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Η κεντρική είδηση την περασμένη εφτομάδα ήταν η αποκλιμάκωση της έντασης μεταξύ Κίνας τζαι ΗΠΑ, στον εμπορικό τομέα..... εν μια οικονομική φυσικά, αλλά τζαι αισθητική αντιπαράθεση... Όσον αφορά την οικονομία, εν σαφές, τζαι που τα χρηματιστήρια, ότι σε μια ανοικτή οικονομική αντιπαράθεση, είναι οι ΗΠΑ που είναι σε αδύναμη θέση... Η Κίνα έσιει ένα παγκόσμιο δίκτυο εμπορικών συναλλαγών, ένα τεραστιο εσωτερικό κοινό/αγορά, με αποθέματα rare earth metals τζαι ένα δημόσιο σχεδιασμό [άρα τζαι συνειδητές αναπροσαρμογές όταν χρειάζονται] της οικονομίας. Οι ΗΠΑ είναι μια χώρα σε κρίση, τζαι λόγω διεθνούς κρίσης της τέως ηγεμονίας της, αλλά τζαι λόγω έντονων εσωτερικών αντιπαραθέσεων... Ήδη το Economist, που είσιεν τις ΗΠΑ σαν πρότυπο, δημοσιεύκει κείμενα για την κρίση εμπιστοσύνης των διεθνών επενδυτών για τις ΗΠΑ, τζαι τους κινδύνους για την αξιοπιστία του δολαρίου στις νυν συνθήκες..
Εν ενδιαφέρουσα τζαι η αισθητική: ο μεν Τραμπ άνοιξε το θέμα των δασμών, σαν «ταύρος εν υαλοπωλείο», ενώ ο Σιν Γιαν-πιγκ, δημοσιοποιούσε προτάσεις – αποφασιστικές, αλλά ανοικτές σε διάλογο. Ο Τραμπ εκατάλαβεν το πλαίσιο που την αρχή, για τούτο εβούρησεν που την πρώτη νύχτα των δασμών, να διαβεβαιώσει [κοινό τζαι αγορές] ότι ο κινέζος ηγέτης εν πολλά καλός, κλπ, τζαι ότι θα τα έβρουν...
Οπότε ποιό φαίνεται να είναι το πλάνο του Τραμπ;... Ενώ στα οικονομικά πάει στην αναδίπλωση [για τους δασμούς], στη διεθνή πολιτική φαίνεται ότι η ρητορική της στρατηγικής του είναι «τέλος των πολέμων»... Τούτο εν σημαίνει ότι έσιει κάποιο ηθικό λόγο που το κάμνει. Εν μάλλον μέρος της εικόνας που θέλει να προβάλει, αλλά τζαι μέρος μιας ευρύτερης στρατηγικής μετατόπισης συμμαχιών των ΗΠΑ με άξονα την διαμόρφωση μιας δικής τους σφαίρας επιρροής [με ανάλογα συμφέροντα] τζαι εγκατάλειψη της στρατηγικής των Δημοκρατικών, για παγκόσμια ηγεμονία με βάση την ιδεολογία του παγκοσμίου «ηθικού αστυνομικού» [κατ’ επιλογήν θεαμάτων, χωρών τζαι συμφερόντων φυσικά] ...Σε τούτο το πλαίσιο η προσέγγιση με την Ρωσία εν τζαι πολιτική τζαι οικονομική... Τζαι ίσως τζαι δαμέ η σχέση των 2 τέως υπερδυνάμεων του ψυχρού πολέμου, να καθορίζεται από την άνοδο ενός τρίτου παίκτη/πόλου – της Κίνας...
Οι κινήσεις «ειρήνης» του Τραμπ εστίασαν σχεδόν αμέσως στα 2 ανοικτά μέτωπα – Μέση Ανατολή τζαι Ουκρανία.. Σίουρα θα περηφανεύκεται [στην φαντασίωση που φαίνεται να έσιει να πιάσει Νόμπελ Ειρήνης] ότι εκαθόρισε την τελευταία εκεχειρία στην Γάζα... τζαι από ότι φαίνεται η σχέση του με τον Νετανιάχου εν τζαι εν σχέση ισότητας ή υπεροχής του ισραηλινού πρωθυπουργού, όπως εγίνετουν επί Ομπάμα – ο Νετανιάχου λ.χ. έθελεν επίθεση στο Ιράν, αλλά ο Τραμπ εκαθόρισε του ημερομηνία να τον δει, τζαι ο Νετανιάχου επήεν, σαν υπό διαταγή, όπως φάνηκε τζαι στο εσωτερικό του Ισραήλ, για να ανακοινώσει o Τραμπ [στην παρουσία του Νετανιάχου] ότι θα ξεκινήσει συνομιλίες με το Ιράν... Εξακολουθεί φυσικά να στήνει θεάματα στην Υεμένη, ή να επιτρέπει τραμπουκισμούς του Νετανιάχου στην Γάζα.. αλλά για τον Τραμπ προφανώς οι νεκροί παλαιστίνιοι εν τζαι έχουν πολλήν σημασία... Φτάνει να μεν απλώνεται στον δημόσιο λόγο η εικόνα πολέμου. Αλλά από ότι φαίνεται, αν δεν τον βολεύκει ο Νετανιάχου, θα μπορούσε να δοκιμάσει τζαι να τον ξεφορτωθεί..
Η στάση του απέναντι στον Ζελένσκι ήταν που την αρχή ξεκάθαρα υποτιμητική... Η εισήγηση του να αναγνωρίσει την Κριμαία σαν ρωσικό έδαφος εν επίσης ενδεικτική, της στρατηγικής μείωσης της έντασης ανάμεσα στις μεγάλες δυνάμεις, καταγράφοντας μια πραγματικότητα.. Όπως είπεν τζαι του Ζελένσκι «Αν εθέλετε την Κριμαία τόσο πολλά γιατί εν επολεμήσετε το 2014;» ...Το οποίο από μόνο του κουβαλούσε την πραγματικότητα των ρωσόφωνων κατοίκων...
I have encountered, on several occasions, rape denialism when talking with Cypriot pro-Palestinian leftists in relation to the October 7 Hamas attack. Since every such discussion has left me, frankly, nauseated, I decided to collect here some of the documented proof regarding the matter. I am responding here to one claim only, that rapes and sexual violence did not take place during Hamas' attack.
I am not interested in writing a detailed rebuttal of every pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian propaganda point surrounding the narratives over sexual violence. Others are better equipped to do so than me, and indeed have done so. What I have encountered is not a discussion of such points, but merely the plain denial that sexual violence took place in any form or consistency. In relation to the facts themselves, we have reports and statements from credible organisations whose purpose is to document human rights violations across the globe, and who have not been shy of documenting atrocities committed by Israel both in the past and in the present. The three sources I quote below do not exhaust the available documentation.
"Overall, based on the totality of information gathered from multiple and independent sources at the different locations, there are reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred at several locations across the Gaza periphery, including in the form of rape and gang rape, during the 7 October 2023 attacks. Credible circumstantial information, which may be indicative of some forms of sexual violence, including genital mutilation, sexualized torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, was also gathered" (page 21).
You can read it by pressing here.
"Amnesty International has interviewed one person who described being subjected to rape at the Nova festival by members of a Palestinian armed group. It has spoken to several mental health and legal professionals who, between them, reported treating or providing legal services to a number of survivors and witnesses of rape or other sexual violence during the attacks, and a psychiatrist who said that some returned hostages reported being subjected to sexual violence by men guarding them. The organization has received testimonies describing bodies of people killed during the attacks that raise concerns about rape or other sexual violence and is reviewing several images of bodies of victims of the attacks that also appear to prompt such concerns" (page 5).
You can read it by pressing here.
"Human Rights Watch found evidence of acts of sexual and gender-based violence by fighters including forced nudity, and the posting without consent of sexualized images on social media. [...] The extent to which acts of sexual and gender-based violence were committed during the October 7 assault will likely never be fully known: many victims may have been killed; stigma and trauma often deter survivors from reporting; and Israeli security forces and other responders largely did not collect relevant forensic evidence from the attack sites or the recovered bodies" (Pages 7-8).
You can read it by pressing here.
Survivor Testimonies
It has been more than once that I encountered the argument that there are no public accounts of rape victims themselves. In the minds of some people, this is apparently proof that rape and sexual violence did not occur. I always found the demand that victims of rape must publicly expose themselves bizarre, a demand that I frankly have never encountered amongst Cypriot leftists in any other occasion of sexual violence.
These accounts are indeed scarce, and the reason is obvious. Many of the victims of rape and sexual assault were killed on the same day by Islamist militants. Those who survived have to endure the psychological fallout of their abuse, as well as social stigma in a patriarchical society that has long been shifting towards conservatism and religious fundamentalism. But for those who desperately need such proof, here is one statement of a survivor of the Nova massacre witnessing rape, and another by a survivor experiencing rape. Although not relevant to the October 7 attack as such, there is also this long piece of a former Hamas hostage detailing her experiences, including being raped at gunpoint.
A Recent Instance of Misinformation
In January 2025, Israeli prosecutor Moran Gez gave an interview to Yedioth Ahronoth, stating, amongst other things, that:
“Unfortunately, it will be very difficult to prove these crimes. In the end, we don’t have complainants. What was reported in the media compared to what will ultimately be established will look very different—either because the victims were murdered or because women who were raped are unwilling to come forward.
We reached out to women’s rights organisations and requested cooperation. They told us no one had contacted them. Some parents reached out to these organisations, asking what to do if something happened to their daughters, but they didn’t disclose the assaults.
In this area, I would temper expectations. I know the public is expecting action and understands the need to address the horrific sexual offences and assaults that occurred, but the vast majority of these cases won’t meet the evidentiary threshold in court, and the criticism will ultimately fall on the prosecution—unjustly so.”
Moran Gez was here commenting on the legal dimension - it is not enough in a court of law to prove that rapes did take place, as the reports above indicate. One has to connect each individual rape to an individual perpetuator, who needs to be first identified, taken into custody, formally charged, and proven guilty based on the standard of proof demanded by the judicial system. So for Gez, the chances of legal persecutions and convictions of October 7 rapists are slim, even if surviving victims do come forward - which they are unlikely to do, as has been the case in past examples of conflict-driven sexual violence, including that of Cyprus.
How was the above reported by some pro-Palestinian sites? By misrepresenting the statements made in the interview, cherry-picking them to promote the narrative that no rapes or sexual violence ever took place, and that Gez herself confirmed that. This is what Electronic Intifada did, as well as the Middle East Monitor, the World Socialist Website, and the Iranian Press TV, just to name a few. And with the way (mis)information spreads in today's algorithm-driven social media, it does not take long for the content of a propagandistic article on a website to be repeated to me by a friend over coffee during a lazy afternoon.
Propaganda & Ideology
Lies during conflicts spread like Los Angeles wildfires. Early on in the conflict, Israeli narratives promoted spectacles of abysmal violence, descriptions of brutal acts that fall well within Islamophobic stereotypes, orientalised caricatures and dehumanising discourses whose purpose is to strip any human resemblance of Palestinians at large. This was a propaganda uninterested in careful documentation, aimed at dominating public discourse at day one, and good propaganda needs its exaggeration. When some of the accounts circulating on international media proved to be false, various pro-Palestinian groups, websites and activists grasped the opportunity to produce their own counter-narrative, that no rapes or sexual violence whatsoever took place during the October 7 attack. This counter-narrative is no less propagandistic than the Israeli one, it concerns itself not with the truth, but with its distortion for political ends. Its presence is neither surprising nor new. Encountering it amongst local feminists and socialists, whose commitment to social justice I do not doubt, is what I increasingly find disturbing.
The first time that I noticed such levels of misinformation within the alternative left in Cyprus was during the Covid-19 pandemic. The second time was during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and there is a long report on this blog (in Greek) documenting the denialism of Russian crimes against humanity by a popular leftist social media page. In all cases, what became blatantly obvious was the inability of people to separate a reliable from an unreliable source, to effectively fact-check what they are consuming and to identify obvious misinformation. I will simply list here again some of the news media sources that have proven to be consistently reliable in terms of their reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Associated Press, Reuters, Al Jazeera, Bellingcat. These are to be viewed as complimentary news media sources, as each has a different focus. In relation to human rights violations and crimes against humanity, the reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the United Nations are the focal points of reference.
On the left, we often accuse others of having been brainwashed by hegemonic discourses. Leftist ideology, like all counter-hegemonic ideologies, perceives itself as being located outside broader ideological processes, looking in. Indeed, much of the self-gratification in leftist politics can be traced to the (un)conscious belief that one sees beyond the ideological facade, participating in a politics that brings to the surface social reality as it itself objectively exists. It is a dangerous belief, making those holding it easily susceptible to all sorts of misinformation, precisely because they perceive themselves exempt from it. And when you are repeating the talking points of rape denialists, it might be time to ask yourself how you got there.
Delirium
There are a
few simple ways to access blocked websites. These
include using the Wayback Machine, proxy sites, and VPNs. It should be noted
that the tools below are not meant for online security but simply for accessing
a blocked site.
Wayback Machine
One way of accessing a blocked website is by checking captures of said website on the Wayback Machine database – as long as you have the link to the website you want to access. The Wayback Machine creates digital copies of internet websites. This allows for access to (versions of) websites that have gone permanently offline, or in our case, of websites that are blocked by our internet provider. This works because what you are in fact actually accessing is the Wayback Machine website, rather than the blocked website in question. As long as the Wayback Machine is not blocked by your provider, you are good to go. In is important to note that the database has partial captures, so it may not necessarily have up to date captures of the link you input, and captures tend to be more numerous depending on the popularity of the site you are trying to access.
Proxy Sites
Another way to access a blocked site is through the use of a proxy server. Proxy servers will load for you the site, bypassing the block, as again what you are technically accessing is the proxy server website in question, rather than the website you are in fact trying to access. One example of a free proxy site is proxysite.com. Again, you will need to have the link of the site you would like to access.
VPNs
A VPN (Virtual Private Network) works by sending your internet traffic through a secure connection to a special server run by the VPN company. This hides your real location and makes it hard for others to see what you're doing. It also helps you access websites or content that might be blocked in your country.
There are many free VPNs available as extensions for browsers that are good enough to use if what you are simply trying to achieve is access to a blocked website. However, if what you are concerned with is also to protect your IP and personal data, paid options appear as an inevitability, as free VPNs tend to collect and sell the data of their users. Nonetheless, for simply accessing blocked websites, free VPNs are good enough. One example of a free VPN extension is ProtonVPN.
The following is a brief discussion on various tools for the effective scanning, digitization, and long-term preservation of documents and media. It highlights accessible hardware and free software options for individuals and organizations working with limited resources.
Scanning & Digitization
Access to a scanner is essential for archiving documents. A4 scanners remain relatively cheap in the market (around €100) and come a long way in allowing for the preservation of printed material. These scanners have their limitations – they may not be able to produce images of the highest quality and will typically not be able to scan film negatives, which high-end quality scanners are able to do. Nonetheless, their relatively low cost and accessible interface makes them suitable for individuals and groups with limited financial resources. In terms of A3 scanners, the only affordable scanner we were able to locate is the Plustek OpticSlim 1180, which costs less than €400.
In cases where a document is in such a dire state of decomposition that the very process of scanning it may result in its destruction or any other significant damage, a simple solution is the careful photographing of each page with a relatively decent digital camera. Photographing documents is however a time-consuming process which I would not advise pursuing as a substitute for scanning.
I highly recommend the digital preservation of documents in the form of PDF files. An exceptionally useful tool is PDF24, a free software that allows for the creation, simple editing and compression of PDF files. It further has the capacity to convert images to text through OCR.
Useful Free Software
For those who have limited knowledge of image editing and no access to commercial software, like me, I recommend Paint.NET, a free image and photo editing software. GIMP is a more advanced alternative, while for very simple stuff, Microsoft Paint remains remarkably handy.
For converting a DVD into a video file, HandBrake is excellent, while WinCDEmu is only one of many free programs allowing the emulation of CD/DVD/BD drives. VLC Media Player remains exceptional for playing video files, while OpenShot Video Editor is an accessible free open-source video editor.
In terms of viewing PDF files, Sumatra PDF is undoubtedly superior to Adobe Reader, being extremely fast and lightweight, unlike its Adobe competitor. Although most operating systems have their own snapping tools, Greenshot is another lightweight free software allowing for easy screen capturing that has proven quite useful over the years. Regarding opening and creating archive files, 7-Zip remains essential. Lastly, when creating a digital archive, consistently in file naming is of the essence, especially as files keep accumulating. Bulk Rename Utility is an excellent tool allowing for the bulk renaming of files, saving its user a lot of time and effort.
Creating Backups
Beyond accessibility, one of the great advantages of creating a digital archive is the possibility of creating multiple copies of the archive, reducing the risk of damage and loss. Creating multiple copies of a digital archive is thus essential to avoid possible loss of data. Loss of data can come in many forms –physical destruction of the hardware where the files are stored (external hard disks, flash drives, laptops etc.), theft of hardware, collapse of a server, online hacking and so on. It is thus important to maintain multiple backups of the digitized files. An easy practice is to create backups by using multiple external hard drives, which are then stored at different locations. In the case of the physical destruction of one hard drive (for example, due to a house fire) other backups survive. There are of course also cloud services, which nonetheless come at a cost.
This practice, although essential, protects digital archives only offline. Assuming an archive is publicly and openly available online, the collapse of its website infrastructure will inevitably lead to the archive going offline as a whole, since files will be hosted on the website’s server. To avoid this, it is worth considering uploading digital files of archived material on alternative databases as well – creating such copies preserves access to the files even if one server hosting them falls apart.
An easy solution to this dilemma is the uploading of files (depending on copyright etc.) on the Internet Archive database. The Internet Archive hosts an enormous amount of files and is an excellent website to upload files for backup. Setting up an account is easy and straightforward, as is uploading files on the database. In addition, the Internet Archive also hosts the Wayback Machine, which creates digital copies of internet websites. This allows for access to (versions of) websites that have gone permanently offline. Capturing your own site’s URLs in the Wayback Machine, including the URLs to digital files, is another way to create backups of an online archive. Another website, archive.is, does something similar and can be used as an alternative, but Wayback Machine is preferable, as it belongs to a broader project dedicated to open access to information. Wayback Machine also has an official browser extension that is very handy and which I highly advise installing.
The last official census conducted in Cyprus to include all the islanders was dated 11 December 1960.[1] Here, the number of Turkish Cypriots was determined as 104,320. The same census gave a figure of 104,942 for the total Muslim population living on the island. In this case, it is understood that 475 gypsies and other Muslims, who generally lived together with the Turkish Cypriot community and were Muslims, were included in this figure.
Following the inter-communal clashes that began in December 1963 due to constitutional disputes, the Turkish Cypriots were separated from the state machinery and a census could not be conducted in the enclaves where the Turkish Cypriots were living. However, according to information compiled from a study by Canadian researcher Richard A. Patrick, who also served in the UN Peace Force in Cyprus, in early 1971, there were a total of 119,147 Turkish Cypriots living in the Turkish Cypriot settlements spread over the island.[2]
In the 1973 population estimates made by the Greek Cypriot administration in Cyprus, the number of Turkish Cypriots was given as 114,960. [3]
A short while after the island was divided in two in the summer of 1974, a report dated 20 October 1974 prepared by Ahmet Sami, Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior and Justice of the "Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration", included the following information:
"A total of 83,719 Turkish Cypriots live in the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration area. A total of 32,039 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south. Of these, approximately 10 thousand were in the British Sovereign Base Area, 4,200 in Limassol and its villages, 12, 000 in the district of Paphos, 2,630 in the district of Larnaca, and 3,209 in the villages of the district of Nicosia. In another part of the same report, it is stated that approximately 12,000 Turkish Cypriots migrated to the north by their own means until 19 October 1974."
In this case, there were 71,719 Turkish Cypriots living in the north and 44,039 Turkish Cypriots living south of the division line, making a total of 115,758 Turkish Cypriots. This figure is essentially close to the number given in Patrick's study.
A report in the Zaman newspaper dated 9 August 1977 stated that Hakkı Atun, the Minister of Settlement and Rehabilitation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), announced that 20,934 families, or 83,650 people, were settled in the north in the three-year period between 1974 and 1977. Since the number of Turkish Cypriot immigrants from the south was determined as 44,039 in October 1974, it is understood that the remaining 39,611 people were settlers brought from Turkey.
SETTLERS BROUGHT FROM TURKEY
In October 1974, Turkish immigrants were first brought to the occupied part of the island to work in the gardens and hotels left by the Greek Cypriots. In January 1975, this situation was expanded with the settlement of the families of those who were martyred in the 1974 war. Those who were discharged from the military and wanted to settle in Cyprus were also added to these. After the signing of the “Agricultural Labour Protocol” in February 1975, the first wave of immigration from Turkey began. A secret regulation was published under the title of “Regulation on the Elimination of the Labour Deficit in the Region”, prepared upon the request of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. It was stated there that even if all the Turkish Cypriots living south of the division line were to come to the north, there would not be enough labour force and therefore the northern part should be filled with the population brought to the island from Turkey as soon as possible.
Citizenship was granted to all those brought from Anatolia and settled in the part of the island occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces by the decision of the “Council of Ministers” of the Turkish Administration. In addition, the houses and lands of the Greek Cypriots who were forced to leave their ancestral homes were distributed. They were not allowed to leave the places they settled for at least five years. If they left, everything given to them would be taken back from them. Those who could not adapt to the new local conditions later returned to Turkey, but the vast majority remained on the island. According to a study, 82,500 Turkish settlers were settled in the occupied part of Cyprus between 1975 and 1979. However, 20-25% of them could not adapt and returned to Anatolia. [4]
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF TURKISH SETTLERS
This group, who were settled in the part of the island occupied by the Turkish military and made citizens of the separatist state, initially participated in general elections with the political parties they founded. The Turkish settlers, who participated in the 1981 elections with the Reformist Welfare Party and the Turkish Unity Party, founded by retired Turkish officers, came together under the single roof of the New Birth Party (YDP) in January 1984 with the help of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia.
These parties, supported by the votes of the Turkish settlers, took part in coalition governments during the periods when the ruling party lost power, ensuring the continuation of the established order.
Thanks to the 8% vote threshold election system, which was tried in the separatist state in 1985 without being implemented in Turkey, the National Unity Party-UBP- (36.7%), which had 25 deputies instead of 18, joined the coalition with the New Birth Party-YDP- (8.7%), which had 4 deputies, and the ruling party was able to maintain its majority until the end of April 1988.
After Aytaç Beşeşler, the Party Chairman and Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, lost the election at the YDP Congress, three YDP deputies resigned from their party. One of them later returned to the YDP, while the other two joined the UBP. The new leader of the YDP was Orhan Üçok, a member of the Party Assembly of the True Path Party (DYP), who came to the island to participate in the congress and won the election. In other words, he was one of those who maintained both Turkish and TRNC citizenship.
POPULATION OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN THE 1990’S
In my study titled “What is the population of Turkish Cypriots?” published in Söz magazine on 31 October1986, I stated that the number of Turkish Cypriots, which was announced as 115,758 on 20 October 1974, had increased to 157,984 by the end of 1984 and that 47,186 Turkish citizens were settled in Northern Cyprus as of 1983. By 1994, it was estimated that this number had reached 100,000.
In an article in which I criticized the fact that the number of immigrants brought from Turkey to Cyprus and made to vote was kept secret and never published before the general census conducted for the preparation of the electoral rolls prior to the Presidential and General Elections held in the spring of 1996, I wrote the following:
“The participation of dual nationals in the elections, who have been preventing the true will of the Turkish Cypriots from being reflected in the election results for years, should be opposed and a definite stance should be taken regarding the elements whose existence prevents the Cyprus problem from being resolved in the interest of the Cypriots. Another issue should be to make a definite decision not to go to the elections with an anti-democratic election law.” [5]
The opposition parties, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP), which received a total of 57.2% of the votes in the 1985 general elections, participated in the elections under the name of the Democratic Struggle Party (DMP), which was formed by Turkish immigrants together with the New Birth Party, and the three parties could only reach 44.4% of the votes. The entry into Parliament of two MPs of YDP origin from DMP who gambled and lost by saying “the anti-democratic election law may be beneficial for us” and two MPs who won from the TKP list (E. Vehbi and İ. Kotak), caused the party to disintegrate in this election. When the 7 MPs of CTP and the remaining 5 MPs of TKP refused to take office on the grounds that “we will not be extra members in Parliament”, their seats were filled by UBP candidates (except for one) in the by-elections that were held.
The articles I wrote to draw attention to the problem created by the Turkish settler population who moved to the part of the island occupied by Turkey and were made citizens and allowed to vote were not given much importance. [6] On the other hand, CTP officials created a definition that Turkish immigrants were also “labourers with calloused hands” and, moreover, they integrated with the party of TKP and Turkish settlers (YDP) and entered the 1990 elections under the name of “Democratic Struggle Party” (DMP). But when their calculations did not prove right, they decided to boycott the Parliament, which led to the 1991 midterm elections. This increased the number of seats of the UBP in the 50-person Parliament from 34 to 45.
HIDING THE CHANGE IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE
The Turkish Cypriot population, which was 104,942 in 1960 and 115,758 in 1974, was shown together with immigrants of Turkish origin as of July 1974, and in the census conducted on 26.5.1990 to determine the number of voters, this figure reached 173,224. When asked why the 1990 census results were not announced in detail, Rauf Denktaş, the head of the regime established in the north of Cyprus, said, "If we announced it, it would be clear who came from where." [7]
It is a well-known fact that the population transfers carried out in violation of the Geneva Convention to the territory under Turkish military control in the north of Cyprus since 1974 have disrupted the demographic structure. The legal status of an occupying power over the territory it occupies, as well as its rights and responsibilities, are regulated by international agreements. These were specified one by one in the 4th Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, dated 12 August 1949.
A report was prepared by Spanish socialist parliamentarian Alfons Cuco on behalf of the Committee on Migration, Immigration and Population of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe regarding the population, transferred to the north of Cyprus by the occupying Turkey after 1974. According to this report, dated 27 April 1992 and titled “Demographic Structure of Cypriot Communities”, between 1974 and 1990, the population in the south of the Republic of Cyprus increased by only 13.70%, while the population in the north increased by 48.5%! The report, referring to UN Representative Camilion, stated that in addition to 30 thousand Turkish military units, a civilian population of 40-45 thousand people was transferred to the occupied northern region, and that 40 thousand Turkish Cypriots left the occupied region for various reasons.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which discussed the Cuco Report, in its recommendation numbered 1197, adopted on 7 October 1992, instructed the European Population Committee to determine the population of the island in cooperation with the relevant authorities and to obtain reliable data instead of population estimates. In the meantime, the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Administration were requested to keep a definitive record of foreigners entering the island and the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus to keep records of Turkish citizens residing in Cyprus and visiting the island. Unfortunately, no census could be carried out in the north of the island under the supervision of international organizations in the intervening period and the number of Turkish Cypriots who were settled in the north or were living illegally could not be determined. The general elections of 12 December 1993, which were decided to be held after Rauf Denktaş was squeezed in the UN peace talks and the CTP was pulled even further to the right after the Democrat Party emerged from the UBP, were held under conditions where the YDP, the party of Turkish immigrants, was dissolved into Denktaş’s new party, the DP.
Before the decision to hold early elections and the amendment of the election law, the opposition parties, who had demanded that a census be held and especially the number of immigrants of Turkish origin be announced, withdrew their demands when the election mood began. For some reason, no political party touched on this issue after the election results were announced. However, in the census conducted on 19 September 1993, it was announced that the population was 155,994 and the number of voters was determined as 106,688, but no information was given about Turkish immigrants. No one even mentioned the headline in the Kıbrıs newspaper published the day after the census, which read “We are approaching 200 thousand.” However, what we heard was that the population had reached 204 thousand.
The data of the first population census, conducted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities on 15 December 1996 and evaluated at the Turkish State Institute of Statistics in Ankara, was only announced two years later. Accordingly, the de facto (actual, not based on residence) population was 200,587 people. Since the question "permanent place of residence" was also included in the questionnaire, the de jure (based on residence) population was reported as 188,662 people. Prime Ministry Planning Organization Undersecretary Ahmet Bulunç, who made the statement, said that the difference of 11,925 people was due to the fact that people who were in the TRNC on the day of the census declared that their permanent place of residence was outside the TRNC. [8]
Total.................. 200,857 100%
TRNC nationals.............. 164,460 82%
TRNC born..................... 137,398
TC born........................... 23,924
3rd country born................ 3,138
TC nationals..................... 30,702 15%
Students.............................. 8,287
Employees........................ 12,922
Unemployed....................... 1,327
Other (employed, income earners,
retired etc.).......................... 8,166
Other nationals.................... 5,425 3%
The number of Greek Cypriots living in the north was 384 and the number of Maronite Cypriots was 173.
As can be seen from the figures above, it was not stated how many children were born in the TRNC to parents born in the TRNC. Furthermore, no mention was made of the families of approximately 35 thousand soldiers and officers of the Turkish Armed Forces on the island. The number of illegal workers, whose number was estimated at 25-30 thousand at the time, also shows that the figure stated as the de facto population was low. In a news report given with reference to some officials who did not want to be named, it was stated that the number of people who were granted citizenship in Northern Cyprus since 1974 was around 46 thousand, and that 20-25 thousand of these people did not permanently reside in the TRNC.[9] Among these were also famous politicians and members of parliament from Turkey.[10] According to the statements of Kenan Akın, who is of Turkish origin and served as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the TRNC government, there were 60 thousand Turkish immigrants in the TRNC.[11]
In the elections of 12 December 1993, which took place after the New Birth Party joined the Democrat Party, which was formed by Rauf Denktaş's son in 1992 with those who left the UBP, 4 of the 15 seats won by the DP belonged to Turkish immigrants. It was striking that 76 (22%) of the 351 candidates who ran in the same elections were born in the Republic of Turkey.
After the results of the early general elections of 12 December 1993 were announced, I wrote an article titled “Election Results Do Not Reflect the Will of Turkish Cypriots” and made the following assessment:
“Of the 351 candidates for parliament, 1 of whom was independent and 350 of whom were members of 7 parties, 76 (22%) were born in Turkey. Of the 50 elected MPs, 4 were of Turkish origin and all were elected from the Democrat Party. In the final analysis, it can be said that “Denktaş” won the election.”[12]
IN 1998, “40% OF THE POPULATION WAS OF TURKISH ORIGIN”
In the general elections of December 6, 1998, 61 (17%) of the 352 candidates who were candidates were born in Turkey. Moreover, it was reflected in the press that there were fierce discussions between immigrants of Turkish origin and Turkish Cypriots during the determination of the MP candidates within the DP. The unrest in the DP, which emerged from the loss of votes in the parliamentary elections, brought forward the idea of reviving the New Birth Party of Turkish origin, which merged with the DP in 1992 and became history. In a paid advertisement given to the press by these disgruntled people, they protested "the cunning division of the votes of a large segment of the population, representing 40% [13] or approximately one third of the population, and the prevention of the fair and balanced representation of this segment in the Parliament." [14]
THE EXACT NUMBER OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS CANNOT BE KNOWN
Since the 137,398 TRNC citizens, born in Cyprus given in the 1996 census results above, include those of Turkish origin, this number also prevents reaching an exact figure regarding the Turkish Cypriot population in the TRNC.
Mustafa Miralay, Director of the TRNC Immigration Department, stated that approximately 49 thousand people were granted TRNC citizenship between 1984 and 1999, and that the number of those granted citizenship between 1974 and 1984 is unknown due to "no records being kept", and that the Council of Ministers has so far granted citizenship to many people, including some Turkish ministers, members of parliament and artists. The newspapers reporting Miralay's statement also used the following headlines: "It was reported that some of those who were made citizens by the decision of the Council of Ministers never came to the TRNC... While an average of 3,300 people are made citizens in the TRNC every year, approximately 30% of our new citizens live outside the island." [15]
A day later, in statements made by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior on the subject, it was claimed that "Miralay made a historical error due to a slip of the tongue", and it was claimed that 49 thousand people were made citizens since 1974, not 1984, and it was stated that "it is impossible not to keep records, all citizens are registered". [16]
Although there is no reliable official number of official citizenships granted to settlers from Anatolia, Arif Albayrak (CTP), a member of parliament, stated in the Kıbrıs newspaper on 23 October 2003 that the total number of citizenships granted between 1974 and 14 October 2003 was 53,904.
The Birlik newspaper on 24 October 2003 also gave the following details of citizenships granted after 1994, a total of 17,293 persons: By decision of the “Council of Ministers”: 3,675; with approval of the “Ministry of Interior”: 7,272; as third generation: 2,246; through marriage: 1,971; citizens of a third country: 1,142; Bulgarian Turks: 987.
A total of 10,203 persons were granted citizenship due to marriage in 2004, but the number of those who received citizenship due to “spouse and child” was 4,480.
The CTP was very critical of this practice when the party was in opposition, but during the CTP governments (2013-2016), the granting of “TRNC” citizenship to Turkish settlers continued. 796 people became citizens by the decision of the “TRNC” Council of Ministers. (Including natural means, this number was 3,916 people in total.)
During the UBP-DP coalition governments (2016-2017), 7,200 Turkish citizens were granted “TRNC” citizenship. If each person is multiplied by 4 (spouse and at least 2 children), this number becomes 28,000 new citizens.
According to the 2011 census, the total population living permanently on the island was: 286,257 people. Their breakdown by place of birth was as follows:[17]
Born in TR: 104,641
Born in 3rd country: 14,933
Born in UK: 6,476
RESULTS OF CHANGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE
The results of various censuses conducted in the Turkish-controlled area in the north of Cyprus since 1974 and the number of voters who voted in the general elections are given below [18]:
DATE POPULATION NUMBER OF VOTERS
11 December 1960 (Census) 104,942
5 July 1970 (Presidential) 110.000 63,500
Early 1971 119,147
1973 (RoC est.) 114,960
20 November 1974 115,758
- (parents born in Cyprus: 98,000)
8 June 1975 (Referandum) 126,949 52,926
20 June 1976 (General) 130,136 75,724
20 July 1976(Pres.) 75,781
28 June 1981(G) 151,233 84,721
28 July 1981(P) 84,721
5 May 1985 (Ref.) 157,984 91,810
23 June 1985 (G) 93,934
9 July1985 (P) 160,287 95,124
22 April 1990 (P) 171,469 101,306
6 May 1990 (G) 173,224 103,218
13 October 1991 (Interim) 173,224 106,303
12 December 1993 (Early) 177,120 108,370
15-22 April 1995 (P) 181,363 113,440
8 February 1998 162,482 122,574
23 June 1998 (Local) 163,610
6 December 1998 163,860 126,675
15 April 2000(P) 170,416 126,675
30 June 2002 (Loc.) 177,416
14 December 2003 (G) 183,604 141,596
24 April 2004 (Annan Ref.) 184,350 143,639
20 February 2005 (P) 188,372 147,249
(both parents born in CY:120,007)
25 June 2006 (L) 191,388 151,635
19 April 2009 (G) 200,466 161,373
18 April 2010 (P) 203,260 164,072
Official 2011 census: de jure: 286,257 -de facto: 294,906 (excluding military)
190,494 TRNC citizens (=only TRNC: 136.362 + dual TRNC+TR: 38.085 + dual TRNC+ other: 16.047)
Results of the 2nd Stage of the 2011 Population and Housing Census (Ali Korhan):
Born in CY: 160,207 (%56) + born in TR: 104,641 (%36.6)= 264,848
Born in UK: 6.476 + born in other countries: 14.933= 21.305+264.848=286.257 total de jure population
May 25, 2014 ROCy EUP Elections 58,642 TC voters
June 29, 2014 (L) 175,258
IN TRNC, NUMBER OF REGISTERED TR VOTERS IN FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HELD IN TR ON AUGUST 10, 2014: 92,171
April 30, 2015 (P) 218,609 176,980
2017 230,747 190,551
(Citizens made citizens between 1974 and March 2017: 76,181 people)
January 7, 2018 (eG) 252,497 191,553
IN TRNC, THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED CITIZENS FOR THE GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN THE TURKEY ON JUNE 7, 2015: 94,135 PEOPLE
IN TRNC, THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED CITIZENS FOR THE GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN THE TURKEY ON NOVEMBER 1, 2015: 95,366 PEOPLE
IN TRNC, THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED TR CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REFERENDUM HELD IN THE TURKEY ON APRIL 16, 2017: 104,509 PEOPLE
IN TRNC, THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED TR CITIZENS FOR JUNE 18, 2018 GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN TR: 106,506 PEOPLE
-Population: 343,000 people (Mustafa Akıncı said: “This is the figure the Minister of Interior gave me at the beginning of March 2019. Then the Minister of Interior announced it as 350,000. In this case, the number of our citizens increased by 130 thousand in 3.5 years. While previous governments granted citizenship to approximately a thousand people per month, the current government grants it to 400-500 people per month” (27 March 2019-YD- The Minister of Interior had given Akıncı the population figure of 220,000 before the talks in 2016.)
-351,000 citizens, 61 thousand people outside the country = 290 thousand people TRNC citizens living in the country. (Kudret Özersay, 15 March 2019 – YD)
-372,486 people (State Planning Organization, Cenk Mutluyakalı, 17 March 2019, YD)
- Ayşegül Baybars : Foreigners staying in the country with permission = 62,381 people (53,844 with work permits + 542 with business establishment permits + 4,297 with companion permits + 3,698 with visitor permits) + 90.438 (54.966 TR+35.472 other) students with permission=TOTAL: 152.819 people with permission + 252,497 TRNC citizens = 405.316 people (Bugün newspaper, 26 March 2019 and Gündem Kıbrıs, 9 October 2019)
-2018-19 academic year (14 Universities):
TRNC nationals 12,508 + TR nationals 54,875 + 3rd country nationals 35,318= TOTAL: 102,701 university students (Only 85,000 of 102,701 students were active students (=12,000 TRNC+45,000 TC+28,000 3rd country)
-2019-20 academic year (22 Universities=16 local, 4 foreign-sourced, 2 higher vocational schools):
TRNC nationals (-265) 12,243 + TR nationals (-4,689) 50,286 + 3rd country (+5,901) 41,219 (from 140 countries = 7,916 Nigeria, 3,405 Jordan + Syria, Cameroon, Iran, Iraq, Zimbabwe Pakistan, Congo, Libya, Egypt, Palestine) TOTAL: 103,748 (91,505 foreigner university students)
5,755 lecturers (2,195 from TR and 982 3rd country citizens = 3,177 foreigners) - There were a total of 94,682 foreigners in universities.
May 26, 2019 RoC EUP elections 81,611 TC voters
October 11, 2020 (P) 198,867
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT: Number of people employed in the private sector in 2018 (Kıbrıs, 13 and 16 October 2019): TRNC citizens 11,738 (workers, employers, public workers) + TR citizens 33,255 + 14,657 from 3rd countries (total 47,912 registered foreign workers)= TOTAL: 59,650 people + Number of people employed in the state sector: 82,761= 132,411 people (+6,742 illegal workers (%5) or 8,930 illegal workers (%20-40)
End of 2019 de facto POPULATION ESTIMATE:
TRNC citizens 252,496
Foreigners with permits 62,381
Uni. foreigners 94,682
Illegal workers 8,930 TOTAL: 418,489 people
Soldiers and their families 45,000 people
RESULT: Approximately 465,000 people live in the northern occupation territory of Cyprus.
***
August 3, 2021 (interim) 382,836 199,029 (+ Non-citizen:95,606=478,442 people)
359,692 people are citizens (mother-father Cy. Born: 131,556) (Under 18: 65,219)
198,867
(126,000 CY + 256,000 TR) (75,000 CY + 124,000 TR)
128,512 -CY and EU- citizens)
November 2021 245,869 (+foreigners=382,000 people)
End of 2021 projection: 390,745
January 23, 2022 (eG) 203,792
Before the local elections in Dec’ 22 203.183(= 81.600 CY+121.583 TR)
December 25, 2022 (L) 208,236
May 12, 2023 209,837
June 25, 2023 (By-election) 210,121
On 8 October 2022, the GC press wrote: 105,252 IDs and 92,000 passports were received by the TCs from the RoC. (Evrensel, 20 July 2024, information from Hüseyin Yalyali)
THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED TR VOTERS IN THE TRNC FOR THE 14 MAY 2023 TR GENERAL ELECTIONS: 140,680. (Of the 240 thousand Turkish citizens living in the TRNC, 142 thousand registered as overseas voters. – Özgül Çelik, EMU Business Administration graduate-Dersim/TR)
End of Year Projection Population: (TRNC Statistical Institute)
2019 420,556
2020 419,810
2021 448,268
2022 462,747
2023 476,214
Number of Turkish citizens registered in the TRNC in the 2022 Turkish General Elections: 140,680 people. (In 2014, it was 92,171 people.)
June 9, 2024 ROC AP elections 103,281 TC voters
Number of foreigners staying with a residence permit at the end of 2024: 104,278 people (64,161 student permits + 12,465 family residence permits + 7,652 short-term permits + 1,020 permanent permits (Yenidüzen, 13 December 2024)
-Ayşegül Baybars (Ex-Minister of Interior): Over 30.000 people were granted citizenship in 4 years from 2020 to 2024. (YD, 17 December 2024)
- According to official data, active insured and minimum wage workers: 159,321 people (TRNC nationals: 76,550 + Foreign nationals: 82,771 + TR nationals: 44,172 + Other country nationals: 38,599) (TRNC Central Bank Bulletin, 4th Quarter/2024)
ILLEGALLY LIVING: 82,606 PEOPLE (YD, 28 June 2024) Ürün Solyalı (MP): More than 100 thousand people are illegal or have not made any transactions - Özgür Gazete, 5 July 2024)
- Total number of students who have not made any transactions: 48,517
- Total number of residence permit holders who have not made any transactions: 33,789
- Number of people with illegal status in prison: 300
Illegal workers 10,300 people + 9,500 people whose procedures are not completed + 2,000 people whose residence permits are not renewed
3RD COUNTRY NATIONALITIES WITH WORK PERMITS (Total: 32,948 people, from 109 countries) Vatan Mehmet, Kibris Postasi, 1 December 2024)
The nationalities with the most work permits are as follows: Pakistan: 9,868 people, Bangladesh: 6,720 people, Turkmenistan: 6,241 people. These countries are among the countries known to work intensively, especially in the construction, service and agriculture sectors. Other highlighted data is as follows; Notable in the top 10: Countries such as Iran (1,299 people), Philippines (596 people) and Nigeria (431 people) are also high on the list. European countries such as Ukraine (467 people), Russia (365 people) and Moldova (218 people) also constitute the workforce in the TRNC. Countries with low representation: Only 1 person each from countries such as Switzerland, Japan, Kuwait and Malta is in the TRNC with a work permit. [19]
-Total number of people receiving salaries from the Central Budget in January 2025: 45,758 (YD, February 24, 2025)
-Number of retirees receiving salaries from the Social Insurance Department in January 2022: Nearly 48 thousand.
-Total number of university students in the 2023-24 academic year: 108,180 (65-70 thousand of 110,266 students are active, 32% are missing-illegal (YD, Salih Sarpten, February 26, 2024))
- 14,594 TRNC (14,498)
- 93,586 foreigners - 49,047 TC (44,562)
44,539 3rd country (51,206)
According to the Immigration Department: There are 63,613 foreign students. (Where are 29,973 students?) - Sami Özuslu's speech in the Parliament - Cenk Mutluyakalı, YD, March 14, 2024),
AT THE BEGINNING OF 2025, POPULATION ESTIMATE IN THE OCCUPIED REGION OF CYPRUS: At least 650 thousand people (476,214 Official population projection + 104,278 foreigners with permits (December 13, 2024-YD) + 82,606 unauthorized, unregistered, illegal foreigners (June 28, 2024-YD) = 645,869 people)
There were 210.121 registered voters for the by-election on 25 June 2023. We can estimate that 75.000 of them were TCs and the remaining 135.000 were Turkish settlers!
References:
[1] Census of Population and Agriculture 1960, Government Printing Office, Nicosia
[2] Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971, Ontario, 1976
[3] George Karouzis, Proposal for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, Nicosia 1976, p.13
[4] The details of this settlement were recorded by two Turkish scientists, Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis, under the title “The Social Exclusion of Immigrants through Citizenship, Identity and Belonging: Being a Turkish citizen in Northern Cyprus!” A 41-page summary of the 300-page Project studies conducted between 2007-2009: “The Nature of Turkish Migration to Northern Cyprus and the Economic, Socio-Spatial Integration Problems of Migrants”, 2010 Scientific and Technical Research Council (TÜBİTAK) Project Number: 106K330, in the book titled “History, Classes and the City” edited by Besime Şen and Ali Ekber Doğan, Dipnot Publications, Istanbul 2010, 465-506
[5] Demokrat, January 10, 1996
[6] a. What is the population of Turkish Cypriots? Söz Magazine, October 31, 1986
b. The deterioration of the demographic structure in Cyprus and Turkish immigrants, Demokrat, December 28, 1988
c. Towards the census and election, Demokrat, January 10, 1990
d. Election results do not reflect the will of the Turkish Cypriots, Yeni Çağ, 27 December 1993
[7] Yeni Düzen, 23 July 1993
[8] Kıbrıs, 28 November 1997
[9] Avrupa, 31 January 1998
[10] Ortam, 17 October 1996
[11] Avrupa, 6.6.1998
[12] Yeni Çağ, 27 December 1993
[13] Kıbrıs, 15 December 1998
[14] Hürriyet-Kıbrıs, 22 December 1998
[15] Kıbrıs, 2 June 1999
[16] Kıbrıs, 3 June 1999
[17] Kıbrıs Postası, 13 August 2013
[18] “Written Evidence” by Ahmet Djavit An as published in the Second Report (22 February 2005) of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs of the British Parliament
[19] Vatan Mehmet, Kibris Postasi (1 December 2024) Total list: Pakistan 9,868, Bangladesh 6,720, Turkmenistan 6,241, Iran 1,299, Philippines 596, Kyrgyzstan 516, Nepal 484, Ukraine 467, Nigeria 431, Uzbekistan 416, Sri Lanka 392, Russia 365, Kazakhstan 352, India 286, Indonesia 256, Azerbaijan 256, Moldova 218, Belarus 173, United Kingdom 169, Cameroon 160, Vietnam 103, Georgia 99, Bulgaria 98, Morocco 78, Syria 76, Germany 52, Jordan 51, Zimbabwe 47, Guinea 45, Ireland 37, Czech Republic 37, Tajikistan 36, Afghanistan 35, Sierra Leone 34, Egypt 32, Lebanon 30, Uganda 29, Romania 28, Congo 28, China 28, Palestine 25, Ghana 22, Kenya 22, Uzbekistan 21, Brazil 19, United States 18, Algeria 16, Israel 15, Iraq 14, Thailand 13, Tanzania 12, Senegal 12, Lithuania 12, Democratic Republic of the Congo 11, Gambia 10, Ethiopia 10, Australia 9, Kosovo 9, Sweden 9, Italy 9, South Africa 9, Libya 8, Colombia 8, Macedonia 8, Ivory Coast 8, Slovenia 7, Andorra 7, Liberia 6, Spain 6, Sudan 6, Georgia 6, Yemen 6, Rwanda 5, Hungary 5, Cuba 5, Albania 5, Belgium 5, Finland 5, France 4, Austria 4, Angola 4, Central African Republic 4, Canada 4, Poland 4, Mongolia 4, Monaco 4, Saudi Arabia 4, Tunisia 4, Namibia 3, Central African Republic 3, Greece 3, Togo Republic 3, Serbia 3, Zambia 3, Mali Republic 3, Montenegro 2, Slovakia 2, Latvia 2, Portugal 2, Venezuela 2, Cyprus 2, Netherlands 2, Honduras 2, United Arab Emirates 2, Bosnia & Herzegovina 2, Denmark 2, Ecuador 2, Dominican Republic 1, Bahamas 1, Argentina 1, Hong Kong 1, Croatia 1, Haiti 1, Japan 1, Cambodia 1, Switzerland 1, Kuwait 1, Malta 1, Mexico 1, Uruguay 1, Suriname 1, Somalia 1, Paraguay 1, Mozambique 1, Djibouti 1, Zaire 1, Saudi Arabia 1, Myanmar 1, West African Rep. 1, Burkina Faso 1.
(This research article was read on 8 April 2025 at a seminar, organized by the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cyprus, Nicosia.)
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Διακήρυξη
Μια νέα προσπάθεια για τη λύση του Κυπριακού έχει αρχίσει.
Οι ελπίδες πως μπορεί επιτέλους να υπάρξει μια συμφωνημένη λύση που θα επανενώνει τον τόπο μας στο πλαίσιο μιας Ομόσπονδης Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας έχουν αναπτερωθεί. Το όραμα αυτό μοιράζονται οι δύο ηγέτες, μεγάλα πολιτικά κόμματα, ενεργοί πολίτες αλλά και η μεγάλη πλειοψηφία στις δύο κοινότητες. Το ενδιαφέρον της διεθνούς κοινότητας είναι δεδομένο και ενισχυμένο. Η τοπική και διεθνής συγκυρία είναι ευνοϊκή.
Η συντριπτική πλειοψηφία των Κυπρίων θέλουμε ειλικρινά να υπάρξει συμφωνημένη λύση και κατανοούμε ότι αυτή θα είναι προϊόν αλληλοκατανόησης και συμβιβασμού. Δεν θεωρούμε το στάτους κβο ως τη λύση του προβλήματος. Κανένας δεν προτείνει τη βία και τη σύγκρουση ως μέσο επίλυσης. Το μοντέλο της Ομοσπονδίας είναι ο μόνος κοινός τρόπος για να υπάρξει συμφωνία. Πέρα από τους φόβους και τις ανησυχίες, που είναι φυσιολογικές λόγω του βεβαρημένου ιστορικού, όλοι οι Κύπριοι θέλουμε να εισέλθει ο τόπος σε μια νέα εποχή μακρόχρονης ειρήνης και να μετατραπεί σε πρότυπο δημοκρατίας, πολύ-πολιτισμικότητας, προόδου και ευημερίας. Αυτή η προοπτική είναι αναγκαίο να στηριχθεί και να ενισχυθεί, ώστε, αναλόγως και της πορείας των διαπραγματεύσεων, να μπορεί να αγκαλιαστεί πλειοψηφικά και να οδηγήσει στην Κύπρο που όλοι ονειρευόμαστε.
Είμαστε μια ομάδα πολιτών με δράση στον ευρύ χώρο της κοινωνίας των πολιτών στην ελληνοκυπριακή κοινότητα, που έχουμε αποφασίσει να συνεργαστούμε για να στηρίξουμε αυτή την προσπάθεια. Δεν έχουμε τις ίδιες πολιτικές ή ιδεολογικές προσεγγίσεις. Μας ενώνει όμως το όραμα για επανένωση της πατρίδας μας. Ανήκουμε ηλικιακά στη νεότερη γενιά - ο μέσος όρος ηλικίας μας είναι κάτω από 40 - που έζησε και μεγάλωσε μετά τα τραγικά γεγονότα που διαίρεσαν το νησί και το λαό μας. Τόσο εμείς, όσο και πολλοί άλλοι, είμαστε ενθαρρυμένοι από τη βούληση και την αποφασιστικότητα των δύο ηγετών να προχωρήσουν με τόλμη και όραμα, και είμαστε πρόθυμοι να συμβάλουμε, ως εθελοντές, στην ευόδωση της προσπάθειας.
Ο δικός μας ρόλος είναι η παραγωγή και εφαρμογή ιδεών για την επικοινωνιακή στήριξη της ειρηνευτικής διαδικασίας και της διαπραγματευτικής προσπάθειας. Επικεντρωνόμαστε σε θέματα ανάλυσης επικαιρότητας, διεξαγωγής ερευνών κοινής γνώμης, διατύπωσης λόγου και χρήσης των νέων τεχνολογιών επικοινωνίας. Στις προτεραιότητές μας είναι η αξιοποίηση των μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης αλλά και των πιο παραδοσιακών Μέσων Ενημέρωσης, προκειμένου να αναδείξουμε και να στηρίξουμε την εν εξελίξει ειρηνευτική διαδικασία, με ενημερωτικό υλικό, απόψεις και αναλύσεις. Τα συμπεράσματα και οι εισηγήσεις μας θα είναι στη διάθεση όλων όσοι προσβλέπουν και εργάζονται για την επανένωση: πολιτική ηγεσία, οργανωμένοι φορείς, κοινωνία πολιτών. Δεν έχουμε απαντήσεις σε όλα τα πιθανά ερωτήματα, έχουμε όμως τη βούληση να αναζητήσουμε εποικοδομητικές απαντήσεις με σεβασμό σε όλες τις ανησυχίες.
Ξεκαθαρίζουμε ότι δεν είναι στις προθέσεις μας ανάμιξη στις συνομιλίες και στην κομματική πολιτική. Η διαπραγμάτευση του Κυπριακού αποτελεί αρμοδιότητα και ευθύνη των δύο ηγετών και της πολιτικής ηγεσίας. Θεωρούμε, ωστόσο, ότι η ειρηνευτική διαδικασία πρέπει να γίνει πιο κατανοητή στον μέσο πολίτη ως προς τα προσδοκώμενα ευεργετικά της αποτελέσματα, πιο διαφανής, και στο μέτρο του δυνατού να εμπλέκει την κοινωνία η οποία μπορεί και πρέπει να φορτίσει θετικά την ειρηνευτική διαδικασία και τους πρωταγωνιστές της.
Πέραν των ατόμων που απαρτίζουν την Ομάδα, είμαστε ανοιχτοί για συνεργασία με ευρύτερους κύκλους συμπολιτών μας που έχουν γνώσεις και εμπειρίες σε τέτοια θέματα.
Δεν έχουμε ενώπιον μας ένα σχέδιο λύσης. Κατανοούμε και σεβόμαστε ότι ο πολύς κόσμος είναι αμφίθυμος ως προς τη λύση και ότι θα τοποθετηθεί όταν και εφόσον θα έχει μπροστά του ένα ολοκληρωμένο πλαίσιο. Το ίδιο ισχύει και για εμάς.
Πρόθεσή μας είναι να λειτουργήσουμε νομότυπα και με πλήρη διαφάνεια και λογοδοσία σε ό,τι αφορά τη χρηματοδότηση των δράσεων που πρέπει να διεκπεραιωθούν.
Τέλος, ονομάσαμε την προσπάθεια μας Ομάδα Κύπρος- ΟΚ γιατί βλέπουμε την Κύπρο μας σαν μια Ομάδα. Μια Ομάδα που περιλαμβάνει όλους τους Πολίτες της ισότιμους και συμμέτοχους στον αγώνα για ένα μέλλον αντάξιο των προοπτικών που έχει η Πατρίδα μας. Τα αρχικά Ο και Κ δημιουργούν το γνωστό σε όλους μας ΟΚ. Μια έννοια που αναδεικνύει τη θετικότητά μας στην επιχειρούμενη προσπάθεια για λύση. Λέμε τους ηγέτες «ΟΚ, προχωρήστε! Είμαστε εδώ, στηρίζουμε, ενισχύουμε και, ταυτόχρονα ελέγχουμε!»
Ανεπίσημο αρχείο με τις βασικές αρχές και κείμενα του Κινήματος Κυπριωτισμού από το 2021 τα οποία ανακτήθηκαν μέσω του Wayback Machine.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Ανεπίσημο αρχείο με τις βασικές αρχές και κείμενα του Κινήματος Κυπριωτισμού από το 2021 τα οποία ανακτήθηκαν μέσω του Wayback Machine.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
BKP Genel Başkanı İzzet İzcan, Cenevre’de başlayan “ Beş Artı Bir Gayri Resmi Kıbrıs Zirvesinde “ tarafları yapıcı ve sonuç alıcı davranmaya çağırdı.
2017 Crans Montana zirvesinin üzerinden 8 yıl geçtiğini dile getiren İzcan, bunun yeterince uzun bir süre olduğunu, işlerin daha da kötüye gittiğini belirterek, Kıbrıs halkının yeni bir başarısızlığa tahammülü olmadığını vurguladı.
Bu zirveye BM Kıbrıs temsilcisinin atanması, güven yaratıcı önlemler konusunda yeni antlaşmalar ve resmi görüşme sürecinin takviminin belirlenmesi gibi uzlaşılar beklediklerini dile getiren İzzet İzcan, BM Genel Sekreteri Antonio Guterres’ten ısrarcı davranarak, sonuç alınması yönünde kararlılık sergilemesini istedi.
Kıbrıs sorununun BM kararları temelinde çözülmesinin kaçınılmaz olduğunu, iki devletli çözüm gibi taleplerle bunun dışına çıkılmasının mümkün olmadığını dile getiren BKP Genel Başkanı İzzet İzcan, Türkiye ve Kıbrıs Türk tarafının bunda ısrarlarının, Kıbrıs zirvesini başarısızlığa taşıyacağını vurguladı.
“ BKP, Birleşik Federal Kıbrısı savunmaya devam edecektir “ diyen İzzet İzcan, bulunacak çözümün AB muktesebatına uygun olması gerektiğini ve tüm Kıbrıslıların temel insan haklarına saygı göstermesini talep etti.
Kıbrıs’ın asker ve silahlardan arındırılarak, birleşik özgür bir ada olmasının temel hedefleri olduğunu dile getiren İzzet İzcan, bölgede yaşanan savaşlardan dersler çıkarılmasını talep etti.
Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi Genel Başkanı İzzet İzcan, ülkemiz gece kulüplerinde kadınların yaşadığı dramların, Avrupa basınında manşetlere çıktığını belirterek “ Ülkemizin ünü sınırlarını aşmıştır “ dedi.
İngiltere’deki Daily Mail gazetesinin manşetlerini süsleyen Moldovya’lı Anastasia’nın yaşadıklarının utanç kaynağı olduğunu dile getiren İzzet İzcan, “ Kuzey Kıbrıs’a yöneticilik bahanesiyle getirilen, pasaportuna el konularak seks kölesi olmaya zorlanan ve sonucunda intihar ederek yaşamına son verdiği iddia edilen haberler araştırılmalı ve bu insanlık dışı faaliyetlere son verilmelidir “ dedi.
Benzer iddiaların geçmişte de dile getirildiğini belirten İzzet İzcan, devletin yaşananlara bilerek göz yumduğunu ve eğlence yerlerinin kadın ticaretinin yapıldığı yerlere dönüştürüldüğünü vurguladı.
Anastasia’nın ölümünün sadece intihar olarak değerlendirilmesinin kabul edilemez olduğunu dile getiren İzzet İzcan, onu bu intihara götüren nedenlerin ortaya çıkartılmasını, benzer durumda olan kadınların kurtarılmasını ve kadınları seks köleliğine zorlayan işletmelerin kapatılmasını talep etti.
“ Gözlerimizi kapatarak bu rezaletlerin devamına izin veremeyiz “ diyen BKP Genel Başkanı İzzet İzcan, UBP koalisyon hükümetini devekuşu misali başlarını soktukları kumdan çıkarmaya çağırdı.
Ο κ. Μάριος Χαρτσιώτης, υπουργός Δικαιοσύνης και Δημόσιας Τάξης, αντί να ταχθεί υπέρ της ελευθερίας έκφρασης και να καλωσορίσει την κριτική από την κοινωνία των πολιτών για τα κακώς έχοντα στο αστυνομικό σώμα, τα οποία επιβεβαιώθηκαν με τον πλέον επίσημο τρόπο μεταξύ άλλων με την πρόσφατη καταδίκη της Κύπρου από το ΕΔΑΔ στη γνωστή υπόθεση ομαδικού βιασμού της νεαρής Βρετανίδας στην Αγία Νάπα, μας κάλεσε αν έχουμε τα «κότσια … να βγάλουμε τις καρναβαλιστές μάσκες και να αφήσουμε τα πεζοδρόμια έξω από τη Βουλή».
Ο υπουργός παρέλαβε τη σκυτάλη από τον κ. Νίκο Λοϊζίδη, συνδικαλιστή αστυνομικό, ο οποίος για μια ολόκληρη βδομάδα περιφερόταν από μέσο σε μέσο για να προωθήσει την υπερψήφιση των υπέρμετρων εξουσιών περιορισμού του δικαιώματος συνάθροισης / ελευθερίας έκφρασης που προβλέπονται για την Αστυνομία στο νομοσχέδιο που κατέθεσε το Υπουργείο Δικαιοσύνης.
Ο κ. Λοϊζίδης την ίδια ώρα που δήλωνε απλός αστυνομικός χωρίς ακαδημαϊκή μόρφωση, παρουσιαζόταν ως ειδικός για τους κανονισμούς λειτουργίας της Βουλής, για την άρση της ασυλίας των βουλευτών, για την ελευθερία έκφρασης, κ.ά., εκφοβίζοντας και απειλώντας βουλευτές, ακαδημαϊκούς και ακτιβιστές που τόλμησαν να στηλιτεύσουν τις παραβιάσεις ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων από την Αστυνομία και προειδοποιούσαν για τους κινδύνους περιορισμού του δικαιώματος έκφρασης με ποινικές διώξεις και εκδικητικές πράξεις από τους αστυνομικούς.
Επειδή τόσον ο κ. Λοϊζίδης όσο και ο κ. Χαρτζιώτης έκαναν επανειλημμένα αναφορά στην εκδήλωση έξω από τη Βουλή και το πανό «μπάτσοι, φασίστες δολοφόνοι», θα θέλαμε να διευκρινίσουμε τα πιο κάτω:
Οι δηλώσεις που ακολούθησαν τόσο από τον κ. Λοϊζίδη όσο και από τον κ. Χαρτζιώτη έχουν επιβεβαιώσει με τον πλέον κατηγορηματικό τρόπο την ανάγκη προστασίας του δικαιώματος των πολιτών να αποκρύπτουν την ταυτότητά τους όταν εκφράζουν ειρηνικά επικριτικές και καταδικαστικές απόψεις, για τις οποίες εύλογα ανησυχούν για εκδικητικές πράξεις από μέρους των Αρχών και δη της Αστυνομίας.
Η ΚΙΣΑ απαιτεί από τον υπουργό Δικαιοσύνης και τον αρχηγό Αστυνομίας αντί να προπηλακίζουν, να μπουν σε διάλογο και να ακούσουν τις απόψεις και την κριτική της κοινωνίας των πολιτών για τα κακώς έχοντα στο αστυνομικό σώμα και το σύστημα απονομής της δικαιοσύνης γενικότερα στην Κύπρο.
Τέλος, καλεί τα κόμματα και τη Βουλή να προστατεύσουν ως κόρην οφθαλμού το δικαίωμα στη διαμαρτυρία και όλων των άλλων μορφών ελευθερίας έκφρασης και να μην επιτρέψουν το νέο νομοθετικό πλαίσιο να παραχωρήσει τέτοιες εξουσίες και διακριτική ευχέρεια στην Αστυνομία, οι οποίες θα μπορούν να ασκηθούν αυθαίρετα για την υπόσκαψη ή/ και στέρηση αυτών των θεμελιωδών ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων
Διοικητικό Συμβούλιο
Το ΕΔΑΔ στην απόφαση του παρατήρησε ότι η Κύπρος διέθετε μεν νομικό πλαίσιο για την προστασία των δικαιωμάτων των θυμάτων έμφυλης βίας όμως η συγκεκριμένη υπόθεση χαρακτηρίστηκε από μια σειρά ελλείψεων από τις ανακριτικές Αρχές, τις εισαγγελικές Αρχές και το πρωτοβάθμιο δικαστήριο, στη βάση έμφυλων προκαταλήψεων.
Τον Ιούλιο του 2019 η Χ μετά από πίεση της αστυνομίας απέσυρε την καταγγελία της για ομαδικό βιασμό από ομάδα Ισραηλινών με αποτέλεσμα να βρεθεί κατηγορούμενη για «δημόσια βλάβη» με τον αρχικό της δικηγόρο να προσπαθεί να την πείσει για παραδοχή… ως το λιγότερο κακό!
Η ΚΙΣΑ μαζί με το Justice abroad μιλήσαμε τότε με την μητέρα της Χ και την ίδια της Χ η οποία πήρε την γενναία απόφαση να μην υποκύψει στις προτροπές για συμβιβασμό και να πολεμήσει για την δικαίωση της και ενώ ήδη τελούσε υπό κράτηση ως κατηγορούμενη. Στηρίξαμε την Χ στην απόφαση της και την βοηθήσαμε να μετακομίσει σε ένα πιο υποστηρικτικό περιβάλλον στη Λευκωσία.
Συνοδεύσαμε τη μάχη της για δικαίωση τόσο δικαστικά όσο και κινηματικά μαζί με πολλές άλλες οργανώσεις της κοινωνίας των πολιτών και πρόσωπα που την πίστεψαν και αγωνίστηκαν μαζί της για τη δικαίωση της. Το 2020 χάσαμε την πρώτη δικαστική μάχη σε μια δίκη που όσες την παρακολούθησαν κάθε άλλο παρά δίκαιη ήταν… όμως πετύχαμε μια απόφαση που δεν της στερούσε την ελευθερία της που ήταν και ο δεύτερος στόχος μας σε αυτή τη δίκη.
Υποβάλαμε στη συνέχεια έφεση στο Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο κατά της καταδίκης και η Χ επέστρεψε στη ΜΒ όπου με αρκετή στήριξη στάθηκε στα πόδια της και ξεκίνησε τις σπουδές της. Το 2022 το Ανώτατο ακύρωσε την πρωτόδικη απόφαση και αθώωσε τη Χ όμως ο Γενικός Εισαγγελέας αρνήθηκε να επανανοίξει την υπόθεση βιασμού και να διερευνήσει εκ νέου τους ύποπτους που πανηγυρικά επέστρεψαν με την κάλυψη των κυπριακών αρχών πίσω στο Ισραήλ όπου τους υποδέχτηκαν ως «ήρωες».
Τον ίδιο χρόνο καταχωρήθηκε προσφυγή στο Ευρωπαϊκό́ Δικαστήριο Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων (ΕΔΑΔ), το οποίο με την χθεσινή απόφαση του δικαιώνει με τον πλέον κατηγορηματικό τρόπο τη Χ. Το ΕΔΑΔ διαπιστώνει στην ομόφωνη απόφαση του ότι υπήρξε παραβίαση των θετικών υποχρεώσεων που απορρέουν από τα άρθρα 3 και 8 για ορθή και πλήρη διερεύνηση αδικημάτων βίας κατά των γυναικών.
Πέραν από την δικαίωση της Χ και του αγώνα της, η απόφαση αποτελεί μια σημαντική νίκη για όλα τα θύματα βιασμού και εμφυλης βίας στη Κύπρο αφού το ΕΔΑΔ στην απόφαση του παρατηρεί «…ότι η παρούσα υπόθεση αποκαλύπτει ορισμένες προκαταλήψεις σχετικά με τις γυναίκες στην Κύπρο, οι οποίες εμπόδισαν την αποτελεσματική προστασία των δικαιωμάτων της προσφεύγουσας ως θύματος βίας λόγω φύλου και οι οποίες, εάν δεν ανατραπούν, κινδυνεύουν να δημιουργήσουν ένα υπόβαθρο ατιμωρησίας, αποθαρρύνοντας την εμπιστοσύνη των θυμάτων στο σύστημα ποινικής δικαιοσύνης, παρά την ύπαρξη ικανοποιητικού νομοθετικού πλαισίου». Από αυτή την κατάληξη απορρέει και η υποχρέωση πλέον του κράτους να αναλάβει αποτελεσματική δράση και μέτρα για να συμμορφωθεί με τις υποχρεώσεις του για προστασία των θυμάτων έμφυλης βίας.
Η ΚΙΣΑ νοιώθει περήφανη που για μια ακόμη φορά έχει διαδραματίσει ένα τόσο ουσιαστικό ρόλο σε αυτό τον αγώνα δικαίωσης της Χ και ανάδειξης των σημαντικών προκαταλήψεων και παθογενειών που επικρατούν και που η πολιτεία οφείλει να ξεπεράσει στο τομέα της καταπολέμησης της έμφυλης βίας στη Κύπρο.
Θέλουμε να εκφράσουμε την αγάπη και σεβασμό μας στη Χ για την τόλμη, επιμονή και συνέπεια που επέδειξε από το 2019 μέχρι σήμερα για την απόφαση της να πολεμήσει για την αλήθεια και την δικαίωση της η οποία τελικά ήρθε με την απόφαση του ΕΔΑΔ.
Επίσης, θέλουμε να ευχαριστήσουμε το τον οργανισμό Justice Abroad, όλους τους επαγγελματίες που ενεπλάκησαν στην υπόθεση και ιδιαίτερα τους δικηγόρους Nicoletta Charalambidou & Michael Polak, όλα τα οργανωμένα σύνολα και ακτιβιστές, ακτιβίστριες καθώς και απλούς πολίτες και πολίτιδες που συστρατεύτηκαν μαζί μας και συνέβαλαν καθοριστικά γι’ αυτό το εξαιρετικά σημαντικό αποτέλεσμα τόσο για την Χ όσο και για τα θύματα έμφυλης βίας γενικότερα.
Ο αγώνας συνεχίζεται!
Διοικητικό Συμβούλιο
Article can be located on archive.is by pressing here.
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The Cypriot art community has been shaken within the last week amidst reactions against the programming of Jan Fabre at the Cyprus International Theatre Festival.
With the organisers pulling every known move from the gaslighter’s hand book, what started as expression of outrage for the programming of an individual who has been found guilty for abuse and violence against 5 women from his dance company has somehow turned into a discussion on whether “cancel culture has gone too far”, on “whether artists can repent” and on “keeping an open mind and participate in dialogue”. Something very particular seems to have expanded into something “grey” and “complicated”. But is it?
This is not a matter of freedom of speech it is a matter of worker rights within the art industry
We don’t create art in a vacuum. It is an industry with an employer-worker relationship in place. While moral outrage over Jan Fabre’s continued recognition may be subjective, the foundation of this debate lies in objective realities about working conditions in the arts.
Unlike Renaissance times, the vast majority of artists do not enjoy the patronship of a Medici, they can’t just be taken care of and create art in a vacuum (although no art is ever created in a vacuum). The reality of today’s society is that an artist is more often than not also a worker, an employee or in the case of Fabre an employer who also receives money from a larger entity, in this case the Belgian government. With those benefits come responsibilities.
The Cyprus international Theatre Festival has been anything but forthcoming about Fabre’s problematic past. Initially when his participation in the lineup was announced the festival failed to mention any of the context surrounding him, perhaps hoping that no one would notice. Even when members of the Cyprus art community did notice, an orchestrated effort through identical press releases published in virtually every major outlet tried to convince otherwise; that this is about opening dialogue and freedom of expression. It is worth noting that this has been accompanied by jargon that significantly downplays Fabre’s record, shifting the discourse into more grey, “complicated” discussions about feelings and morality, which both can be subjective.
What is objectively a fact, is that his conviction was not a mere civil lawsuit seeking reparations but a criminal trial where guilt had to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that it was. Fabre received an 18-month suspended sentence and a five-year suspension of his civil rights, including voting and assembly, which remains in effect until 2027. Fabre is not just a “provocative personality”, he is a convicted criminal by the dictionary definition of the term. This doesn’t mean that individuals do not deserve a second chance, that is after all the purpose of a suspended sentence. But if CITF truly believes there is nothing reprehensible about its programming, why wasn’t there any transparency on who this individual is from the get go?
This case underscores systemic failures in the arts: blurred boundaries between creative expression and coercion, a culture of silence fostered by industry precariousness, and the lack of structures to protect workers. Unlike doctors or lawyers, artists face no professional oversight body; in the absence of regulatory deterrents, abuses persist under the guise of the “creative process.”
This issue extends beyond Mr Fabre; it is pervasive across artistic communities, including the Cypriot scene. The biblical saying, “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone,” feels particularly relevant. Boundaries in the creative process can sometimes be subjective, and rumors about colleagues—some of whom have spoken out on this case—circulate widely. Even I, as the writer, am not exempt from differing perceptions on my personal and professional integrity. This lack of a clear framework creates a vacuum, enabling behaviors like Fabre’s to take root in the first place.
Rather than debating Mr Fabre’s personal right to artistic expression, we should focus on the impact of his programming post-conviction—while he is still serving his sentence—on the industry as a whole. If a choreographer of his stature is found unfit to safeguard his employees yet continues to receive exposure that sustains his influence and power, effectively facing no real consequences, how can behaviors like his ever be denormalized?
No one can dictate to an Artistic Director, especially of a festival that is privately funded, what they can or cannot programme. Programmers, audiences and authors alike can celebrate and rejoice the privilege to “artistic expression” all they want. But it is the art workers who collectively have to bear the consequences by continuing to survive in an industry that resists any shifting towards sustainable, healthier and attainable expectations.
The lesson for the Cypriot art community
Fabre is just one piece of a larger issue, and while his art—undeniably compelling—is forever marked by the boundaries he repeatedly crossed, culminating in his conviction. The sold-out shows scheduled for next week are caught in the crossfire of debates that extend far beyond him or any single artist or artwork. That is, of course, if one chooses to prioritise the human factor over the final product, whatever that may be.
Whereas Fabre is a problem, the problem for the Cyprus art community is the vacuum that CITF claims to be filling. A vacuum created by the lack of long term, determined and achievable cultural policy on a state level.
A privately funded festival has found access to a municipal theatre with more ease than any other performing arts organisation or individual artist. With the exception of Diastasis and NEA KINISI when was the last time that Pattihio theatre was offered as an accessible venue for the presentation of any state funded dance performance? Almost 40% of Pattihio Municipal Theatre’s programming from now until October is promoted only in Russian, with no English or Greek descriptions.
This reality is deeply revealing—we are witnessing two parallel worlds on the island, especially in Limassol. In one, historically and culturally significant real estate with immense potential for thoughtful cultural development is steadily being acquired by private stakeholders. This was the case with old factories in Limassol, now housing commercial artistic spaces. These spaces, privately managed and accountable to no one, exert control over cultural affairs by monopolising venues, often offering them at “Russian prices.”
It is within this bubble that CITF finds its place—an event organised entirely by non-natives, seemingly indifferent to the withdrawal of the only native Cypriot productions from its lineup. Even their inclusion in the first place could be seen as decorative rather than integral to the festival’s programming. It does make one wonder if appropriating the name “Cyprus” and “International” comes from a point of audacity or from a point of reflecting a new state affairs on the island.
In a parallel reality, Dance House Lemesos remains without a home, struggling against Limassol’s hyperinflated real estate market—despite being one of the oldest and most dedicated organizations for contemporary dance in Cyprus. The city’s municipal theatre, Pattihio, lacks artistic direction, while in cities where municipal theatres do have leadership—like the Nicosia Municipal Theatre—there is little transparency. Questionable practices persist, such as programming young artists at festivals without a fixed payment fee, expecting them to rely solely on box office earnings in exchange for “exposure.” Just this past week, we learned that the Cyprus Youth Symphony Orchestra—one of the island’s most accomplished ensembles, with domestic and international recognition—has no fixed rehearsal space, and its academy’s budget for affordable, high-quality training has been cut.
The problem isn’t that “foreigners come and alter our culture.” It becomes a problem when private interests override collective needs, limiting the majority’s ability to shape its own future. Consider how MidBrain Ltd intervened in the redevelopment of the Limassol Municipal Garden playground without public consultation. If CITF did not carry a name suggesting it represents the collective Cypriot cultural community, perhaps the backlash wouldn’t have been as strong.
The reason private interests have taken over is because we, collectively, have not stepped up. Cyprus is overflowing with native talent, intelligence, and artistic inspiration. We don’t need to be “taught” culture—but we do need direction, not just in the arts but in governance. A recent poll from the Deputy Ministry of Culture identified the artistic community’s top priorities: increased funding and a legal framework for art workers. Both are essential, but as this case demonstrates, money and legality alone are not enough.
I wouldn’t waste more of my time discussing whether another problematic personality can or cannot express himself. I learnt a lot from his past work, but my personal ethics and logic push me to prioritise things that I deem more important than any kinds of art available out there.
But this is a time for reckoning for our community. Where are we heading at? What do we want culture on this island to look like in 10, 15, 20 years from now?
*Marita Anastasi is a Cypriot born and raised arts administrator and movement artist. She is currently Programming Coordinator at the English National Opera based in London.
Κριτική καταγραφή και σχολιασμός της κάλυψης της Ρώσικης εισβολής στην Ουκρανία από τη Δέφτερη Ανάγνωση. Γράφτηκε τον Απρίλιο του 2022 και κυκλοφόρησε σε κλειστό κύκλο. Δημοσιεύθηκε ανοιχτά τον Μάρτη του 2025.
Μπορεί να εντοπιστεί πατώντας εδώ.
Η πυρκαγιά που ξέσπασε τα ξημερώματα του περασμένου Σαββάτου, 15.02.2025 στη Λεμεσό, ξεκλήρισε πενταμελή οικογένεια με μικτή μεταναστευτική βιογραφία η οποία αποτελείτο από τους γονείς και τα τρία παιδιά τους ηλικίας 7, 3 και 2 ετών. Ακόμα μια ανείπωτη τραγωδία έχει συγκλονίσει ολόκληρη την κοινωνία θέτοντας με τον πλέον κατηγορηματικό τρόπο στο τραπέζι μια σειρά από σημαντικά θέματα για ασφαλή και αξιοπρεπή στέγαση, ως ένα από τα βασικότερα κοινωνικά δικαιώματα για το σύνολο του πληθυσμού της χώρας, στη βάση της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης.
Σύμφωνα με την ανακοίνωση του Τμήματος Ηλεκτρομηχανολογικών Υπηρεσιών, ενδεχομένως η πυρκαγιά να προκλήθηκε από βραχυκύκλωμα στην ηλεκτρολογική εγκατάσταση ή από βλάβη σε ηλεκτρική συσκευή που υπήρχε στον ενιαίο χώρο του διαμερίσματος, το οποίο μεταξύ άλλων είχε διαχωριστεί για τις ανάγκες της οικογένειας με φτηνά οικοδομικά υλικά.
Από τις προτάσεις και μέτρα της κυβέρνησης αλλά και των πολιτικών κομμάτων για τη στεγαστική πολιτική διαπιστώνουμε ότι για ακόμα μια φορά δεν γίνεται καμιά αναφορά σε μετανάστες και πρόσφυγες, σε αντίθεση με άλλες ευάλωτες ομάδες του πληθυσμού που αναφέρονται πολύ συγκεκριμένα.
Θεωρούμε ότι οι εκστρατείες που έχουν αναληφθεί το τελευταίο διάστημα από φορείς της τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης με επίκεντρο την έξωση, αν όχι την εκδίωξη, μεταναστών και άλλων ευάλωτων ομάδων από ακατάλληλα και μη αδειοδοτημένα υποστατικά όχι μόνο δεν επιλύουν αλλά οδηγούν σε μεγαλύτερους κινδύνους και εκμετάλλευση τα επηρεαζόμενα άτομα.
Η ΚΙΣΑ συμφωνεί ότι η μόνη αποτελεσματική απάντηση στο πολύ σοβαρό αυτό θέμα είναι η χάραξη ολοκληρωμένης στεγαστικής πολιτικής που να ανταποκρίνεται στις ανάγκες όλων των ομάδων του πληθυσμού, διασφαλίζοντας ιδιαίτερα το δικαίωμα των ευάλωτων ομάδων, όπως πολιτών με χαμηλά εισοδήματα, μετανάστες και πρόσφυγες, σε ασφαλή και αξιοπρεπή στέγη προσιτή στα οικονομικά τους δεδομένα.
Η συντριπτική πλειοψηφία των μεταναστών και προσφύγων ζει σήμερα στη χώρα μας στη βάση των πολιτικών της κυβέρνησης με καθορισμένα έσοδα που ανταποκρίνονταν στα δεδομένα της δεκαετίας του 1990, είτε από την εργασία τους (π.χ. οικιακές εργάτριες) είτε από κοινωνικές παροχές, και που δεν υπερβαίνουν τα €400 – €450 τον μήνα. Όσο το κυπριακό κράτος συνεχίζει να κρατά τα έσοδα αυτών των ανθρώπων καθηλωμένα σε αυτά τα ανεπαρκή επίπεδα οφείλει να προσφέρει ασφαλείς και αξιοπρεπείς στεγαστικές λύσεις που να ανταποκρίνονται στη σημερινή πραγματικότητα.
Ιδιαίτερα ευάλωτη είναι και η συντριπτική πλειοψηφία των μονογονεϊκών οικογενειών με μεταναστευτική βιογραφία που είναι αποκλεισμένη από κοινωνικές παροχές και υποστηρικτικές επιδοματικές πολιτικές (π.χ. επίδομα τέκνου), με αποτέλεσμα τα χαμηλά έσοδα από την εργασία τους να τις αποκλείουν από αξιοπρεπή και ασφαλή στέγη.
Θεωρούμε ότι τεχνικές, ηλεκτρολογικές και άλλες αναβαθμίσεις, συμπεριλαμβανομένων και αλλαγών χρήσης των υποστατικών, θα πρέπει στην περίπτωση ευάλωτων ομάδων είτε να διενεργούνται δωρεάν είτε με την ανάλογη επιδότηση, διαφορετικά οι βελτιώσεις και έλεγχοι που θα υιοθετηθούν θα παραμείνουν στα χαρτιά όταν οι επηρεαζόμενοι δεν θα έχουν την οικονομική ευχέρεια να καλύψουν το επιπρόσθετο αυτό κόστος.
Τέλος, θεωρούμε ότι καμιά στεγαστική πολιτική δεν μπορεί να επιφέρει τα αναμενόμενα αποτελέσματα όσο ο συστημικός και κοινωνικός ρατσισμός και οι διακρίσεις συνεχίζουν να υποθάλπονται και να μαστίζουν την κοινωνία αφού στο τέλος της ημέρας τα μέτρα που θα ληφθούν δεν θα βρουν την ανάλογη ανταπόκριση από το κοινωνικό σύνολο ώστε να μπορέσουν να επιφέρουν τα αναμενόμενα αποτελέσματα.
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