trade-unionist friend. He was against the partitionist policies of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and for the friendship and cooperation of the two communities in Cyprus. These actions of intimidation silenced the democratic opposition within the Turkish Cypriot community.
In the 1960’s, contrary to the processes in Europe, many African and Asian states were formed before the consolidation of a nation. In the case of Cyprus, this fragile partnership lasted only three years. In December 1963, the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios tried to change the 13 points of the constitution by abolishing the veto power of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Dr. Kuchuk. The inter-communal clashes started and at the beginning of 1964, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the state apparatus. This conflict of nationalisms between the pro-union Greek Cypriot leadership and the pro-partition Turkish Cypriot leadership complicated the solution of the ethnic-national question in Cyprus. The unity of action and aim of the Cypriots could not be developed under a common shared aim and this was exploited by the imperialist powers.
            On 21 December 1963, inter-communal clashes started and the underground organizations, which had their connections with the foreign powers, became influential again in both communities. The Greek Cypriot leadership was aiming the union of the island with Greece and the Turkish Cypriot leadership was planning to create the conditions for the partition of the island. Now Cyprus problem was once again on the international arena.
            We read in a working paper, prepared by Donald A. Wehmeyer, a US legal adviser, on 11 December 1963 that a Treaty of Joint Sovereignty between Greece and Turkey was proposed. Wehmeyer added to his memorandum “Outline of Possible Cyprus Settlement” an important ingredient for a solution, which would be more attractive to Turkey: Cyprus should be divided into provinces. Certain provinces would be administered mainly by Turkish Cypriots and this would create an illusion of partition or federation. (Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention”, Germany, 2001, p.226 and 229)
Salahi R. Sonyel writes that the British government hit upon an interesting solution, which was the reconstruction of Cyprus as a federal solution:

“Thus on 3 January (1964), Sir Francis Vallat asked H.G.Darwin, a constitutional expert, to produce a paper examining the possibility of dividing Cyprus into a Turkish and a Greek area, which might be formed into a federal state. Even if such a plan was feasible a number of problems were foreseen in its application. Darwin composed a memorandum, in which he suggested a federation of two states, one predominantly of Greek, and the other of Turkish populations. He also suggested an exchange of population in order to realise the Turkish state. The capital of the Turkish state would be Kyrenia.” (Cyprus, The Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath, British Document 1960-1974, Extended second edition, Ankara 2003, pp.78-78)

In the summer of 1964, Makarios rejected the Acheson Plan, which was discussed in Geneva and which envisaged the union of Cyprus with Greece on the condition that a military base would be given to Turkey in Karpas peninsula. President Makarios was re-elected in 1968 with his new policy of “feasible solution”, instead of enosis.
We read again from Nicolet’s book: “Acheson was fully indulging himself in studying the different proposals that had emerged in Washington throughout spring of 1964. In Brands’ words, “he was ready to devise a plan that would eliminate the Cyprus problem by eliminating Cyprus.” A suggestion he was particularly intrigued with was Don Wehmeyer’s scheme of 24 April, providing enosis with an illusion of partition or federation to the Turks by the establishment of certain provinces to be administered by Turkish Cypriot eparchs, as he cabled to Ball on 8 July. (Nicolet, ibid, p.257)
And this was finally realized with a so-called “controlled intervention” (Nicolet, ibid, p.213)  in the summer of 1974, which was decided by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece, Christos Ksantopoulos-Palamas and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Osman Olcay. The two ministers met on 3-4 June 1971 during the NATO ministerial meeting in Lisbon and discussed how to get rid of Makarios and put an end to the independence of the Republic of Cyprus by partitioning the island through “double enosis”.
            As the imperialist foreign powers and their tools on the island were against the independent development of the Republic of Cyprus, which followed a non-aligned foreign policy, they were continuously inciting nationalistic and anti-communist feelings among the island’s population. We observe again in this period that a Cypriot consciousness could not be developed to a sufficient degree.

From 1968 until 1974, various rounds of inter-communal negotiations were carried out without signing a final agreement.  A de facto situation was created by an aborted coup d’Etat against President Makarios, organized by the fascist Greek junta and its military forces in Cyprus on 15 July 1974. This created an opportunity for Turkey to intervene five days later to the internal affairs of Cyprus. Turkey occupied the 37% of the northern part of the island and on 16 August 1974, on the 16th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the island’s territory was partitioned into two regions, one in the North for the Turkish Cypriots and the other in the South for the Greek Cypriots.

In a declassified Secret Memorandum sent from Helmut Sonnenfeld, Counselor of the US State Department to Secretary Henry Kissinger on 14 August 1974, the directive was the following:

“Assuming the Turks quickly take Famagusta, privately assure Turks, we will get them a solution involving one third of the island, within some kind of federal arrangement.” (Cyprus Weekly, 10 August 2007)
            The Greek Cypriots were forced to leave the occupied areas and the Turkish Cypriots living in south of the cease-fire line were transported to the northern part. A bi-regional, ethnically cleansed geographical division was attained de facto. It remained to form a de jure central government for the “federation”, which was the aim of the Turkish government since 1964. The new state of affairs forced the Turkish Cypriots to have closer relationship with Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots became under the direct influence of the mainland Turkish economy, politics and culture.

            The Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration declared first on 13 February 1975 the “Cyprus Turkish Federated State” and then announced a unilateral declaration of independence on 15 November 1985, under the name “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, on the Turkish occupied territory of the island. This was condemned immediately by a resolution of the Security Council of the UN. Several rounds of inter-communal talks could not bring the two communities together under a bi-communal federal umbrella and the island remains since 1974 partitioned, occupied and colonized. Besides the Turkish Occupation Army of 40,000 troops, there are more than 250,000 Anatolian settlers, living in the northern part of the island and most of them are given the citizenship of the “TRNC”. Northern Cyprus has become a colony of Turkey, where the number of the indigenous Turkish Cypriots are estimated to be around 120,000.
            We observed that especially after 1974, two different identities have emerged: One in the north of the divide, possessing the separatist “TRNC” as an expression of Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist identity and another one in the south of the divide, as the sole owner of the Cypriot state, which has distinctively a Greek Cypriot character.
            In order to reach at a common goal, there should be common political parties of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, seeking common political aims. The full equality of all the communities living on the island in the fields of politics, economy and culture could only be achieved through common political parties, which will fight for a democratic federal state and against all kinds of separatism and discrimination.

            A correct policy for the solution of the problem of nationalities is indispensable and this is the responsibility of the party of the working class, the AKEL. Unless the AKEL review its policy for the Turkish Cypriots and turn to them, no step forwards could be achieved with the existing nationalist policies and this would consolidate the partition of the island.  
            Another point of view, which should not be overlooked is that the solution of the problem in the concrete conditions of Cyprus depends on one hand on the elimination of the influences of imperialism and neo-colonialism and the military bases and on the other hand to decide how to solve the internal question of nationalities, which I see as the main issue. But the determining factor here is not the difference between the two communities. On the contrary, it has to be stressed that the class struggle in the whole country and in the international arena will be decisive.
It seems that the following fear of the imperialists is still valid, first mentioned in the 1989 International Yearbook of Communist Affairs: “If the north and the south of Cyprus will be united in a future “Federal Cyprus”, the electoral power of the Greek and Turkish communists can win the majority of the votes in any Presidential elections of such an unusual government. But here the crucial problem is not, as the bourgeois circles suggest, “which   community will govern the other one”, but “which class will have the power in his hand on the whole of the island.

(Paper read at the Emergency 4th Euro-Mediterranean Workers’ Conference, organized by Balkan Socialist Center “Christian Rakovsky” and the RedMed web network, in Athens-Greece, on 26-28 May 2017)


  • May 30th 2017 at 09:46
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Οι Εξορύξεις Σε Ελλάδα – Κύπρο Και Η Απάντηση Των Κοινοτήτων

By Dayanışma

Οι Εξορύξεις Σε Ελλάδα – Κύπρο Και Η Απάντηση Των Κοινοτήτων

Παρασκευή 27 Μάη 2017, στις 18:00 στα πλαίσια του αντιεξουσιαστικού φεστιβάλ B-FEST6 στην Ελλάδα

Βίντεο

Οι Εξορύξεις Σε Ελλάδα – Κύπρο Και Η Απάντηση Των Κοινοτήτων

By Dayanışma

Οι Εξορύξεις Σε Ελλάδα – Κύπρο Και Η Απάντηση Των Κοινοτήτων

Παρασκευή 27 Μάη 2017, στις 18:00 στα πλαίσια του αντιεξουσιαστικού φεστιβάλ B-FEST6 στην Ελλάδα

Βίντεο

Beyond Gay: The politics of pride

By Dayanışma

Beyond Gay: The politics of pride

We invite everyone to join our screening of the documentary “Beyond Gay: the Politics of Pride” on the 9th of May at Social Space Kaymakκιν, in Kaymakli, at 19:00. Following the screening, there will be presentations from members of antifa λευkoşa, Dayanışma, Queer Cyprus and Syspirosi Atakton on LGBTQI+ activism and pride experiences in Cyprus, continued with open discussion.

Recording:

Αναδημοσίευση: Σημείωμα για την παράτυπη φραγή ...

Αναδημοσίευση: Σημείωμα για την παράτυπη φραγή ιστοσελίδας με εντολές της αστυνομίας

Το Κινηματικό Αρχείο μοιράζεται τις ανησυχίες που εκφράζει το πιο κάτω σημείωμα της Συσπείρωσης Ατάκτων. Αναδημοσιεύουμε από την ιστοσελίδα της οργάνωσης.

Την Παρασκευή 12 Μάη, η αστυνομία έβαλε στο μάτι μια ιστοσελίδα που είναι ξεκάθαρα πλατφόρμα δημοσίευσης για φάρσες. Εσυλλάβαν με την κατηγορία της διάδωσης ψευδών ειδήσεων έναν άτομο που εδημοσίευσεν φάρσα με πρωταγωνιστήν τον εαυτόν του.

Σύμφωνα με τες εφημερίδες, που την Παρασκευή εψάχναν τρόπο να μπλοκκάρουν την ιστοσελίδα για λόγους “δημοσίου συμφέροντος”. Την Δευτέρα είχαν ήδη έτοιμη την λύση: εχρησιμοποιήσαν δύο νόμους που έν έχουν καμιά σχέση με την υπόθεση για να αναγκάσουν τις εταιρίες που παρέχουν πρόσβαση στο ίντερνετ να μπλοκκάρουν ολόκληρη την πλατφόρμα. Πρόκειται για τον νόμο καταπολέμησης της παιδικής πορνογραφίας, τζιαι τζιείνον για τον ηλεκτρονικόν τζόγο. Δηλαδή, ό,τι ήβραν για να τελειώνουν – έτσι τζι αλλιώς ο φαρσέρ ακόμα εν εκαταδικάστηκε, τζιαι φυσικά μια ολόκληρη πλατφόρμα έν μπόρει να φέρει ευθύνη για την ανάρτηση ενός χρήστη της, άρα νομική κάλυψη μηδέν για την απόφασήν τους. Σημειώνουμεν βέβαια ότι μέχρι στιγμής κάποιες εταιρίες αγνοήσαν το αίτημα του κράτους.

Για εμάς τούτη η εξέλιξη εν ανησυχητική. Πρόκειται για περισταστικό λογοκρισίας της ηλεκτρονικής έκφρασης, με αρκήν έναν εύκολο στόχο χωρίς πολιτική σημασία, το οποίο ελπίζουν να περάσει απαρατήρητο.

Αν για το “δημόσιο συμφέρον” ξεκινήσουν να μπλοκκάρουν σελίδες όποτε θέλουν, ίσως φέρνοντας τζιαι νόμους που να τους προσφέρουν νομική κάλυψη στο μέλλον, η διεθνής εμπειρία δείχνει μας ότι το κίνημαν της αντιπληροφόρησης το οποίο η σΑ θεωρεί ιδιαίτερα σημαντικό, αλλά τζιαι της συλλογικής συγγραφής (όπως το έργο της Wikipedia) γίνουνται στόχοι.

Ας μεν συνηθίσουμεν λοιπόν στην ηλέ-αστυνομία ακόμα τζιαι αν πρόκεται για φάρσες, γιατί κάθε μικρή ολίσθηση προς τον ολοκληρωτισμό περνά εύκολα απαρατήρητη την στιγμή που γίνεται.

Ζητούμεν που τα κυπριακά μέσα αντιπληροφόρησης τζιαι ριζοσπαστικής συζήτησης (οργανώσεις τζιαι bloggers) να μεν περιμένουν να γίνει ο χώρος μας στόχος πριν εναντιωθούμεν δημόσια σε τούτες τες πρακτικές.

Beyond Gay: The politics of pride

By Dayanışma

Beyond Gay: The politics of pride

We invite everyone to join our screening of the documentary “Beyond Gay: the Politics of Pride” on the 9th of May at Social Space Kaymakκιν, in Kaymakli, at 19:00. Following the screening, there will be presentations from members of antifa λευkoşa, Dayanışma, Queer Cyprus and Syspirosi Atakton on LGBTQI+ activism and pride experiences in Cyprus, continued with open discussion.

Recording:

Που το Σιάτλ στο Αμβούργο

By Συσπείρωση Ατάκτων

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Μάη 2017

Που το Σιάτλ στο Αμβούργο

Με αφορμή τη συνάντηση των G20 στο Αμβούργο τον Ιούλιο του 2017 και τις κινητοποιήσεις που διοργανώνονται στο Αμβούργο εκείνες τις μέρες, αφιερώνουμε το αυτόνομο σχολείο του Μαίου για να συζητήσουμε την ιστορία των κινητοποιήσεων του κινήματος παγκόσμιας δικαιοσύνης, ξεκινώντας από το Σιάτλ το 1999 και φτάνοντας μέχρι το Αμβούργο.

Ηχογράφηση

Μετακινήσεις και έμφυλες διαφορές

By Μαρία Σαρρή

Μετακινήσεις και έμφυλες διαφορές

Αυτόνομο σχολείο 27 Απριλίου 2017

H Συσπείρωση Ατάκτων οργανώνει για το αυτόνομο σχολείο Απριλίου την εκδήλωση “Μετακινήσεις και έμφυλες διαφορές”.

Στην εκδήλωση θα γίνει προβολή της ταινίας μικρού μήκους “Romeo&Juliet@Freeland” και συζήτηση με τη δημιουργό Μαρία Σαρρή καθώς και εισήγηση απο τον Άκη Γαβριηλίδη: “Είναι η μαντίλα σύμβολο θρησκευτικής καταπίεσης;”.

Ηχογράφηση

Λύσην τωρά! Çözüm Şimdi! Solution now!

By linopampakos


 
1. Ελληνοκύπριοι, Τουρκοκύπριοι, Αρμένηες, Μαρωνίτες, ξένοι τζ̆αι ντόπιοι, που κατοικούμεν τζ̆αι αγαπούμεν τούτον τον τόπον, δηλώννουμεν ότι δεν θέλουμεν να ενωθεί με κανέναν κράτος, ούτε να μείνει μoιρασμένος. Καλούμεν τα ελληνοκυπριακά τζ̆αι τουρκοκυπριακά πολιτικά κόμματα που στηρίζουν την λύση να αναλάβουν πρωτοβουλίες για να το κάμουν γνωστόν τζ̆αι ξεκάθαρον προς τους ξένους τζ̆αι προς τους Κυπραίους ούλλους, ότι τούτον εν η πεποίθηση αλλά τζ̆αι ο στρατηγικός στόχος της πλειοψηφίας του λαού. Είναι η κυριόττερη σύγκλιση για την ασφάλειαν που χρειαζούμαστιν σήμμερα για να ξεπεραστεί το αδιέξοδον, να γνωρίζει τζ̆αι να εμπιστεύεται η μια κοινότητα τους πραγματικούς στόχους της άλλης. Καλούμεν τες πολιτικές δυνάμεις να στηρίξουν την προσπάθειαν των ηγετών για λύσην, δείχνοντας τους έμπρακτα το πολιτικόν υπόβαθρον πάνω στο οποίον θα χτιστεί η ομοσπονδία.

2. Εμάς που υπογράφουμεν την δήλωσην τούτην, δεν επηρεάζεται η σκέψη μας που γόητρα παλιών πολέμων. Δρούμεν μαζίν ορθολογικά για την ειρήνην τζ̆αι το κοινόν μας μέλλον. Καλούμεν τους ηγέτες να απελευθερωθούν που τα όποια γόητρα τζ̆αι να επικεντρωθούν στην δουλειάν να ξεπεραστούν οι δυσκολίες. Καλούμεν τους να σταματήσουν να σπαταλούν ενέργειαν να ρίξει ο ένας τον άλλον που το γόητρον του τζ̆αι να χάννουν τον χρόνον ποιού εν τα φταισίματα, Ο κόσμος χρειάζεται να του δείξουν στην πράξην πως θα λειτουργήσει αρμονικά η αυριανή μας ομοσπονδία.

3. Εμείς μελετούμεν τα γεγονότα για να δημιουργήσουμεν άποψην για το παρελθόν τζ̆αι να εμπνευστούμεν για έναν όμορφον τζ̆αι ειρηνικόν μέλλον. Οι ηγέτες να καλέσουν τους θεσμούς παιδείας των θκυ̮ο κοινοτήτων  να δηλώσουν ότι εν προσηλωμένοι σε μιαν εκπαίδευσην που σέβεται την ιστορίαν σαν επιστήμην τζ̆αι όχι πολιτικόν εργαλείον,  τζ̆αι που σέβεται τους μαθητές σαν αθρώπους ελεύθερους, να έχουν δικήν τους κρίσην για τα γενονότα.

4. Καλούμεν τα κόμματα που λαλούν ότι θέλουν λύσην να δηλώσουν ότι απέχουν που οποιανδήποτε προεκλογικήν δραστηριότηταν μέχρι τζ̆αι 4 μήνες πριν τες εκλογές για να δώσουν χώρον τζ̆αι χρόνον στους ηγέτες να καταλήξει η τρέχουσα προσπάθεια τους, ή να προχωρήσει σε σημείον μη επιστροφής, έτσι που να την συνεχίσει όποιος τζ̆αι να εκλεγεί αν δεν προλάβουν. Καλούμεν τους ηγέτες να προσηλωθούν πάνω στα σημαντικά προβλήματα για να έχουμεν σύντομα τες τελικές συγκλίσεις που θα ορίσουν την λύσην. Επιθυμούμεν οι επόμενες εκλογές να είναι ομοσπονδιακές τζ̆αι να ψηφίσουμεν ούλλοι οι Κυπραίοι τους άρχοντες πον να εφαρμόσουν την λύσην τζ̆αι θα θεμελιώσουν την ομοσπονδιακήν ειρήνην στον τόπον.

5. Προσκαλούμεν τα κόμματα, τες οργανώσεις, τους ενεργούς πολίτες να αναλάβουν πρωτοβουλίες ενημέρωσης του λαού. Όπως φτάννουμεν στα δύσκολα με το θέμαν της ασφάλειας, να οργανωθούν δικοινοτικές συγκεντρώσεις όπου ΤΚ πολιτικοί της λύσης να εκθέσουν στο ελληνοκυπριακόν ακροατήριον την αντίληψην τζ̆αι τους φόβους των ΤΚ για την ασφάλειαν τζ̆αι  ΕΚ πολιτικοί της λύσης, να εξηγήσουν σε τουρκοκυπριακά ακροατήρια την αντίληψην τζ̆αι τους φόβους των ΕΚ. Καλούμεν πρωτοποριακές οργανώσεις της κοινωνίας, πολιτιστικές οργανώσεις, συνδέσμους καλιτεχνών, επαγγελματιών, να τολμήσουν να κάμουν το βήμαν για την πιο ειρηνικήν ένωσην, δημιουργώντας δικοινοτικές ομοσπονδίες, διόντας στες οργανώσεις τζ̆αινούρκαν δυνάμικήν απευθυνόμενοι σε ούλλους τους Κυπραίους.

6. Η σημμερινή κρίση δείχνει ότι τα αδιέξοδα μας στην Κύπρον δεν μπορούν να ξεπεραστούν ούτε με επιβολήν της άποψης μιας αριθμητικής πλειοψηφίας που μιαν κοινότηταν πα στην άλλην, ούτε με το βέτο μιας μειοψηφίας που μπλοκκάρει, ούτε με την προσφυγήν στην βίαν από τρίτα κράτη που διαθέτουν στρατιωτικήν ισχύν, ούτε με τον αποκλεισμόν ή με αποχώρησην της μιας κοινότητας που τες πολιτικές αποφάσεις. Καλούμεν τους ηγέτες να γινούν πιο σοφοί τζ̆αι πολιτικά πιο δυνατοί που τα διδάγματα της κρίσης, για να έβρουν την πολιτικήν βούλησην μιας τελευταίας σύγκλισης για την ασφάλειαν τζ̆αι την διακυβέρνησην αποκλείοντας ότι φοβίζει τους αθρώπους που θα ψηφίσουν την μέλλουσαν συμφωνίαν.

Απαιτούμεν λύσην τωρά! Κύπριοι μπλόγκερ -  
Dayanışma

 
Λύσην τωρά! Çözüm Şimdi! Solution now!


1.  Kıbrıslı Rumlar, Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıslı Ermeniler ve Kıbrıslı Maronitler, yabancılar ve bu topraklarda yaşamayı seven yerliler olarak bizler, başka herhangi bir devletle birleşmek ya da bölünmüş bir şekilde yaşamak istemiyoruz. Çözümü destekleyen Kıbrıslı Rum ve Kıbrıslı Türk siyasi partilerine inisiyatif almaları ve Kıbrıs’ta ya da dışında yaşayan herkesi bunun halkın çoğunluğunun stratejik amacı olduğu noktasında bilgilendirmelerini istiyoruz. Günümüz çıkmazını aşmamızın tek yolu her iki toplumun da birbirlerinin gerçek hedeflerini bilmeleri ve güvenmelerinden gelir. Siyasi güçleri liderlerin, Federasyonun inşa edileceği siyasi bağlamda gerçek ve belirgin bir yol çizerek çözüme ulaşma çabalarının yanında durmaya çağırıyoruz.

2. İmzası bulunan bizler, düşüncelerimizin eski savaşlarından etkilenmesine izin vermiyoruz. Birlikte ve mantıklı bir şekilde barış ve ortak geleceği hedefliyoruz. Liderleri, gururlarını bir kenara bırakıp halihazırda bulunan zorlukları aşmaları için gerekli çözümlere odaklanmaya çağırıyoruz. Birbirlerini aşağılamaya ve suçlamaya enerji harcamamalarını talep ediyoruz. Halk, liderlerden gelecekteki federasyonun nasıl çalışacağını göstermesini istiyor.

3.Tarihin gerçeklerini öğrenerek geçmişe dair bakış açıları yaratmak ve birlikte güzel ve barışçıl bir gelecek kurmak istiyoruz. Liderler her iki toplumun eğitim kurumlarına seslenip, temel eğitim prensiplerini örnek alarak, tarihi bir siyasi bir araç olarak değil, bir bilim dalı olarak görmelerini ve öğrencilere kendi yargılarını şekillendirebilecek özgür bireyler olarak saygı göstermeleri gerektiğini belirtmelidir.

4. Kendilerini çözüm yanlısı ilan eden partilere, liderlere şu anki çabalarını tamamlamak için bolca zaman verme, ya da geri dönülmeycek noktayı aşmak için yeterli zaman yoksa, çabaların bir sonraki seçilen kişi tarafından devam etmesini sağlamak için seçimlerden 4 ay öncesine kadar hiçbir seçim hareketinde bulunmaması için sesleniyoruz. İki liderin, sorunun zorlu noktalarına odaklanmasını  ve çözümün şeklini belirleyecek olan son noktaya ulaşmasını istiyoruz. Bir sonraki seçimin, tüm Kıbrıslıların çözümü tamamlayacak ve adadaki federal barışı sağlamlaştıracak lidere oy vereceği, federal bir seçim olmasını istiyoruz.

5. Siyasi partilere, örgütlere ve sivil topluma insanları bilgilendirme insiyatifini almaları için sesleniyoruz. Şu anda güvenlik etrafında dönen zorlu problemlerde olduğumuzdan, Kıbrıslı Türklerin çözüm yanlısı siyasetçilerinin Kıbrıslı Rumlara korku ve görüşlerini aktaracağı ve Kıbrıslı Rum çözüm yanlısı siyasetçilerin Kıbrıslı Türklere korku ve görüşlerini anlatacağı iki toplumlu toplantılar olmalıdır. İlerici sivil toplum örgütlerine, kültür gruplarına, sanatçılara ve derneklere, cesaret edip barışçıl birleşme için önemli adımlar atmaları, iki toplumlu federasyonlar yaratarak organizasyonlarına bütün Kıbrıs’a hitap eden yeni bir dinamik getirmeleri için sesleniyoruz.

6. Günümüzdeki kriz bize Kıbrıs’taki çıkmazın ne çoğunluğun fikrini tüm topluma kabul ettirmesi, ne azınlığın vetoyla karar vermeyi bloke etmesi, ne üçüncü ülkelerin askeri gücü, ne de diğer toplumu karar alma mekanizmasından atarak ya da birleşik kurumlardan çekilerek çözülemeyeceğini gösteriyor. Liderlerimize, siyasi olarak daha da güçlenmek için, akıllıca hareket etmeleri ve bu krizden bişeyler öğrenmeleri için sesleniyoruz.


Barışı şimdi istiyoruz! Dayanışma - Kıbrıslı blogcular




Solution now! Çözüm Şimdi! Λύσην τωρά!




1. We Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenian Cypriots and Maronite Cypriots, foreigners and locals living and loving this land, state that we don't want it to be unified with any other state or remain divided. We call upon Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political parties that support a solution to take the initiative to inform everyone abroad and in Cyprus that this is the belief and the strategic purpose of the people's majority. The main convergence necessary to overcome the impasse today is for each community to know and to trust the real aims of the other. We call upon the political forces to stand by the leaders' effort to achieve a solution by manifesting in a real and specific way the political context within which the federation will be built.

2. We the undersigned will not allow our thoughts to be influenced by the glamor of old battles. We act together and rationally aiming for peace and a common future. We call upon the leaders to let go of pride and focus on the work that needs to be done to overcome the existing difficulties. We call upon them to stop wasting energy trying to humiliate each other and blaming each other. The people need to see the leaders actively demonstrate how our future federation can function.

3. We study the facts of history in order to formulate our perspectives about the past and get inspired towards building a beautiful and peaceful future. The leaders should call upon the educational institutions of the two communities to state that they are intent on applying educational principles that respect history as a science and not as a political tool, with respect to students as free humans with their own judgment.

4. We call on the political parties that consider themselves to be pro-solution to declare that they will abstain from any electioneering activity for up to 4 months before the elections, in order to give the leaders ample time to conclude their current effort, or if there's not enough time to get past the point of no return, so that the effort can be continued by whoever is elected. We call on the two leaders to focus on the outstanding issues of the problem so that we can soon arrive at the final convergences that will define the shape of the solution. We desire the next elections to be federal so that all Cypriots can vote for the leaders who will implement the solution and will cement federal peace on the island.

5. We call on political parties, organizations and civil society to take the initiative of informing the people. Aw we move in the difficult issues around security, there should be bicommunal gatherings where Turkish Cypriot pro-solution politicians will explain their fears and perspective to a Greek Cypriot audience and Greek Cypriot pro-solution politicians will explain to a Turkish Cypriot audience their fears and perspective. We call on progressive civil society organizations, cultural groups, artist and professional associations to dare and take the crucial steps towards peaceful reunification, by creating bicommunal federations, giving their organizations a new dynamic by addressing all Cypriots.

6. The present crisis shows that the impasse in Cyprus can be overcome neither by imposing the opinion of the majority of one community over the other, nor by a minority veto blocking decision-making, nor by resorting to the military strength of third countries, nor by ruling out the other community from decision-making or walking out from joint institutions. We call on our leaders to become wiser and learn from this crisis, so as to emerge politically stronger.


We call for a solution now! Cypriot Bloggers - Dayanışma
  • March 15th 2017 at 06:16
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By linopampakos



Απαιτούμεν λύσην τωρά! Κύπριοι μπλόγκερ
  • March 13th 2017 at 09:20
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UNCERTAINTIES AT THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS

By myislandcyprus.blogspot.com

In Cyprus, which has been divided since 1974 as a result of the occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey, a new set of the intercommunal negotiations have been going on since mid-May 2015 between President Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı, in order to reunite the island under a federal umbrella, but there are some uncertainties, which draw attention as follows:  


1. The two sides have agreed that the constituent federal states shall have the right to enter into agreements with foreign governments and international organizations on matters falling within their jurisdiction. These areas cover culture (including arts, education and sports), tourism and economic investment (including financial support).


According to the information given to the Turkish Cypriot press, the constituent states may only want the Federal Foreign Office to be in operation, if they need it! But the Greek Cypriot side said the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not need to ratify, as the agreements will involve the entire state in a cooperative effort with the constituent state.
Since the education is left to the powers of the constituent states, it is a matter of debate how federal state citizens will be educated in a federalist and unifying manner, whereas the nationalistic prejudices have been strong for many years. This issue is important in the context of the dependencies of the Turkish Cypriot statelet on Turkey in all aspects since 1974.

2. The Turkish Cypriot side has accepted in the past that the proportion of the territory of the constituent federal state in the north could fall from today’s 36% to 29% +. The Greek Cypriot side has prepared two maps, which envisage that 28.5% of the territory will be left to the Turkish Cypriot side, but the talks on territory have not yet ended.

The Greek Cypriot side suggested that if the establishment of cantons in the areas of Karpasia and Maronite villages were accepted, Morfou could also be a special administrative area for the central government.

The Turkish Cypriot does not accept the creation of special territories, mass population migrations and the reduction of the coastline. (According to official data of the Central Command of the British Sovereign Base Areas, 316.19 km of the coastline of Cyprus is controlled today by Southern Cyprus and 420.55 km by Northern Cyprus.) Moreover, it insists that the borderline between the two constituent states must be flat!

3. According to the agreement reached on the population, there will be 800,000 Greek Cypriots in the south and 220,000 Turkish Cypriots in the north. However, the Turkish side wants to add 30,000 Turkish Cypriots living abroad to this 220,000.

An interesting point is that Mr. Anastasiadis, in response to the question put by the Chairman of the Citizens’ Alliance, Georgos Lillikas, about the source of the number of accepted 220,000 Turkish Cypriot citizens, answered that the number of Greek Cypriots registered in the Statistical Office of the Republic of Cyprus was deliberately increased from 667,000 (2011 Census) to 800,000 in order to provide legitimacy to the 100,000, who are Turkish citizens!


According to the latest official census, conducted in 2011 in the occupied territory, the number of permanent residents is 286,257. The number of those born in Cyprus (“TRNC” and Southern Cyprus) was 160,207 (56.0%) and 104,641 (36.6%) were born in Turkey. As it is known, after 1974, Turkey moved population to the occupied territory in order to change the demographic structure of the island and this is contrary to the 1949 Geneva Convention. It is a fact that these settlers, who were granted citizenship of the “TRNC”, also voted for the Annan Plan, but this does not mean that they are legally located in the island.

On the other hand, President Anastasiades said that the number of Turkish Cypriots registered as Cypriot or have a passport or ID card is 117,544 and that there are at least 12,500 Turkish Cypriots, who did not apply or did not sign up, and thus the number of Turkish Cypriots reached 130,000.

Anastasiades said that the total number of Turkish nationals, formed by mixed marriages and their born children, did not exceed 90,000, but later he said that this figure was “a wrong number spelled out” and led to reactions. Anastasiades told that about 40,000 Turkish settlers will stay in the island and that this figure is much less than the Greek Cypriots had accepted in the past.

,In addition, Anastasiades noted that 25,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the United Kingdom have not applied to the Republic of Cyprus and that the number of Turkish Cypriots, included in the figure of 220,000, has increased to 155,000. It was estimated that the total number of mixed marriages and their children was 25,000 this time, making a total of 180,000 Turkish Cypriot population. Thus, he reduced the number of Turkish settlers, who would gain legitimacy, to 40,000.

Akıncı stated that the number of Turkish Cypriot citizens is taken as 220,000 persons, instead of 286,257 as mentioned above and he explained that all the “TRNC” citizens will be citizens of the new federal state and the EU in the future without difference of origin. Underlining that the work permits of the non-citizens will be renewed and they will continue to work, Akıncı emphasized that the work-force required by the economy will continue to be in Cyprus. He stated that the wish of the Turkish Cypriots is that the needed workforce should remain in the island.

The New Birth Party, formed by the settlers from Turkey, directed the following questions to Akıncı: "Anastasiades said 90,000 people will stay. Who are meant by the words, those who originate from Turkey? How are they determined? What is the status of the spouses in mixed marriages and what will happen to the children born in “TRNC”?

According to the Greek Cypriot press reports, it is estimated that between 90 and 120 thousand citizens of the Republic of Turkey will remain in the island. If it is the case, the Turkish Cypriots will be a minority in their own constituent state. In order to find out the real composition of the population, it is necessary to have a census, monitored by UN or another reliable organization.

This issue is important also for the EU. Because, if the composition of the population in the northern federal state is dominated by the settlers of Turkish descent, the impact of Turkey, which is not a member of the EU, may be decisive in Cyprus's foreign policy issues and this will cause dispute within the EU. Already, many bureaucrats in Brussels have asked "Will Erdogan step on to the territory of the EU through Cyprus? Will Cyprus be Erdogan's Trojan Horse?" Moreover, Turkey has demanded that four freedoms should be valid for its citizens in Cyprus that will remain to be a EU country after the solution.

4. The number of Greek Cypriots, who will live in the federal state in the north, has been constrained in terms of four freedoms and the ethnic cleansing after the 1974 war has also become permanent. The Turkish Cypriot side explained that there is difference between the legal domicile and the right of abode, which has no political or other right. Moreover, for any person, who would apply for "internal citizenship", s/he should be able to know and to use the native language in the North perfectly. Apart from the right to stay, for example, there will be no political right to vote. "Domestic citizenship", i.e. legal residence will be entitled maximum up to 20% of the population of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. It is thought that thus, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot population in its own state will not be threatened in any way.

MORE DISPUTES
There are 183 topics, which have not yet been agreed upon, as reflected in the minutes of the negotiations. Among these are some of the demands of the Turkish Cypriot side:

1. Although there has already been a rapprochement in the idea of a “single ticket” for the election of the President and the Vice-President, the Turkish Cypriot side has clearly indicated during the process of negotiating the subject of “Governance” that "Cross voting" is a package with the subjects of “Rotating Presidency” and the choice of the ministers to be preferred by both communities. Thus a cleavage was formed.

2. The Turkish Cypriot side believes that the subject of Primary Law is not yet closed. However, Peter van Nuffel, EU Commissioner in Charge of the Negotiations, said that the Final Agreement must be approved in the national parliaments of the EU member countries, which is a very difficult argument.


3. The Turkish Cypriot side insisted on the FIR for having two separate air traffic control centres. The Greek Cypriot side did not discuss this and suggested that there should be two control towers for approaching 20 km to the airport.

4. It was agreed that the casinos would be under federal juristiction. However, according to the convergence reached, the operating conditions and rules will not be applied to the existing casino facilities in the occupied area.

5. The Turkish Cypriot side has not yet provided the required data for organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank that are examining the economic aspect of the solution.

FINAL UNDERTAKINGS
After the political agreement is reached there are technical issues that need to be discussed and resolved. Some of them are: The writing of the constitutions of the constituent states and the federal state, which should be in harmony with each other, the list of international agreements, the federal laws and even the detailed writing of the coordinates of the territory. Besides the ones mentioned above, it has been reported that the UN provided a list of 103 items, including flag, anthem, civil servants, demining, etc., which should be realized before the agreement. Of course, once the internal aspects of the Cyprus dispute are resolved in this way, securing the newly established order, if necessary, by the UN or the EU, will be discussed at an international meeting. 


(Published in "In Depth", Bimonthly Electronic Newsletter, Special Issue: The Cyprus Problem, Volume 14, Issue 1- February 2017, © 2016 Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs • University of Nicosia)


  • March 2nd 2017 at 18:10
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Φασισμός, Ξενοφοβία, Εκμεταλλευση και Ρατσιστική ...

Φασισμός, Ξενοφοβία, Εκμεταλλευση και Ρατσιστική Βία στην Κύπρο - Πέμπτη Έκδοση

Το link περιέχει αρχείο PDF που μας στάλθηκε, που αρχειοθετεί περιπτώσεις φασισμού, ξενοφοβίας, εκμετάλλευσης μεταναστών/τριών και προσφύγων στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία την περίοδο 1999-2017 από διάφορες πηγές.

Φασισμός, Ξενοφοβία, Εκμεταλλευση και Ρατσιστική Βία στην Κύπρο - Πέμπτη Έκδοση

Γλώσσα πηγών: Ελληνικά, Αγγλικά. Γλώσσα Τίτλου, Περιεχομένων: Ελληνικά, Ελληνικά/Αγγλικά.

Archive Regarding Fascist, Racist, Xenophobic and Migrant/Refugee Exploitation in the Republic ...

Archive Regarding Fascist, Racist, Xenophobic and Migrant/Refugee Exploitation in the Republic of Cyprus (1999-2017 - 5th Edition)

The following link contains a PDF file we received archiving incidents of Fascist, Racist, Xenophobic and Migrant/Refugee Exploitation in the Republic of Cyprus in the period 1999-2017 from various sources.

Φασισμός, Ξενοφοβία, Εκμεταλλευση και Ρατσιστική Βία στην Κύπρο - Πέμπτη Έκδοση

Language of Sources: Greek, some English. Language of Title - Table of Contents: Greek, Greek/Englsih.

Ριζοσπαστικές Αφηγήσεις για το Κυπριακό

By Κωστής Αχνιώτης

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Φεβράρης 2017: Ριζοσπαστικές Αφηγήσεις για το Κυπριακό που το 1970 τζιαι μετά: Η Άνοδος της Κυπριακής Συνείδησης τζιαι του Δικοινοτικού Κινήματος

Στα πλαίσια του Αυτόνομου Σχολείου του Φεβρουαρίου, η Συσπείρωση Ατάκτων φιλοξενεί συζήτηση με θέμα Ριζοσπαστικές Αφηγήσεις για το Κυπριακό που το 1970 τζιαι μετά: Η Άνοδος της Κυπριακής Συνείδησης τζιαι του Δικοινοτικού Κινήματος με τον εκπαιδευτικό - δημοσιογράφο Κωστή Αχνιώτη τζιαι τον κοινωνιολόγο Αντρέα Παναγιώτου.

Ηχογράφηση:

Biz-Εμείς coverage of the February 2017 School

By Dayanışma

CyBC's Biz-Εμείς coverage of Autonomous School 2nd February 2017: Perspectives on Solution in the Turkish Cypriot Community (Dayanışma)

The next Autonomous School organized by Syspirosi atakton will host Dayanışma on a presentation concerning the perspectives of various political groups and organizations in the north cyprus, in regards to the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus issue. An open discussion will follow laying the basis of a grass root approach amongst people living in the north and south side of the border. Dayanisma is a Turkish Cypriot activists group. You can find more here: http://dayanismanet.org/

Video:

Perspectives on Solution in the Turkish Cypriot Community

By Dayanışma

Autonomous School 2nd February 2017: Perspectives on Solution in the Turkish Cypriot Community (Dayanışma)

The next Autonomous School organized by Syspirosi atakton will host Dayanışma on a presentation concerning the perspectives of various political groups and organizations in the north cyprus, in regards to the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus issue. An open discussion will follow laying the basis of a grass root approach amongst people living in the north and south side of the border. Dayanisma is a Turkish Cypriot activists group. You can find more here: http://dayanismanet.org/

Video (Presentation Only):

Audio Recording (Presentation and Discussion):

Η Λύση του Κυπριακού ως Διαρκής Διαδικασία

By Αντιεξουσιαστική Κίνηση

H Λύση του Κυπριακού ως Διαρκής Διαδικασία

Παρασκευή 27 Ιανουαρίου 2017, στις 19:30 στον ελεύθερο κοινωνικό χώρο Nosotros (Θεμιστοκλέους 66, Εξάρχεια).

Ηχογράφηση

2004. 2010. 2017. Το κυπριακό επανέρχεται στην διπλωματική πραγματικότητα και την επιχειρηματική σκακιέρα για να ακονίσει τους αλληλοσυγκρουόμενους εθνικισμούς Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας ταυτόχρονα με την ατσαλένια αποικιοκρατική κυριαρχία.

Με ή χωρίς σχέδιο, η Κύπρος, από τη δεκαετία του ’50 όταν ο ελληνικός εθνικισμός εγκαταστάθηκε για τα καλά στο νησί, με την απαραίτητη συνδρομή της Εκκλησίας, μετατρέπεται σε ιδανικό πεδίο ώστε να ξεδιπλωθούν τα σχέδια του εκάστοτε εθνικιστή: λήσταρχου, τεχνοκράτη, δεξιού και αριστερού πατριώτη. Είτε τον λένε Κοτζιά είτε Ερντογάν. Είτε σκορπά το πατροπαράδοτο δηλητήριο του εθνικισμού της ‘μητέρας-πατρίδας’ είτε το μεταλλαγμένο προϊόν του καπιταληστρικού μέλλοντος. Γρίβας, Γιωρκάτζης, Ντενκτάς, είναι πρόσωπα που συμπυκνώνουν με αιματοβαμμένο τρόπο την ιστορία του κυπριακού ως θέμα διαμοιρασμού της εξουσίας μεταξύ των πολιτικών ελίτ, συγκαλύπτοντας την καταστροφή της κοινής κυπριακής κουλτούρας και των μικρών κοινοτήτων μέσω της συγκρότησης εθνοκρατους, ενός θεσμού που προωθεί την ομογενοποίηση, την ομοιομορφία, την υπακοή, τον μιλιταρισμό. Σε αυτόν τον χορό των εθνικιστών -τεράτων- το διεθνές κεφάλαιο δεν θα έμενε απέξω υποσχόμενο την ‘κόλαση’ του καπιταλιστικού ονείρου.

Οι Κύπριοι/-ες και από τις δυο πλευρές γνωρίζουν όμως καλά ότι υπάρχει λύση, λύση που μόνον η αυτόνομη ακηδεμόνευτη κοινωνική κίνηση μπορεί να επιβάλλει -προωθώντας την αποστρατιωτικοποίηση, ρίχνοντας τα συρματοπλέγματα που διαχωρίζουν το νησί, τα τείχη μεταξύ των ανθρώπων και τα εμπόδια που θέτει η ύπαρξη του Κυπριακού στην κοινωνική πρόοδο και στη ριζοσπαστική δράση. Αναγνωρίζουν τις προοπτικές που θα δημιουργήσει η επίλυσή του και την δυναμική που θα ανοίξει για την υπέρβαση της ηγεμονίας των εθνικιστικών ιδεολογιών και την αναίρεση της γεωγραφικής διαίρεσης του νησιού.

Οι διαδηλώσεις των Τουρκοκυπρίων το 2011, το κίνημα του Occupy μεταξύ 2011-12 και πολλές κοινές αντιμιλιταριστικές, εκπαιδευτικές και περιβαλλοντικές δράσεις κράτησαν τις γέφυρες της επανένωσης ανοικτές.

Σήμερα η πολιτική επίλυση του κυπριακού προβλήματος στη βάση της Διζωνικής Δικοινοτικής Ομοσπονδίας (ΔΔΟ) είναι κάτι περισσότερο από απαραίτητη, μέσα από μία νέα αντίληψη του «κοινού», γεωγραφικού, οικολογικού, ιστορικού, κοινωνικού και πολιτιστικού χώρου, ως χώρου ελευθερίας, όπως επισημαίνει η ‘Συσπείρωση Ατάκτων’.

Με συντρόφους από τη Συσπείρωση Ατάκτων θα συζητήσουμε τη λύση του κυπριακού ως διαρκούς διαδικασίας και τους αγώνες του κινήματος ενάντια στον εθνικισμό, την Παρασκευή 27 Ιανουαρίου 2017, στις 19:30 στον ελεύθερο κοινωνικό χώρο Nosotros (Θεμιστοκλέους 66, Εξάρχεια).

Μια πρώτη παρουσίαση του Αρχείου - Τα slides

Μια πρώτη παρουσίαση του Αρχείου - Τα slides

Στις 3 Γενάρη διοργανώσαμε μια πρώτη παρουσίαση του Αρχείου στον Κοινωνικό Χώρο Kaymakκιν. Στο infobox κατεβάσματος δίπλα μπορείτε να βρείτε τα slides από την παρουσίαση.

Για να επικοινωνήσετε με το Αρχείο, στείλτε ένα email στην διεύθυνση arxeio@riseup.net.

movementsarchive.org: Our new domain name

movementsarchive.org: Our new domain name

We have now moved the Archive to its own domain name, movementsarchive.org. We thank 35-33.com for their offer of a temporary subdomain for the past few months.

Please update your bookmarks to point to our new domain, movementsarchive.org.

Cyprus Movements Archive: A First Presentation

Cyprus Movements Archive: A First Presentation

The Movement's Archive is an attempt to make the history of the Cypriot radical movement throughout the island available, as it is recorded through its publications, with an emphasis on past decades; but without ignoring recent publications. Read more about our goals here.

On the 3rd of January we will present, at social space Kaymakκιν at 18:30, the work that has been done so far, how the archive works, and the ways you can help.

Whispered translation in English will be available.

Κυπριακό Κινηματικό Αρχείο: Μια Πρώτη Παρουσίαση

Το Κινηματικό Αρχείο είναι μια απόπειρα να γίνει προσβάσιμη η ιστορία του κυπριακού ριζοσπαστικού κινήματος σε ολόκληρο το νησί, όπως καταγράφεται μέσα από τις εκδόσεις του, με έμφαση στις προηγούμενες δεκαετίες χωρίς να αγνοούνται οι σύγχρονες δημοσιεύσεις. Διαβάστε περισσότερα για τους στόχους μας εδώ.

Στις 3 Γενάρη θα παρουσιάσουμε, στον κοινωνικό χώρο Kaymakκιν η ώρα 18:30, την δουλειά που έγινε μέχρι τώρα, τον τρόπο λειτουργίας του Αρχείου και τους τρόπους με τους οποίους μπορείτε να βοηθήσετε την προσπάθεια.

ΕΟΚΑ – ΤΜΤ: Πέρα από τους Ήρωες και τους Τρομοκράτες

By Χρίστος

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Δεκέβρη 2016: ΕΟΚΑ – ΤΜΤ: Πέρα από τους Ήρωες και τους Τρομοκράτες

Η Συσπείρωση Ατάκτων φιλοξενεί στο Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Δεκεμβρίου την Παρουσίαση: ΕΟΚΑ – ΤΜΤ: Πέρα από τους Ήρωες και τους Τρομοκράτες.

«Η οργάνωση ΤΜΤ είναι ο κακός δαίμονας για όλους τους κατοίκους της Κύπρου- Έλληνες και Τούρκους.» (Σπύρος Αθανασιάδης, Φάκελος ΤΜΤ) «Η τρομοκρατική οργάνωση της Ε.Ο.Κ.Α. σκοτώνει τους Έλληνες που δεν θέλουν την ένωση με την Ελλάδα, όπως και Βρετανούς και Τούρκους. Έτσι ξεκινούν οι δικοινοτικές συγκρούσεις στην Κύπρο.» (Serter, Vehbi Zeki, Ιστορία της Κύπρου, βιβλίο ιστορίας που διδασκόταν στα σχολεία της Τ/Κ κοινότητας ως το 2005.)

Δυο αναδυόμενοι εθνικισμοί, δυο μητέρες πατρίδες, δυο μεγάλες ιδέες, ένα νησί. Δυο οργανώσεις, δυο αφηγήσεις περί ηρώων, αυτοθυσίας, απελευθέρωσης – ή αλλιώς, περί τρομοκρατίας, δολοφονιών, καταπίεσης.

Μια παρουσίαση που εξετάζει τις οργανώσεις ΕΟΚΑ και ΤΜΤ στα χρόνια 1955-59 πέρα από τον κυρίαρχο εθνικιστικό λόγο, πέρα από τις κατεστημένες ιστορικές αφηγήσεις, πέρα από τους «Ήρωες» και τους «Τρομοκράτες».

Ηχογράφηση:

THE FIRST BI-COMMUNAL MOVEMENT FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND FEDERAL CYPRUS

By myislandcyprus.blogspot.com
The first founding meeting of the “Movement for an Independent and Federal Cyprus” took place in Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia on 23 and 24 September 1989 with the participation of 25 T/Cs and 36 G/Cs. The participants discussed the ways of rapprochement and more contacts between the two communities in Cyprus. The joint press release of the meeting was published both in the T/C and G/C press and the meeting was flash news at the CyBC-TV.
            The Second Meeting of the Movement took place on 20-21 January 1990, where the participants approved the following basic views and principles, which were later published, in Greek, Turkish and English languages as a leaflet.


MOVEMENT FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND FEDERAL CYPRUS
Views and Basic Principles

1.We are concerned about our future
Every Cypriot citizen in our times is deeply concerned about the future of his country.

We have all lived through the tragic moments of our history – the armed and bloody conflicts, the forced displacement of people, the immeasurable human suffering, the partition of our country.
For years now we all have experienced the consequences of this violent separation – the uprooting, the uncertainty, the lack of contact and communication between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot citizens.
The separate existence of the two communities and the separate organization of daily life leads them to consider the absence of each other as the norm. The new generation is raised with an image which presents the other community as the enemy – magnifying the crimes of the other side while minimizing the crimes of its own.

2. We acknowledge our share of common responsibilities
We believe that every Cypriot citizen fully comprehends that the root of our problem and suffering are quite complex. Undoubtedly, foreign interests and intervention share a substantial part of the blame.
We believe, however, that every sincere Cypriot also acknowledges a collective blame and responsibility. For it is the internal contradictions and weaknesses of our society that have made outside intervention possible.
The lack of common objectives, the antagonism between Turkish and Greek Cypriots – instead of a common, liberation struggle against colonial rule, undermined the prospect of a free and democratic common future.
The outcome of all this was a Constitution that was imposed on us and a “crippled” independence, where divisions, antagonism and suspicion among Greek and Turkish Cypriots were institutionalised. The final blow came from the persistence of separatist ideologies (Enosis and Partition) even after the establishment of the fragile Independence.

3. We must condemn both the violence and the separatist ideologies of the past.
All Cypriot citizens would agree that foreign meddling in our affairs should be put to an end and that we ourselves should be those to decide our own fate, our own future.
But this alone is not sufficient. In order to be able to proceed together towards a common future, with shared goals, we must begin by acknowledging and condemning whatever separated us in the past.
It is high time that each community acknowledges and irrevocably condemns the violence it used against the other in the past. For the ordinary citizen, the victim of violence whichever direction it came from, this violence was equally painful and caused the same grief.
It is high time each community recognized the consequences of its own separatist ideology and condemned it thereof. What is called for today is not an ideology that separates people, but one that can unite them together, that could form the basis of a common struggle.
This is the only way through which we can “cleanse” ourselves from our bloody and violent past – so that henceforth we may sincerely join forces together bringing about reconciliation and shaping a shared and peaceful future.

4. Federation – our common future
The continuation of separation and antagonism does not promote our own common interests, but only serves the enemies of the independence of Cyprus.
            The struggle for a common future, in a united country, is not a matter of sentimentalism or utopia – but a basic, imperative, historical and political need, a sheer matter of survival.
            In a common country the survival of Greek and Turkish Cypriots crucially depends on the survival of the Turkish Cypriots, and vice-versa.
            All Cypriot citizens have a right to live in a federated and united Cyprus, under conditions of freedom, democracy and security.
A federal solution is, under the present circumstances, the only guarantee for the independence of Cyprus. It should not be looked upon simply as a solution of necessity; it is at the same time our only hope for a just and peaceful common future.
            A federal solution has the potential of transcending our past history of violent conflict, which built the walls of separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The pursuit of a federal solution constitutes a common goal, a path towards a common future. A future, which will secure some measure of autonomy for each community, whilst also ensuring a unified character for the Cyprus Republic, preventing permanent separation and estrangement.
The future federation, for which we must strive, should be based on the principles of justice and viability. It should establish the right of every Cypriot to live in a democratic system, irrespective of race, ethnic identity, religion, sex or colour, under conditions of security and equal opportunities for development.
Federation is not a magic formula which will be introduced by outside forces, and which will automatically solve all of our problems. No one system or constitution can by itself secure our future. The most important is the good will of the people. Federation should be regarded as the expression of our collective determination for a joint struggle/effort by all Cypriots.

5. The mobilization of citizens is an imperative need
The dangers from the continuing impasse of the Cyprus problem are only too obvious. The reappearance of mistrust and chauvinism, as well as thoughtless pseudo-patriotism on either side, are the consequences of the present stalemate.
            Real and constructive patriotism nowadays means resistance to mistrust, fanaticism and chauvinism.
            Every Cypriot should stand against the reactionary forces in both communities which are attempting to undermine the effort for a common future – expressed, in our days, in the pursuit of a federal solution. It is only with the active participation of the people of Cyprus that independence, democracy and a common peaceful future can be achieved.
            The mobilization of ordinary citizens and the dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots should become a conscious political choice and action, a matter to be undertaken independently – of and beyond any formal and official procedures.
            It is nowadays imperative to cross over from passive awaiting to active political participation in the struggle of shaping our common future.



  • November 29th 2016 at 08:33
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Η πολιτικοποίηση του ποδοσφαίρου στην Κύπρο - η περίπτωση της Θύρας 9

By Θύρα 9

Η πολιτικοποίηση του ποδοσφαίρου στην Κύπρο: η περίπτωση της Θύρας 9

Μέλη της γραμματείας της ΘΥΡΑ 9 θα κάνουν παρουσίαση για τον τρόπο ίδρυσης της ομάδας μας και την ιδεολογική δράση της οργανωμένης μας κερκίδας. Στην συνέχεια θα υπάρξει ανοικτή συζήτηση.

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Η ηθικοποίηση του ρόλου των διδασκάλων και των διδασκάλισσων στην αγγλοκρατία

By Κώστας Κωνσταντίνου

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Οκτώβρη 2016

Η ηθικοποίηση του ρόλου των διδασκάλων και των διδασκάλισσων ως μέσο προώθησης της εθνικιστικής ιδεολογίας την περίοδο της αγγλοκρατίας

ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΗ 14/10/2016, ώρα 19:30 στον Κοινωνικό Χώρο Kaymakκιν στο Καϊμακλί: Ο διδακτορικός ερευνητής Κώστας Κωνσταντίνου παρουσιάζει το άρθρο του με τίτλο “Ο ηθικοκοινωνικός ρόλος του διδασκαλικού υποκειμένου ως τεχνολογία εκπολιτισμού και κοινωνικού ελέγχου στην Κύπρο, 1878-1937” που δημοσιεύεται στο 9ο τεύχος της Εντροπίας.

To άρθρο παρουσιάζει τις συγκυρίες κάτω από τις οποίες διατυπώθηκε και θεσμοθετήθηκε ο ηθικός ρόλος των Ελληνοκυπρίων διδασκάλων και των διδασκαλισσών, για την περίοδο 1878-1937. Ειδικότερα, συζητά πώς ο ρόλος αυτός χρησιμοποιήθηκε στον λόγο των διαφόρων πολιτικών και κοινωνικών ομάδων, στην προσπάθειά τους να πειθαρχήσουν και να εκπολιτίσουν τη λαϊκή τάξη επιδιώκοντας την ηγεμονική τους επικράτηση. Ιδιαίτερα παρατηρείται η σύνδεση του εθνικού με τον ηθικοκοινωνικό ρόλο του διδασκαλικού υποκειμένου.

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Poster

Ιδεολογία, Κράτος και Οικονομία στην Τουρκία μετά το πραξικόπημα

By Νίκος Μούδουρος

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Σεπτέβρη 2016

Ιδεολογία, Κράτος και Οικονομία στην Τουρκία μετά το πραξικόπημα

Παρουσίαση – Συζήτηση με τον τουρκολόγο Νίκο Μούδουρο στον Κοινωνικό Χώρο Kaymakκιν (Αρχιεπισκόπου Μακαρίου Γ’ 127, Καϊμακλί)

«Ο δεύτερος απελευθερωτικός πόλεμος» Ιδεολογία, Κράτος και Οικονομία στην Τουρκία μετά το πραξικόπημα της 15ης Ιουλίου 2016

Η αποτυχημένη απόπειρα πραξικοπήματος στην Τουρκία την 15η Ιουλίου 2016 καταγράφεται ως ένα από τα σημαντικότερα γεγονότα των τελευταίων δεκαετιών στη χώρα. Είναι εξέλιξη ποικίλων διαστάσεων και συνεπειών. Ως τέτοια απαιτεί προηγουμένως την όσο το δυνατό καλύτερη κατανόηση των πρωταγωνιστών της κρίσης, του ιδεολογικού τους υπόβαθρου και των θέσεων τους. Η παρουσίαση στοχεύει σε μια σφαιρική ενδοσκόπηση της απόπειρας πραξικοπήματος, αλλά την ίδια στιγμή επιδιώκει να αναδείξει τις μετατοπίσεις που σημειώνονται μετά το πραξικόπημα στο ιδεολογικό περιβάλλον της χώρας. Ο στόχος «επανίδρυσης» του κράτους και ο οικονομικός μετασχηματισμός ως συστατικά μέρη της πλατφόρμας του ισλαμικού κινήματος της Τουρκίας, είναι επίσης ανάμεσα στα κύρια σημεία της παρουσίασης.

Η παρουσίαση και συζήτηση θα γίνει στα Ελληνικά με δυνατότητα ψιθυριστής μετάφρασης στα Αγγλικά.

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Πορεία Κυριακή 18/9 ώρα 18:30 πλ.ελευθερίας Λευκωσία. Ο Παύλος ζει τσακίστε τους ναζί

By antifalem

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ΔΕΝ ΞΕΧΝΩ ΤΟΝ ΦΑΣΙΣΜΟ!

Καμία ανοχή στους νεοναζί ΕΛΑΜ – ΧΡΥΣΗ ΑΥΓΗ!

Την νύχτα 17 προς 18 του Σεπτέμβρη 2013, τάγμα εφόδου της νεοναζιστικής οργάνωσης Χρυσή Αυγή δολοφονεί τον αντιφασίστα μουσικό Παύλο Φύσσα, στην Αθήνα. Αυτό συνέβηκε μόλις λίγους μήνες μετά την εκλογή τους για πρώτη φορά στη Ελληνική Βουλή, το 2012.

Η διεθνής κατακραυγή για τη δολοφονία και η ορμή του αντιφασιστικού κινήματος στην Ελλάδα οδήγησαν όλη την ηγεσία της Χρυσής Αυγής – ανάμεσα τους και την κοινοβουλευτική ομάδα – στα δικαστήρια όχι μόνο για τη δολοφονία αλλά και για σύσταση και λειτουργία εγκληματικής οργάνωσης. Η δίκη ακόμα συνεχίζεται.

Αυτή είναι η μητρική οργάνωση του ΕΛΑΜ – της Χρυσής Αυγής της Κύπρου. Δεν το λέμε εμείς – το λένε οι ίδιοι!

Για αυτό, από μόνο του το γεγονός της εισόδου του ΕΛΑΜ στη Βουλή είναι μια πολύ ανησυχητική και επικίνδυνη εξέλιξη που δεν σηκώνει καμιά υποτίμηση. Μα το πιο ανησυχητικό είναι η ασυλία που απολαμβάνει το ΕΛΑΜ από τα ΜΜΕ, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του ΡΙΚ, και το πολιτικό κατεστημένο.

Τα κρούσματα βίας απέναντι στους Τουρκοκύπριους παρουσιάζουν αύξηση τον τελευταίο καιρό από μέλη του ΕΛΑΜ και άλλα φασιστικά στοιχεία που εκτρέφονται από τον ρατσισμό και τον εθνικισμό της κυπριακής δεξιάς.

Στις 15 του Νοέμβρη 2015 αυτοκίνητο με τουρκοκυπριακές πινακίδες δέχθηκε επίθεση από μαθητές, μέλη του ΕΛΑΜ, κατά τη διάρκεια της επετειακής τους πορείας. Στις 15 Μαΐου, στην Μακαρίου, κοντά στα γραφεία του ΕΛΑΜ και το κτήριο του ΑΠΟΕΛ, ομάδα 30 τραμπούκων επιτέθηκε σε Τουρκοκύπριο οδηγό. Στις 2 Αυγούστου, πάλι έξω από το ΑΠΟΕΛ, αυτοκίνητο Τουρκοκυπρίων όχι μόνο δέχτηκε επίθεση αλλά και κυνηγήθηκε στο δρόμο. Και αυτές είναι μόνο οι καταγραμμένες περιπτώσεις.

Πριν λίγες εβδομάδες, οι δύο βουλευτές του ΕΛΑΜ μαζί με τέσσερις βουλευτές του ΔΗΣΥ και με ένα της Αλληλεγγύης μαζί με «αγανακτισμένους» πατατοπαραγωγούς, στην περιοχή Αμμοχώστου, τραμπούκισαν και απείλησαν ελληνοκύπριο επιχειρηματία που συνεργάζεται με Τουρκοκύπριο πατατοπαραγωγό μέσα στα πλαίσια του Κανονισμού της Πράσινης Γραμμής.

Είναι φανερό ότι, αφού δεν μπορούν να επιβάλουν το κλείσιμο των οδοφραγμάτων, προσπαθούν να δημιουργήσουν κλίμα φόβου και τρομοκρατίας ανάμεσα στους Τουρκοκύπριους ώστε να μην τα διασχίζουν.

Δεν πρέπει να αφήσουμε τα νεοναζιστικά στοιχεία να δρουν ανενόχλητα!

Δεν μπορούμε να ανεχόμαστε αυτές τις επιθέσεις χωρίς καμιά αντίδραση!

Δεν πρέπει να τους αφήσουμε να επαναλάβουν τις συγκρούσεις του 63-67!

Αντιδρούμε τώρα!

Δεν πρέπει να επιτρέψουμε ξανά ο ΣΩΒΙΝΙΣΜΟΣ και η ΜΙΣΑΛΛΟΔΟΞΙΑ να επικρατήσουν στο νησί με αποτέλεσμα ένα νέο αιματοκύλισμα και την οριστική διχοτόμηση!

Καμία ανοχή στους νεοναζί ΕΛΑΜ – ΧΡΥΣΗ ΑΥΓΗ!

Νέα Διεθνιστική Αριστερά (ΝΕΔΑ)
Πρωτοβουλία Ενάντια στην Φασιστική Απειλή
Αντιφασιστικό Δίκτυο Λεμεσού
Εργατική Δημοκρατία
ΚSP – Σοσιαλιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου
YKP – Κόμμα Νέα Κύπρος

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH CYPRIOT SECULARISM AND TURKISH CYPRIOT RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

By myislandcyprus.blogspot.com


Ahmet Djavit An

The origins of today’s Moslem population on the island
After the conquest of the Cyprus in 1570-71, the Ottoman commander Lala Mustafa Pasha left a small garisson on the island.  The official Ottoman sources refer to a total of 3,779 soldiers, many of whom, later, brought also their families.[1] Some of them even married the widows or daughters of the fallen Latin notables; an example is the last Lusignan Cornaro Lady of Potamia Castle who married the cavalry soldier Ibrahim Menteshoglou; their family has survived to the present day with the families of Menteshoglou and Bodamializade.
A census, taken shortly after the conquest, revealed a taxable population of some 85,000 Greeks, Armenians and Maronites, as well as 20,000 Turkish settlers, mostly campaign veterans, who were given land by Mustapha.[2] According to the Ottoman Register Book of 1572, 905 villages were inhabitated and 76 villages were deserted.[3] Thus the Ottomans did not build new villages and inhabited the empty ones, which mostly kept their old names while a few were given new Turkish names. The Sultan, realizing that the island needed human resources for labour, issued a firman which was sent to the Kadıs (local judges) of six Anatolian provinces: Karaman, Ichel, Bozok, Alaiye (Alanya), Teke (Antalya) and Manavgat. One in every ten families living in those provinces was ordered to transfer to the island, which meant a total of 5,720 families; at the end, only 1,689 families settled in Cyprus.[4]

According to the Register Book of 1581, there were plans to transfer 12,000 families, but eventually only 8,000 families were transported. In the following years, other Turkish families from Konya, Kirsehir, Chorum, Samsun, Chankiri, Eskisehir, Ankara, Darende and Ushak settled in the towns,[5] which were surrounded by fortified walls or had castles (Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Paphos and Kyrenia), and in the deserted Latin villages.

Later the Anatolian settlers, who were mainly Turkmen artisans and villagers, intermingled with the Greeks of the island and cooperated with them in every field of life. Although the two communities belonged to different religions and had dissimilar ethnic distinctive features, they lived harmoniously, influencing each other as they worked side by side in the rural and urban areas.[6] In the course of 300 years of coexistence, during the Ottoman domination, some Christian Greeks converted to Islam in order to avoid high taxation. In some other cases, some Anatolian Moslems converted to Christianity.[7] Analysing the situation, Ronald C. Jennings wrote:


In the decades following the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus many of the island’s Christians converted to Islam.Contemporary observers and modern scholars have attributed that conversion to official compulsion, but no contemporary local sources substantiate that view except a few travelers embarrassed at the circumstances (as Venetians or Christians) who had no way of guessing how the new converts really felt. Although the level of conversion cannot be measured precisely, there are several indicators of its extent. In 1593-1595 32% of the adult male Muslims whose names and fathers’ names were cited as legal agents (vekil) were converts, as were 28% of those names as witnesses to legal cases and 41% of those named as instrumental witnesses. More than a third of such Muslims appearing in court at that time were converts. What the highest proportion ever reached was or when it was reached can only be conjectured, but obviously the intensity was temporary.[8]


There was another category of Cypriots, called Linobambaki that they were Crypto-Christians. This community of Cypriots was living in villages like Louroudjina (originally Laurentia), Potamia, Monagria, Ayios Sozomenos and some villages of Tylliria that were formerly estates of the Latins, who converted en masse to Islam.[9] Theodoros Papadopoullos gave an example of conversions from Christianity into Islam between 1825 and 1832, when in 16 villages, the percentage of the previously Christian population changed into a Moslem religion. By 1960, nine of them (Marki, Givisilin, Melounda, Kouklia, Sinda, Prastio, Malunda, Kantou, Platanissos) were all Moslem, two villages (Skoulli, Monagri) were all Christian, and the remaining five villages (Denia, Flasou, Palekithro, Syngrasi, Moniatis) had one third of their village population as Moslems.[10]

            Paschalis M. Kitromilides pointed out that the names of Christian Saints borne by several Turkish villages, especially in the Paphos and the Karpasia regions, offer a convincing indication of Islamization. These are the following Turkish Cypriot villages: in Paphos district, Ayyanni (Agios Ioannis), Aynikola (Agios Nikolaos), Ayyorgi (Agios georgios); in Limassol district, Aytuma (Agios Thomas); in Nicosia district, Aybifan (Agios Epiphanios); in Famagusta district, Ayharida (Agios Chariton); in Karpassia; Hirsofu (Agios Iakovos), Ayandroniko (Agios Andronikos), Ayistar (Agios Efstathios), Aysimyo (Agios Symeon).[11] Kitromilides notably wrote:


It should be made clear in this connection that this sort of evidence is not cited here in order to question the Turkish Cypriots’ Turkishness – which as is the case with modern national identity generally, has to do more with the states of consciousness and less with the ‘purity’ of ethnic origins.[12]

The Moslem identity of the Turkish Cypriots
After the conquest of Cyprus in 1571, the traditional Ottoman settlement system brought a new ethnological and cultural element to the island. The Anatolian Moslems had a different religion, language and culture than the island’s Christian population. The Latin Catholic Church did not oppress the Orthodox Christians anymore, and the Latins (Lusignans and Venetians) were allowed to stay in Cyprus if they would choose the religion of the conqueror, Islam, or the religion of the local Cypriot Orthodox people.[13] According to the Ottoman millet system, there were two millets in Cyprus. One was the Moslem millet and the other was the (Christian) Rum[14] millet. The Orthodox Christian Church and its Archbishop was responsible from the Christian population and later he was given the right to collect the taxes for the Ottoman governor. 

The Moslem community was mainly Sunni-Islam following the Hanefi sect. There were a Muftü for religious affairs, a Chief Kadı appointed from Istanbul for judicial matters, and a Mulla as the deputy of the Ottoman Governor.  From 1571 up to 1839, when a legal reform (Tanzimat) was proclaimed, the Moslem sacred Sheri Law was applied for the Moslem population; the Sheri Laws derived mainly from verses of the Koran and from traditions of Prophet Mohammed. Sometimes the Orthodox Christians themselves applied to the Sheri Courts in order to solve their disagreements with the Moslems in Cyprus. The Anatolian settlers believed in Islam, but they were not all following strictly the Sunni sect; some followed other sufi orders. For example, the tanners in Nicosia had their own lodge, called “Ahi Revan Dede”, a kind of “lonca” (professional syndicate). 

Right after the Ottoman occupation of Cyprus in 1570, various Vakfs[15] were created for the assistance of the Moslem community in their religious, social and cultural needs. Since the Ottoman conquerer of Cyprus, Lala Mustafa Pasha, was a devotee of the Mevlevi order, a Tekke[16] was built in Nicosia, near the Kyrenia gate, soon after the conquest; the Mevlevi Tekke functioned until the beginning of the 1950’s. Another Tekke of the Jelveti order was built in Famagusta, which had a library founded by Kutup Osman Efendi, the Grand Şeyh of this order. Aziziye Tekke, within the municipality market of Nicosia, founded in the name of the Müftü of the Ottoman Army that conquered Nicosia in 1570, was following the Rifai order. C. F. Beckingham wrote in 1955:


The dervish orders, which still have secret adherents in Turkey, were not strong in Cyprus. At present there is one Mevlevi tekke in Nicosia. […] Most Cypriot Muslims would prefer to close the tekke and use its income for the repair of mosques, the payment of hocas and religious education. It is felt that the Mevlevi ritual has lost all religious significance and has become, as one Muslim said, ‘a floor-show for tourists’.[17] (The text continues with a new paragraph here)

Formerly other dervish orders had a few adherents. There were Qadiris in Nicosia at the time of British occupation and there was once a small Bektaşi community in Larnaca; these have now disappeared. In Turkey many of the dervish orders were, or became, xenophobe. Their comparative absence from Cyprus, doubtlessly, helped the spread of modern ideas. The general character of Cypriot Islam is liberal and tolerant, and in this the Mufti reflects the attitude of the community. The social changes associated with Ataturk’s revolution were introduced into Cyprus without encountering the opposition of mullas, as they did in some parts of Turkey. (17) [Is this your text or Beckingham’s text? Quoted from Beckingham, same article, word by word]
When the British occupation began in 1878, the administration of Evkaf (Moslem pious organization) was entrusted to two delegates; a British, and a Moslem Turk who was appointed by the “Sublime Porte” (Ottoman Empire). The annexation of Cyprus (1914) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) brought a change in the status of the island; when the post of the Turkish delegate vacated in 1925, after the death of Musa İrfan Bey, the appointment was made by the British authorities (Colonial Office), which was subsequently confirmed by a British Order-in-Council in 1928.[18] The Moslem members of the Legislative Council, led by Hacı Hafiz Ziyai Efendi, protested to the British colonial government and claimed that the Caliph should appoint the director of Evkaf, and that the Cyprus Kadı should be considered as the head of Evkaf.

Vedjhi Efendi, who was the Kadı of Cyprus, supported this thesis. Already in 1902, the governor of Cyprus informed the Kadı by telegram that the management of the Evkaf would be carried out by the Kadı of Cyprus; advocate Fadıl Korkut wrote that he was among the congregation when this telegram was openly read in the Agia Sophia Mosque in Nicosia. Vedjhi Efendi was not able to take the necessary steps to implement the transfer of administration to Evkaf, since he got a mental disease; eventually Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi withdrew from the Legislative Council and become the Müftü of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot delegate of Evkaf, Musa İrfan Bey, who was appointed in 1903, started to behave as the leader of the Moslem community by using his authority at the Evkaf. He also adopted a policy of allocating the Moslem memberships of the Legislative Council to the candidates of the Evkaf. He gave 10,000 pounds credit to the candidates from the Evkaf Treasure, but later there were difficulties to get the Evkaf money back.

When Numan Efendi was appointed to the post of Kadı of Cyprus in 1907, he demanded again to get the administration of Evkaf to his office. It was in this year, when Dr. Hafız Djemal Bey (Lokman Hekim) settled in his own country and started to publish a newspaper and more than 20 booklets for the enlightenment of the Turkish Cypriot community. He also opened his Cyprus Industrial School in Nicosia, where young boys were taught various handworks and they used to sell their products in the Friday Market. In the evening classes, people were taught foreign languages. But the reactionary circles fought against him until he left the island for good in 1909.  

A National Council (Meclis-i Milli) convened under the leadership of Müftü Ziyai Efendi on 10 December 1918 in order to raise the demands of the Turkish Cypriots in the Paris Conference, where the Greek Cypriots would participate. We read from its resolution that Müftü Ziyai Efendi was elected as the head of the millet (reis-i millet), defining the Müftü for the first time as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. But the British local government did not allow him to go abroad.
When the “Organization of Islam Community” (Cemaat-ı İslamiye Teşkilatı) was established in 1924, as the first political association of the Turkish Cypriots, it demanded that the administration of the Evkaf should be handed over to a commission to be elected among the community. There was no positive outcome and when Münir Bey was appointed as the Turkish delegate of Evkaf in 1925, after the death of İrfan Bey, the government had two delegates, instead of one. Evkaf should have been handed over to its real owner, the Turkish Cypriot community, but the Lausanne Agreement had already abolished the Cyprus Convention, which provided for the British Administration to appoint one of the Evkaf delegates.[19]

            In 1928, the Evkaf Department was established by a decree issued by the colonial government, which gave special privileges to the director of the department. After the Lausanne Agreement, the Evkaf properties in the Balkan countries and Palestine were to be administered by a commission and this was not done in Cyprus and therefore there was no say anymore on the administration of the Evkaf properties by the Turkish Cypriot community. On the other hand, the Greek Orthodox Church continued to administer the Church properties in Cyprus.

Starting from 1923, when the Republic of Turkey was declared, there was no Califdom and no Minister for Religious Affairs anymore in modern Turkey. The British Colonial Government abolished the post of Müftü, starting from 19 November 1928, and this was an important event, since the Moslem population had this institution since 1571. Instead of Müftü, the post of Fetva Emini was created under the Evkaf Department and Hürremzade Hakkı Efendi was appointed there. He was supporting the Kemalists and also made a meeting together with the teacher for replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin at the schools. Now the authority of the Evkaf director was reinforced and Münir Bey was regarded as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and was invited as such to the Royal Garden party in London in 1928.
The Sheri Courts were in a deplorable state, functioning in Cyprus as if the island was still in Ottoman 19th Century. In 1927, the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order-in-Council limited the jurisdiction of the Sheri Courts to strictly Moslem religious matters and provided for appeals from them to the Supreme Court. This was done in conformity with the view of a report prepared by three leading Turkish Cypriots, Münir Bey, M. Raif and M. Shevket. Cingizzade Mehmet Rifat wrote a series of open letters to the British Governor of Cyprus, between 10 December 1932 and 11 March 1933, in his newspaper Masum Millet for the modernization of the Sheri Courts, and the Inheritance Law, similar to the reforms made in Turkey since 1926, as well as the matters of Müftü and Evkaf. 

            In 1930, Münir Bey lost his seat at the Legislative Council to the Kemalist leader Necati Bey, who voted later in April 1931 against the Customs Tax Law together with the Greek Cypriot members. In May 1931, Necati Bey convened a National Congress, where a new Müftü was elected for the Turkish Cypriots, but this was not recognized officially by the colonial government. When the British appointed in 1951 Yakup Celal Menzilcioğlu, aged 72, as temporary Müftü from Turkey, his preaching was strongly criticized by the Kemalists of the Turkish Cypriot community; uncoincidentally, after six months the anti-Kemalist Menzilcioglu resigned and left Cyprus. Necati Özkan supported again another candidate from Turkey, Mahmut Kamil Toker, for the post of Müftü against the candidate of the National Party of Dr.Küçük, Dana Efendi. But Toker was forced to withdraw his candidacy before coming to the island and the only candidate from Paphos, Dana Efendi was elected on 30 December 1953 as the new Müftü of Cypriot Muslims.    


Religious Education
Eleven “Sibyan” schools were opened between 1571 and 1600 for the elementary education. In 1632 “Büyük Medrese” and in 1640 “Küçük Medrese” were founded for the young people, who wanted to acquire religious and legal knowledge. These schools were started by rich philanthropic Turkish Cypriots, who made vakıf for the financing of these institutions, therefore the schools were under the administration of the Evkaf. From the Vakf Registers, we can see that some of these philanthropics belong to religious orders that they appointed their own care-takers for these vakıf properties for financing their activities.[20]

The first modern secondary school (Rüştiye) was opened in 1862 and in 1897 the first modern gymnasium (İdadi) followed. In 1922, it was called “Sultani”, but after the foundation of Turkey, the name was changed into “Cyprus Turkish Lycee”. The British colonial government appointed in 1937 an English headmaster to the Lycee, Mr. Wood, who changed the name all of a sudden into “Cyprus Islam Lycee”. The Turkish Cypriot community could use the original name only in 1950, when a Turkish Cypriot Headmaster was appointed to the Lycee. In 1932 a Moslem Theological School was established by Münir Bey in order to replace the Büyük Medrese, which was demolished. Advocate Mehmet Rifat (Con Rifat), who was one of the supporters of the Kemalist populist movement, criticized in his newspaper Masum Millet [Innocent Nation] the establishment of a Theological School in Cyprus.

In the first year, there were only two students and three teachers. From 1932 until 1949, in 16 years, only 8 imams graduated from this school. To be exact, in addition, two persons, one coming from Solia and the other from Tilliria also took a short course. If we bear in mind that there were about 300 mosques over the island, the qualified imams were not over two dozens. Many mosques were without imams and prayers were officiated there only at great intervals, twice a year by qualified persons. This Moslem Theological School in Nicosia was closed in 1949.[21]

            The Interim Report on Turkish Cypriot Affairs was prepared in 1949 by exclusively Turkish Cypriot members, who collected data on all relevant subjects (Evkaf, Müftü, Family Laws, Sherie Couts, Schools) from official and non-official quarters, and five public meetings were held in all towns of the island other than Kyrenia. The Turkish Cypriot press gave also considerable prominence to its deliberations. Therefore, these recommendations had gained general approval and represented a fair reflection of the desires and opinions of the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus the Turkish Family Courts Law and Marriage and Divorce Law came into force in 1951 and later amended in 1954.[22] There were reactions by Şeyh Nazım Hoca, who published a leaflet “Family Law is contrary to the Sheria”, but he was attacked by Dr. Küçük in Halkın Sesi, on 25 May 1950. Another political opponent of Dr.Küçük, Necati Özkan, wrote a series of articles in his own newspaper İstiklal (28 May-11 June 1950). The Turkish Religious Head (Müftü) Law was enacted in 1953. It provided an indirect election, that the Turkish Cypriot community elected in 1954 Dana Efendi as the Müftü for the first time after 27 years. The transfer of the Management of Evkaf properties was made officially on 14 April 1956. The administration of the Turkish Cypriot schools was handed over to the Turkish Cypriot community on 9 June 1959. 


The traditional Turkish Cypriot mosques
After the conquest of the island in 1571, the Ottomans were impressed with the Latin cathedrals in Nicosia and Famagusta and they converted them into mosques by adding minarets and other Islamic elements. Besides these and other conversions, mosques were built by the Turks in various periods in Ottoman style. Those of architectural interest are Arabahmet, Sarayönü and Turunçlu in Nicosia, Seyit Mehmet Ağa and Hala Sultan in Larnaca, Haydar Paşazade Mehmet Bey in Lapithos, Cafer Paşa in Kyrenia and Camii Cedid in Limassol. The mosques in the villages have tiled roofs, carried by one or two rows of high arches, giving the interior a spacious atmosphere.[23] Most of the mosques in rural areas did not have minaret, because they were modest buildings for the villagers built by Evkaf. Some writers insist that they represent the Alevite sect in Cyprus; but they have nothing to do with the “Cemevi”, where the Alevites perform their rituals.


The Islamization of the northern part of the island
There has been a religious movement among the Turkish Cypriot community, which was mainly represented by Şeyh Nazım Hoca, a Turkish Cypriot follower of the Nakshibendi order, which was active especially between the years 1945 and 1949 and later in 1954. Those activities were well documented by one of his followers, Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin, in his book Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Şeyh Nazım Kıbrısi, (İstanbul, 1997). The book reflected the ideological struggle between Dr. Fazıl Küçük, (who was supporting Kemalism and modern Turkey in Cyprus in his activities for winning the leadership of his community) and Nazım Hoca, (who was an anti-Kemalist.) The same writer wrote also the history of the Islamic Movement among the Turkish Cypriots in Kıbrıs’ta İslami Kimlik Davası [The case of Islamic Identity in Cyprus] (İstanbul 1996).[24]

Islamization activities of the occupied parts of the island started right after the invasion and the occupation in 1974. Churches were transformed into mosques in the main towns and villages. Religious propaganda went parallel with the increasing activities of the religious parties in Turkey. When Müftü Dana Efendi retired on 1 September 1971, his deputy, Dr. Rifat Mustafa was appointed as Müftü. The Turkish Cypriot Islam Association was founded already in 1971 with a publication of a fortnightly newspaper Her şeyde ve her yerde milli ve dini NİZAM [National and religious ORDER in everything and at everywhere], on 5 February 1971, which ceased its publication with issue 38 on 19 July 1974. Right wing and religiously oriented columnists from Tercüman newspaper, Ahmet Kabaklı and Ergun Göze, were invited to Cyprus in February 1974; it was a kind of revival of the Şeyh Nazım movement.
A second religious association “Cyprus Turkish Islam Cultural Association” was re-activated after 1974. One of its activities was a conference organized in Kyrenia in June 1977. The chairman of the Association accused the Turkish Cypriots as being “Gavur” (infidel to Islam): “Unless Islam disseminates now or in the future in Cyprus, they shall stay as Gavur as they are today”.[25] The insult provoked Dr. Fazıl Küçük to reply in a series of articles in his daily Halkın Sesi for five days, under the title “Tongues with spikes”. On 12 July 1977 he wrote:


They have given permission to those members from the Koran courses that are spreading across the island and they are practicing as imams and preachers. The administration should be more sensitive in their duties. […] We are embarrassed from the words of those, who came from mountain or forest villages. They don’t know how to walk properly on the street, with their wide trousers. They are chewing the sentence ‘You are bastards of the British, gavurs, without any religion’ and they passed the limits of tolerance. We don’t know what will happen and what will be the result, when there will be no tolerance for these curses. […] Our arms are open for the Ataturkist imams and preachers and we can share our bread with them. These associations have become hearths of disaster. These Islam associations should be closed without any further delay. Although everyone is free to open an association according to the constitution, but the government has the right to close them, when they engage in dangerous activities. […] There is no authority today, who will force them to withdraw their long tongues back into their mouth, who says ‘We shall make you, the gavur Turks, Moslem’.[26]

He further wrote that he had received a letter about the activities of Süleymanist missioners, who were employed by the Müftü Mustafa Rifat that they were teaching Arabic to the youth in Famagusta and giving conferences without getting permission in the villages, where they accused the Turkish Cypriots of not being religious enough. Halkın Sesi reported one year later, on 11 August 1978, that Koran courses were organized in a mosque in Famagusta and the children were told not to watch TV, because it was a sin; small boys were not allowed to wear short trousers and they could not learn by heart to sing the prayers properly at the minarets.


The growth of mosques and Islam in occupied Cyprus
There were approximately 300 mosques in Cyprus before 1974. Many of them in the rural areas did not have minarets and between 1968 and 1974 minarets were built to some mosques like the ones at Krini, Fota and Agridi. At the end of 1991, there were 141 mosques in the occupied areas, but 58 of them did not have imams for performing the religious prayers. Βy 1999 the Department for Religious Affairs – with a personnel of 13 – employed 135 imams in all the mosques (only 5 of them were graduates of a Theological Faculty), plus 56 imams were appointed from Turkey. According to the official numbers, there were 199 mosques in the ‘TRNC’ at the end of 2012, excluding those in construction; in these mosques, 255 imam and muezzin were employed. Furthermore, there were another 103 imams, who were paid by the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. Thus the total number of imams – including the three imams working in the southern part of the island – is 361 of whom only ten are are permanently employed while the rest are on a contact basis.[27] In 2014, there were 260 imams, who were paid from the budget of the Prime Ministry of the TRNC, but only 13 of them were on permanent staff- list. Another 120 imams received their salaries from the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia.[28]

Nine mosques were built between 1974 and 2002 in various towns and villages in the occupied areas with the finances of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. One of them is the big mosque, built in Anatolian style in Kyrenia in 1999 and it was named after Nurettin Ersin Pasha, the Turkish commander of the 1974 invasion forces. It was followed, in 2003, by another big mosque that was built in Famagusta and was named after Fazıl Polat Pasha, the Turkish commander who occupied Famagusta in 1974. In the summer of 2005, there were a total of 173 mosques and a budget of 3.5 million TL was allocated in order to build 12 new mosques. During the AKP government, starting with the year 2002, out of 39 newly built mosques, 37 were in occupied Greek Cypriot villages; they were all reduced-size copies of the big mosque built in Kyrenia, either with one or two minarets.[29]

The Turkish Cypriots perceive these Islamization activities with concern. For example the Trade Union of Turkish Cypriot Teachers (KTÖS) issued a statement and criticized the ongoing Koran courses and new schools for religious education:

There are 192 mosques in the TRNC, whereas there are 160 schools, 21 health centres and 17 hospitals. Each university wants to build a mosque and these plans increased the controversies. […] They say that they got permission from the Ministry of Education, but there are Koran courses ongoing in the mosques, without permission and controls. If the government does not have the power to control these places, they should resign.[30]


The Trade Union of the Turkish Cypriots Secondary School Teachers (KTOEÖS) protested for a teacher that was appointed from Turkey, at the Polatpaşa Lycee, because the pupils did not like the way he was teaching the lesson of “Religious Culture and Ethics”.[31] The parents’ association of the same school made a demonstration and criticized the Ministry of Education that there was no inspection how the teachers for religion perform their duties.[32] The chairman of KTOS, Semen Saygun, remarked that there were 2,000 pupils, who were participating at the Koran courses during summer season in 2012 while in 2015 the number increased to 5,000. She said that it was not pedagogically appropriate for the immature children to have these courses instead of playing games, resting or spending time with their own families.[33]


Turkish Cypriot reaction

The majority of the Turkish Cypriots does not like that that religious belief is mixed with politics in a show off and are against using religion for political purposes.  Therefore they do not approve mass propaganda for Islam, done by the various religious associations, mainly set up by Anatolian settlers and students. There have always been religious people among the Turkish Cypriot community, but they were in minority and not so fanatic. Some religious Turkish Cypriots formed in cooperation with Turkish settlers some political parties, which were based on religious programs, but they did not have any success: “Reform and Welfare Party” (1979), “Our party” (1998). When the followers of Şeyh Nazım convened on 22 December 1996 in Nicosia at a meeting under the name “Great Islam Congress”, Şeyh Nazım defined the Turkish Cypriot as “a different kind of human, who is clever and has many demonic ideas. There is a need to have someone, who can imprison the demon in a bottle. Those imams, who are sent from Turkey, do not know the Turkish Cypriots. I can convince millions, but in the last 60 years, I got tired of trying to convince this millet (of Turkish Cypriots)!”[34]

            Since the population of the Anatolian settlers is more than the local Turkish Cypriots in the occupied areas at the moment, religious events and activities are organized mainly for them by various associations and organizations that are financed by the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia or some reactionary Arabic countries, and enjoy the support of the ‘TRNC’ government. Last year the Evkaf distributed 5,000 packages of food, sent by the General Directorate of the Vakıfs in Turkey. During the Ramadan month, when the Moslems do not eat or drink anything during the daytime, 100,000 persons had the chance to have dinner on 14 meeting-points in various towns and villages, under the organization of the “Red Crescent Association of Northern Cyprus” with the support of the Turkish Embassy Aid Department in Nicosia. Since 2005, it has been a traditional event. Similar dinners were given also by the Evkaf Department, the Turkish Cypriot Islam Association and Universal Love and Brotherhood Association (ESKAD).[35]
            At the moment there are 600 students at the two theological faculties, one at the Near East University (YDU) and the other one at the University of Social Sciences [Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi], while another 800 pupils attend the Theological Colleges. Almost all of the students and teenage pupils are from Turkey who came to the occupied areas with scholarships while a small number are the children of the Anatolian settlers; the teachers are all coming from Turkey. The newly established Hala Sultan Theological College is part of the big complex with a boarding house, a large mosque, conference rooms and shops that will cost 80 million dollars. The Hala Sultan Mosque with its four tall minarets – a small replica of the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne – will be ready by 2017 at a total cost of 30 million dollars. Another large mosque with six minarets is being constructed at the Near East University and is expected to be completed by 2017.

            It is interesting to note that an Anatolian settler, professor Talip Atalay – also an unsuccessful AKP candidate at the 2015 general elections – who settled with his family in occupied Famagusta in 1975, when he was 7 years old, was appointed by Ankara, in 2010, as the Muftü of Cyprus. His employment as the Director of the Religious Affairs, was accompanied by the purchase of two Mercedes and three BMW cars for his Department, which caused criticism by the Trade Union “Hizmet-Sen” in the Turkish Cypriot press.[36] Talip Atalay, a professor of theology, represents the Turkish Cypriot community in its relations with the Cyprus Greek Orthodox Church and he is welcomed by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, although he is not a local Turkish Cypriot. The Anatolian settlers can visit now the Hala Sultan Tekke during Moslem Holidays. Since 2014, four such visits were organized with the participation of more than one thousand visitors in each time, comprising mainly of the Turkish citizens![37]

(Published in “EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY NOTE • No. 8 • 10 July 2016, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia)






Dr Ahmet Djavit An, MD, is a historical researcher, activist and author of 24 books about the Turkish Cypriot political, religious, communal and social affairs. Among his books about the history of the Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus Problem are: Kıbrıs’ta Fırtınalı Yıllar (1942-1962) [The stormy years in Cyprus (1942-1962)], (Nicosia: Galeri Kultur, 1996); Kıbrıs Türk Liderliğinin Oluşması: Dinsel Toplumdan Ulusal Topluma Geçiş Süreci (1900-1942) [The formation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership: the process of making a national community out of a religious community (1900-1942)], (Nicosia: Galeri Kultur, 1997); Kıbrıslılık Bilincinin Geliştirilmesi [Notes on the development of Cypriot awareness], (Nicosia: Galeri Kultur, 1998); Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor? [Quo Vadis Cyprus], (Istanbul: Everest, 2002); Küçük Adada Büyük Oyunlar: Kıbrıs’ta Ayrılıkçılık, Federal Çözüm ve AB Üyeliği [Big games on a small island: separatism, federal solution and EU membership of Cyprus], (Istanbul: NK Publishing, 2004); Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun Geri Kalmışlığı (1896-1962) [The under-development of the Turkish Cypriot community (1892-1962)], (Nicosia: Shadi Publishing, 2006)

[1] Cengiz Orhonlu, The Ottoman Turks Settle in Cyprus (1570-1580), in Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi (14-19 Nisan 1969) Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri, Ankara 1971, p.100
[2] Ibid, p.97
[3] According to the 1572 census 76 villages in the Mesaoria and Mazotos regions were empty: Cengiz Orhonlu, Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri, p.93. Quoting B. Sagredo in des Mas Latrie, Histoire De L’Ile de Chypre, III, Paris 1855, p. 542, Halil İnalcık wrote that “in 1562 there were 246 villages belonging to the State and were described as ‘Real’ while those belonging to the mobility and the Church numbered 567”: Halil İnalcık, Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri, p. 64.
[4] Cengiz Orhonlu, ibid, p.94
[5] Ibid, p.100
[6] Ahmet Djavit An, “Origins of Turkish Cypriots”, Cyprus Today, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, April-June 2008, pp.13-21.
[7] Letter of Mehmet Ziyai Efendi to Sublime Porte (“Bab-ı Ali” in İstanbul) dated 22 February 1910, quoted by Mustafa Haşim Altan, Kıbrıs’ta Rumlaştırma Hareketleri [Movements for Greek convertions in Cyprus), 2nd edn (Kyrenia: Milli Arşiv, 2000), pp. 9-10; also M. Nabi, “Nüfus Sayımı-2”, Hürsöz newspaper, 15 June 1947.
[8] Author’s emphasis; Ronald C. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640, New York University Studies in Near Eastern Civilization XVIII (New York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 137.
[9] Alkan Chaglar, Toplum Postası newspaper, London, 5 August 1981.

[10] Cyprus Today, July-December 1967 and January-March 1968.
[11] Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “From coexistence to confrontation: the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus”, in Cyprus Reviewed, ed. by Michalis Attalides (Nicosia: New Cyprus Association, 1977), pp 35-70 (37).
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ahmet An, ‘Changes in the ethnic and cultural structure of Cyprus after 1571’, in Kıbrıs Türk Kültürü Üzerine Yazılar [Articles on the Turkish Cypriot Culture]; (Nicosia: Ateş Matbaacılık, 1999), p.15.
[14] [“Rum” is related to Eastern Roman Empire and all the Greek speaking Orthodox Christians, who were living in Anatolia, were called as “Rum” in Turkish language. The Greek Cypriots used to be citizens of the Eastern Roman Empire, therefore they were called also as “Rum”, i.e. “Kıbrıslı Rumlar” (Rums of Cyprus).  For example, those Rums, who were living in the Black Sea region, were called as “Trabzonlu Rumlar” (“Rums of Trebizun”= Pontians). On the other hand, “Yunan” means (Ionian in Arabic) and it is used for a citizen of the state of “Yunanistan” (Land of Ionians= Greece) after 1829. Therefore the Greeks, living outside the boundaries of Greece, are called “Rum” as the ex-citizens of Eastern Roman Empire, not being the citizens of Greece.  Could you please explain in this footnote why the Christians in Cyprus were called Rum and not Υunan]
[15] Evkaf is a religious institution in Islam. The legal definition of Vakf (Evkaf is the plural of Vakf) is the tying up of the property for the sake of God and to earn the Divine Mercy, with ultimate imposition of interdiction on its transfer to persons contrary to the conditions of dedication. The term is equivalent of “dedication”.
[16] A Tekke (convent) is a place where Dervishes belonging to a cult used to stay and carry out their prayers and religious ceremonies. 

[17]  C. F. Beckingham, “Islam in Cyprus”, The Islamic Quarterly, vol. II, no. 2, July 1955, p. 140.
[18] M. Kemal Dizdar, “Cyprus Evkaf”, in Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi, 14-19 Nisan 1969 Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri (Papers of the Turkish delegation to the First International Congress of Cypriot Studies) Ankara: 1971, p. 211.  

[19] Advocate Fadıl N. Korkut, 31 Mart 1947 tarihinde Kıbrısta Mevcut Türk Kurumları Namına Ekselâns Valiye Takdim Edilen Arizada Hükûmetten Talep Edilen Haklarımızdan 2ncisi EVKAF, Hür Söz Basımevi, (Lefkoşa), (Evkaf, The second of our rights, being demanded from the government in an application given to his Excellency the Governor in the name of the existing Turkish institutions in Cyprus on 31 March 1947, Hür Söz Printing House (Nicosia).

[20] Ali Süha, ‘Turkish Education in Cyprus’, in Papers of the Turkish delegation to the First International Congress of Cypriot Studies (Ankara: 1971), pp. 235-237.
[21] 1949 Interim Report of the Committee on Turkish Affairs [in Turkish], Nicosia 1950, p.70.

[22] Ahmet An, A Short Overview on the Past of the Turkish Law Institutions in Cyprus, Articles on Turkish Cypriot Culture, Nicosia, 1999, p.89.

[23] Hakkı M. Atun, “The Influence of Ottoman Architecture in Cyprus”, in Papers of the Turkish Delegation to the First International Congress of Cypriot Studies (Ankara: 1971), pp. 262-263.

[24] Ahmet An, “The role of religion in Turkish Cypriot community” (in Turkish), Kıbrıslı Turkun Sesi dergisi, 27 September 1996, http://can-kibrisim.blogspot.com.cy/2014/01/kibris-turk-toplumunda-dinin-yeri.html; Ahmet An, “Religion and society in the 2000’s” (in Turkish), Kıbrıslı Turkun Sesi dergisi, December 1997, http://can-kibrisim.blogspot.com.cy/2014 /01/2000li-yillarda-din-ve-toplum.html.
[25] Halkın Sesi, 11 June 1977.
[26] Dr Fazil Küçük, “Dikenli diller” [Tongues with spikes], Halkın Sesi, 12 July 1977, p. 1

[27] Havadis, 6 December 2012.

[28] Afrika, 18 August 2014.
[29] Mete Hatay, “‘Direniş’ Minarelerinden ‘Vesayet’ Minarelerine”, Afrika, 17 October 2014, p. 19.
[30] KTÖS Press release, Kıbrıslı, 5 August 2012.
[31] Yenidüzen, 29 December 2015.
[32] Kıbrıs, 16 February 2016.
[33] Kıbrıs, 11 July 2015. 

[34] Quoted by Ahmet An, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunda Dinin Yeri [Place of Religion in Turkish Cypriot Society] Kıbrıslı magazine, 27 September 1996, no.14.
[35]  Kıbrıs, 18 June 2015.
[36] Afrika, 5 March 2014, p. 3.
[37] Kıbrıs, 11 December 2015.

  • July 23rd 2016 at 23:53
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THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS IN TURKEY

By myislandcyprus.blogspot.com

 The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi=AKP) has been in power in Turkey in the last 14 years and it has already made big steps forwards in order to legitimize the establishment of an Islamic State in Turkey. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1924 by Kemal Ataturk and until 1990’s, Kemalism has been the state ideology of modern Turkey.  

The AKP originated from the religious movement, started by the National Order Party (MNP) of Necmettin Erbakan, who broke apart from the traditional right wing Justice Party (AP) in 1970 and started a separate political party in order to represent independently the political Islamism in Turkey. Erbakan’s political movement continued under various parties, which succeeded each other after the proscription of the previous one: National Order Party (1970-1981), National Salvation Party (1983-1998), Welfare Party (1983-1998), Virtue Party (1997-2001), Prosperity Party (2001-today). Those, who did not want to join the Prosperity Party, established the AKP on 14 August 2001 and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the chairperson between 2003 and 2014.  The AKP won 34.28% of the votes in the general elections in 2002, 46.58% in 2007 and 49.83% in 2011. In June 2015, the AKP won 40.89% of the votes under its new chairperson Ahmet Davutoğlu, who could increase the percentage in November 2015 up to 49.50%. Davutoğlu was previously the Foreign Minister in Erdoğan’s cabinet and he initiated the so-called “Zero-problem with the neighbours” policy, which proved later to be an enemy maker policy for Turkey.    

The Islamic religious communities have been very active since 1973 in Turkey and the most influential one of them was Fethullah Gülen’s movement. Gülen supported Erdoğan’s AKP, starting from the general elections of 1994 until 2009. During the power of the AKP, the state apparatus was not anymore supporting the Kemalist principles of the founder of the Republic of Turkey. It was already under the influence of a Turkish-Islam synthesis, which could be defined as a kind of fascism with Turkish flavour. It is not only anti-communist and anti-democratic, but also anti-humanist and anti-enlightenment. The ideology of the AKP is oppressive and against the classic liberalism in the sense of political rights and freedoms.

After the military regime of 1980, the Turkish state establishment did not disturb the so-called “moderate” religious movement of Gülen, organized as companies, associations and foundations. The security bureaucracy of the Turkish State, like the Ministry of National Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs were already indocrinated with the Turkish-Islam synthesis, as well as the Intelligence Services (MIT), the police and the army. It is not possible to find Kemalist persons anymore, working in the Ministries of National Education or Internal Affairs or among the Security Bureaucracy.  

Starting with the military ultimatum on 28 February 1997, the political Islam in Turkey took a neo-liberal course, which brought Turkey to participate in the Great Near East Project of the USA, to start relations with the EU, to implement the programme of the IMF and to privatize the big state enterprizes. The big monopolies of Turkey have accumulated a lot of capital during the power of the AKP and they bought almost all of the state properties and benefited from extraordinary subsidies.

According to a survey, done by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, published at the beginning of 2013, Turkey is one of the countries at the top of the list with inequal division of national income. The division of national income is unjust and inequal. 95% of the households live below the poverty line (3.200 TL) and 60% live below the limit of hunger (1.200-1.000 TL). Out of 19.7 million families, the richest 100 were getting 30% of the national income with their wealth of 216 billion dollars. The income of the richest 10% of the population in Turkey is 12.6 times more than the 10% of the poorest population. According to the numbers from 2015, Turkey is the fifth OECD country after Mexico, Chile, USA and Israel and the first in Europe.

According to the study of Research Institute on Turkey, which was based on the Global Wealth Report of the Credit Suisse, the richest 1% of the population in Turkey, used to get 39.4% in 2002, but they got 54.3% in 2014. The remaining 99% got in 2002 60.6% of the total wealth, reduced to 45.7% in 2014.  Erdoğan’s family, alone, has accumulated in the last 10 year a wealth of 128 billion dollars, which makes 16% of the national income.

The Gülen Movement had 88 foundations, 20 associations, 128 private schools, 218 companies and approximately 500 boarding houses in Turkey. It was also well organized in the mass media with 17 newspapers and magazines, several TV and radio stations. The Gülen imperium, which is supposed to have the support of the CIA, has in 92 countries, approximately 500 elementary and secondary schools and 6 universities, plus many education and language centres. The movement educate more than 100.000 persons worldwide. The schools, which operate in the foreign countries, are all private and enroll the children of the middle and the upper classes.

In November 2013, Erdoğan decided to break his cooperation with the Gülen Movement and and get the whole power in his own hand in Turkey. Therefore he started by preparing a bill for the closure of the preparatory classes for the universities. This was a big challenge for his long-time collaborator, the Gülen Movement, which was recruiting young members to the movement through these preparatory classes for the universities. The “Zaman” daily newspaper of the Gülen Movement reacted strongly against this decision of the AKP government by saying that this was not done even during the Kemalist military regimes in Turkey. This was a big economic and political blow to the Gülen community, because 60% of all the preparatory classes (4.000 of them registered, 2.000 - 5.000 unregistered) belonged to Gülen Movement and 80% of the publishing materials for the preparatory classes.   

Gülen Movement reacted on 17 December 2013 by making some operations, where 80 persons were detained and  among them was an Iranian businessman, Rıza Sarraf, who sold the Iranian petrol during the years of embargo and gave the money back to his partner in Iran in gold.  The mass media was given some recorded telephone conversations about the corruption of four cabinet ministers, who were bribed by Sarraf. This ended up with their resignation on 24 December, because the sons of  Zafer Çağlayan, Muammer Güler, Erdoğan Bayraktar were involved. During the police operations, 4.5 million dollars were found, hidden in shoe-boxes in the house of the director of Halk Bank and a money-counting machine was found at the bedroom of Minister Güler’s son! Erdoğan Bayraktar told to the press that what he had done was according to the orders of Premier Minister Erdoğan! But he negated this statement later.  On 25 December 2013, a second operation for the arrest of 30 suspected persons for money laundering could not be realized, because the security forces did not implement the order of the state attorney. From that day on, the AKP started to restructure the legal system in Turkey with its own supporters. 

Later, the events on 17 and 25 December 2013 were seen as a civil coup d’Etat of Erdoğan, whereas the accused ministers should have been before court, in order to have a clarification, if they did something against the law or not, but the AKP stopped the legal procedure!

In January 2014, the MIT officers did not allow the state attorney to search lorries carrying guns and ammunition for the ISIL. The Minister for Internal Affairs stated on a TV programme that during 35 days, after the incident on 17 December, 5,000 policemen and many state attorneys were appointed to other posts. On 25 February 2014, another voice-recording was popular on the social media and Youtube which was recorded on 17 December 2013. The PM Erdoğan was informing his son, Bilal, about the police operation at the homes of the sons of some ministers and he told his son to get rid of the money, hidden at their own home. Bilal Erdoğan has been accused of involvement in illegal oil smuggling in Syria  and Iraq.

After the corruption scandals were made public, Erdoğan decided to abolish the court decisions on Ergenekon case and the similar ones, which made a big blow on the strength and authority of the Turkish Army. Now the Army was a reliable partner of Erdoğan, who wanted to avoid his cornered position.

The AKP was able to collect 44% of the votes in the local elections on 30 March 2014 and Erdoğan declared war on the Gülen Movement, which he defined as a “parallel state within the Turkish state.” On 12 June 2015, 37 judges and attorneys were expelled from their professions.  

Erdoğan started also a revenge attack on the Kurdish cities and people in South-Eastern provinces, where his party could not win, but the Democratic Party of the Peoples (HDP) was very successful. Erdoğan broke the alliance with the Kurdish movement, which costed 40.000 lives in 35 years and 6.000 people were killed only in 8 months time!

According to a report, prepared by the TU for Education Labourers (Eğitim-Sen), when the AKP came to power in 2002, the number of students attending 450  Imam Hatip schools were 71,100.  In the school year 2014-2015, the number of the Imam Hatip Schools was 1,017 with an increase of  90% to almost 750,000 children, aged between 10 and 18, or 9% of all students. (Hürriyet, 13 June 2015) Government officials, many of them former Imam Hatip pupils themselves, have since argued that the schools’ revival responds to demand by Muslim families, who felt discriminated against after 1997.

The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, which employs 120.000 personnel, in a total of 84,684 mosques (emlakwebtv.com, 18 June 2015), had a budget of  more than 3 billion Euros (6.5 billion TL) for 2016 and the whole amount, spent on religious activities between 2006 and 2015 makes a total of approx. 12 billion Euros. (haber.sol.org.tr, 27 January 2016) In the summer of 2015, more than 3 million children (4-6 year-olds included) went to Koran courses, organized in 60.000 mosques. More than 1 million visited other places than mosques for Koran education. 929 persons and many other associations and foundations organized 16.958 Koran courses in 2013-14. (Birgün newspaper, 31 March 2016)

In Turkey, there are 107,000 doctors and 1,250 hospitals, whereas there are 122,000 imams and almost 85,000 mosques. Every year only 9,000 doctors graduate, whereas there is a need of 105,000 doctors more. On the other hand, there are 122,000 imams and every year 60,000 imams graduate and they are in surplus. (Yılmaz Özdil, Sözcü newspaper, 8 January 2015)

The AKP is very happy with the majority of the media, including some 32 newspapers and 22 television channels, using them in order  to dominate the news coverage and attack on opposition parties. 

Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to announce on 5 May 2016 that he was resigning as head of the ruling AKP and giving up the premiership. President Erdogan continued to concentrate the whole power of the state in his own hands and obedience to him within the AKP was openly praised as a virtue and required as a duty.

On the other hand, the country faced now serious challenges on the security and economic fronts. Turkey failed to protect the city of Kilis on the border with Syria, where ISIS attacks with missiles that took lives of 21 people, including eight Syrian refugees, and wounded scores of others. Many buildings have been devastated. One columnist wrote that Kilis is a clear testimony to Turkey’s powerlessness in its ambition to be recognized as a regional power.

Erdogan and his party AKP are among the major actors in the ordeal that Syria has been going through since 2011, alongside with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Erdoğan strives to assume the leadership of the Sunni masses of the Middle East and return to Turkey the glory of its Ottoman past. This is one of the reasons why the AKP government supported ISIL until very recently and continue to support other Islamist groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria, where he flamed the hatred of war between the Sunni and the Alevi. The Alevites are a minority denomination in Islam and they are closer to the Shia than the Sunni. The AKP does not have good relationship with the Alevites in Turkey. Another problem for the AKP government is the formation of the Kurdish cantons on the Syrian border. The USA asked Turkey to cleanse the line Cerablus-Azez from the ISIL, but Erdoğan does not want that the Syrian Kurds would put these areas under their control. Russia and Syria prefer the Kurdish authority rather than the ISIL.

The relationship between Turkey and Russia have deteriorated significantly since 24 November 2015, when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane in Syria. Russia declared economic sanctions against Turkey and the trade between the two countries contracted 25% in 2015. Since the beginning of 2016, Russia has put restrictions on the supplies of vegetables, fruits and other goods from Turkey and these restrictions included also a ban on hiring of Turkish citizens. It is estimated that the embargo could cost the Turkish economy more than 3 billion dollars.         

Erdoğan does not act as an independent President, but continue to govern the AKP as its leader, getting involved in goverment affairs and breaching the Constitution, which is punishable with life-long imprisonment. He should have cut his relationship with his AKP on the day he was elected as President. On the contrary, he succeeded the resignation of the Premier Minister, who won the elections with 23 million votes. Erdogan intervened also the internal party affairs of the oppositional National Movement Party (MHP) in order to secure the continuation of the party’s support for his power. 

The new chairperson of the AKP, Binali Yıldırım, who would be the Prime Minister of Turkey, is a well-known close friend of Erdoğan and one of the founders of the AKP in 2001. He was appointed to the Ministry of Transport in 2002 and served the longest term in the history of Turkey at that post. During his term of office, a lot of corruption allegations were published in the media and many state enterprizes were sold cheaply under the guise of privatization. Yıldırım’s family owns 17 companies, 28 cargo-ships and 2 super-yachts, but others allege that the real number of ships are higher than this. Now that Erdoğan has a puppet Prime Minister, he would try to get rid of the MP’s of the Democratic Party of the Peoples (HDP) in the Turkish Grand National Assembly by removing their immunity, nut not those from his own party, AKP. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has lost its Kemalist ideology on one hand and takes a nationalist position in the Kurdish question like the MHP. Erdoğan is now a monarch!  

 

(Published in IN DEPTH bimonthly electronic newsletter • Volume 13 Issue 3 • June 2016
© 2016 Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs • University of Nicosia)




  • July 17th 2016 at 22:02
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Αντιφασιστική – Αντιρατσιστική εκδήλωση Σάββατο 16/7 στην Λεμεσό

By antifalem

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Η Συνέλευση για την δημιουργία Αντιφασιστικού Αντιρατσιστικού Μετώπου (στην οποία συμμετέχει και το Αντιφασιστικό  Δίκτυο Λεμεσού μαζί με άλλες ομάδες, συλλογικότητες και άτομα) διοργανώνει Αντιφασιστική και Αντιρατσιστική εκδήλωση με συζήτηση και συναυλίες στο Θεατράκι του Μόλου στην Λεμεσό (Επίχωση) το Σάββατο στις 16 Ιουλίου και ώρα 19:00.

 

Πρόγραμμα Εκδήλωσης:

 

Συζήτηση: Το παρελθόν και το παρόν του Φασισμού στην Κύπρο και πως απαντάμε.

Ομιλητές: Αλέξης Αλέκου, Γιώργος Χαραλάμπους

 

Συναυλία: Αρχή Δια Του Ρεμπέτικου, Μπερτέδες, Julio Κομπολόι, Στέλιος Πελλάρας

 

Tο κείμενο της Συνέλευσης:

Σε μια περίοδο που η διεθνής οικονομική κρίση φαίνεται να μην έχει τελειωμό, παρά μόνο να βαθαίνει όλο και περισσότερο, η ακροδεξιά και οι φασίστες δυναμώνουν σε όλη την Ευρώπη αλλά και σε άλλες χώρες μέσα από την αναγωγή του ρατσισμού και του εθνικισμού σε επίσημη πολιτική των κυβερνήσεων όπως την είδαμε να εκδηλώνεται και στην περίπτωση των προσφύγων που ζητούν καταφύγιο στην Ευρώπη.

Στην Κύπρο, ο φασιστικός λόγος έχει διαχυθεί σε πολλά επίπεδα της δημόσιας ζωής και η φασιστική συμμορία του ΕΛΑΜ είναι πια μέσα στη βουλή, πράγμα που τους δίνει τη δυνατότητα να λειτουργούν και με βούλα του «δημοκρατικού» κόμματος. Εκείνοι οι οποίοι χτυπούν Τουρκοκυπρίους και ακτιβιστές, που είναι αδελφό κόμμα με τους ναζί δολοφόνους της Χρυσής Αυγής, εκείνοι που ονειρεύονται αναγέννηση της ΕΟΚΑ Β’, οι νοσταλγοί του Άουσβιτς, δεν έχουν καμία θέση σε καμία δημοκρατική κοινωνία.

Το κράτος στηρίχτηκε από τη δημιουργία του στον επιθετικό εθνικισμό και στην μισαλλοδοξία απέναντι στους Τουρκοκύπριους, κάτι που αποτέλεσε και αποτελεί ακόμα ένα παράγοντα που άνοιξε το δρόμο για το δυνάμωνα των φασιστών. Σε ένα κράτος όπου οι φασιστικές ιδέες εκφράζονται μέσα από ρατσιστικές, σεξιστικές και ομοφοβικές δηλώσεις και συμπεριφορές στελεχών και άλλων κομμάτων, σε ένα κράτος που έχει βασιστεί από τη δημιουργία του στον εθνικισμό και τη μισαλλοδοξία, που όχι απλώς επιτρέπει και ενθαρρύνει τη διάχυση φασιστικών ιδεών αλλά σκορπά το ίδιο τις ιδέες του μίσους σε όλα τα επίπεδα: Με την ενίσχυση του στρατού και του μιλιταρισμού, με ένα εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα που διδάσκει τα παιδιά μας ότι «ο εχθρός παραμονεύει», μέσω των σχέσεών του με την εκκλησία, της οποίας ο ηγέτης δηλώνει ότι χάρηκε που μπήκαν οι φασίστες στη βουλή χωρίς να αντιμετωπίζει συνέπειες για αυτό. Με την ηρωοποίηση και συγκάλυψη φασιστών τύπου Γρίβα.

Όλα αυτά τα ζητήματα, μας φέρνουν αντιμέτωπους με μια ιστορική αναγκαιότητα: Να χτίσουμε ένα μαχητικό αντιφασιστικό μέτωπο, που θα είναι ικανό να αντιπαρατεθεί στο ρατσισμό, να μην επιτρέψει στους φασίστες να επιβάλουν ένα κλίμα φόβου και τρομοκρατίας μέσα στην κοινωνία και να τους στείλει στη θέση τους, δηλαδή στους υπονόμους της ιστορίας.

Οι ομάδες, συλλογικότητες και άτομα που απαρτίζουν αυτή τη συνέλευση, αποφασίσαμε να δουλέψουμε προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση και σαν πρώτο σταθμό διοργανώνουμε μια εκδήλωση στις 16 Ιουλίου, με στόχο να θεσμοθετηθεί ένα ετήσιο αντιρατσιστικό φεστιβάλ, αρχής γενομένης από το ερχόμενο φθινόπωρο.

Η επιλογή της συγκεκριμένης μέρας δεν είναι τυχαία. Φιλοδοξούμε να αποτελέσει μια πρώτη πολιτική απάντηση στους φασίστες αλλά και στις εθνικιστικές και ρατσιστικές εκδηλώσεις της επίσημης πολιτείας με αφορμή τις επετείους της εισβολής και του πραξικοπήματος. Μια εκδήλωση όπου θα συζητήσουμε όχι μόνο την ιστορία, προβάλλοντας έναν διαφορετικό τρόπο μνήμης αυτής της περιόδου. και την σημερινή άνοδο του φασισμού (και του ΕΛΑΜ στην Κύπρο) αλλά και τους τρόπους με τους οποίους μπορούμε να την ανατρέψουμε.

Καλούμε όλους/ες όσοι θέλουν να παλέψουν ενάντια στο φασισμό, το ρατσισμό και τη μισαλλοδοξία, στην εκδήλωση στις 16/7, στο θεατράκι του μόλου Λεμεσού.

Γλώσσες και Διάλεκτοι Α - Συζήτηση για την κατάσταση στην Κύπρο

By Ιάκωβος Χατζηπιερής

Αυτόνομο Σχολείο Ιούνη 2016

Παρουσίαση του Κοινού Ελληνοκυπριακού-Τουρκοκυπριακού Λεξικού και συζήτηση για την γλωσσική κατάσταση στην Κύπρο

ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΗ – 10 ΙΟΥΝΗ 2016 στις 19:30 στον Κοινωνικό Χώρο Kaymakκιν, Αρχ. Μακαρίου 127 Καϊμακλί (Info & Χάρτης: kaymakkin.org & fb.com/kaymakkin)

Με τους Ιάκωβο Χατζηπιερή (ένας από τους συγγραφείς του Κοινού Λεξικού) και Φοίβο Παναγιωτίδη (Γλωσσολόγος, Πανεπιστήμιο Κύπρου)

Αργότερα τον Ιούνη: Το Μέρος Β θα καταπιαστεί με τις έμφυλες διαλέκτους και την ελληνική γκέι αργκό

Ηχογράφηση

Poster

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